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Abstract
This thesis focuses on recent monetary and macroprudential policies addressing
the Financial Crisis.
Chapter1 stresses the role of central-bank communication. In particular, shocks
derived from movements in federal funds futures prices during monetary pol-
icy announcement days have become popular for analysing U.S. monetary policy.
While the literature often considers only surprise changes in the policy rate (“ac-
tion” shocks), we distinguish between action and “communication” shocks (sur-
prise announcements about future rates), using a novel decomposition of futures
price movements. Our results indicate that communication shocks are the main
driver of U.S. monetary policy shocks and that they explain a substantial share of
variation in production.
Chapter 2 turns to a macroprudential topic: How will a tightening in aggre-
gate bank capital requirements aect the real economy? We investigate this using
a narrative index of regulatory US bank capital requirement changes for the pe-
riod 1980M1 to 2016M8. Our results robustly suggest that a tightening in capital
requirements leads to a temporary drop in lending and economic activity. The ag-
gregate capital ratio and the level of bank capital increase permanently. Our results
suggest that permanently higher capital requirements have no lasting negative ef-
fect on the real economy.
Finally, Chapter3 looks at asset purchases by the ECB. Their declared goal is to
revive ination, but purchases of which asset will be best suited for this? I address
this question in a DSGE model with a role for three dierent asset classes: Govern-
ment bonds, securitised nancial assets and corporate sector bonds, which aect
the economy via dierent channels. I investigate the impact of asset purchases in
an environment of low ination and a policy rate at the zero lower bound. Pur-
chases of government bonds appear most eective in countering disinationary
episodes, while those of securitised assets have less impact.
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1 MonetaryPolicyCommunication Shocks and the
Macroeconomy
(joint with Robert Goodhead)1
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1.1 Introduction
On December 16, 2015, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve decided to
increase the federal funds target rate range for the rst time since June 2006. The
move came as little surprise to nancial markets, however. While in the previous
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting of October the target rate had
been held constant, policymakers had indicated that a rate rise was likely, subject
to a continuation of recent positive macroeconomic developments.2
Although this rate hike ocially marked the end of the zero-lower bound (ZLB)
period of monetary policy for the United States, it was the October FOMC meet-
ing that saw a revival in trading of near maturity federal funds futures contracts,
which are used by market participants to bet on future Fed target rates. The mar-
ket for federal funds futures, which began operating in 1988 and quickly became
deep and liquid, has been used extensively to identify surprises in U.S. monetary
policy and analyse their eect on nancial markets and the real economy. The
idea is simple: given that the prices of such contracts incorporate all information
available to markets, they ought to embody the market expectation of future pol-
icy rates. Changes in the futures rate during the course of FOMC meeting days
can thus be credibly interpreted as policy surprises, or monetary policy shocks.
Data from futures markets therefore provide the econometrician with a means to
separate the eects of changes in monetary policy from the underlying changes
in macroeconomic conditions to which policy makers respond.
Such a high-frequency identication approach has been used in several re-
cent VAR studies to examine the eects of changes in monetary policy rates on
macroeconomic and nancial variables (e.g. Barakchian and Crowe, 2013, Gertler
and Karadi, 2015). Moreover, we expect interest by economic researchers in the
federal funds futures market to increase in the near future, with the resumption of
the use of conventional monetary policy tools by the FOMC. However, we argue
that the majority of existing VAR research has not employed the informational
2The press release of the October meeting states that “[t]he Committee anticipates
that it will be appropriate to raise the target range for the federal funds rate when
it has seen some further improvement in the labor market and is reasonably condent
that ination will move back to its 2 percent objective over the medium term”. See
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20151028a.htm.
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content of futures data to the fullest: Given that the maturity spectrum of federal
funds rates spans the known dates of several future policy meetings, one can use
dierences in futures price reactions across the maturity spectrum to discern mar-
ket expectations about future monetary policy moves. We argue that these changes
in expectations are a response to communication by the FOMC and show that they
are powerful drivers of economic activity. In a recent contribution, Barakchian
and Crowe (2013, BC in the following) rightly point to the increased importance
of forward-looking elements in monetary policy, insofar as the Federal Reserve
(and other central banks) have made increasing use of forecasting when designing
policy. However, we argue that by aggregating futures rates movements across ma-
turities into a single factor, the authors neglect a fruitful opportunity to precisely
identify also the forward-looking component of the announcements as received
by nancial markets. If nancial markets are similarly forward-looking in their
judgment of FOMC communication, and given that Federal Reserve communica-
tion has become more detailed about its future policy course, markets should react
to announcements in a way that is reected systematically over the spectrum of
federal fund future maturities.
We propose a novel measure to obtain shocks from futures rates of dierent
maturities, using a linear decomposition of daily futures price movements in com-
bination with an institutional arrangement: Since 1994, the FOMC has published
its meeting days well in advance, so that market participants know the dates of the
future meetings that make up the routine functioning of the FOMC.3 This allows us
to resolve the dating discrepancy resulting from the fact that futures prices dened
over calendar months represent expectations about meetings that are not them-
selves monthly. We therefore transform the diering maturities of monthly federal
funds funds rates (reecting anticipated average target rates in future months) into
anticipated rates between any two future FOMC meetings covered by the usable
maturity range.
Since changes in the target rate tend to persist, surprise rate changes today are
likely to also aect higher-maturity futures rates. However, additional information
3The eect of unscheduled meetings (in ve out of 181 months with meetings in our sample)
is discussed in Subsection 1.3.1.
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about potential policy changes in future meetings should aect only future rates,
and not current ones. We are therefore able to employ a simple yet credible re-
cursive scheme to orthogonalise monetary policy “action shocks” (surprises about
the actual target rate decision communicated at an FOMC meeting) from mon-
etary policy “communication shocks” (information about potential future target
rate decisions taken at later FOMC meetings). Monetary policy communication
shocks are the linear component of observed variation that does not aect pre-
ceding maturities.4 Importantly, the action shock is based on central bank actions
that are directly observable, whereas the other shocks are based on central bank
communication and related expectation shifts regarding future policy actions.
In this sense our approach is in the spirit of Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson
(2005, GSS in the following), who oer a two-factor interpretation of monetary
policy surprises and convincingly argue that a “target factor” (an eect similar
across all maturities) and a “path factor” (increasing over maturities) are sucient
to explain futures rate movements on announcement days. They also orthogo-
nalise their shocks by placing restrictions on the rst maturity of the contracts.
Indeed, BC also nd that two factors explain most of the variation, but use only
the rst one (a “levels eect” similar to the “target factor” in GSS), reasoning that
“[s]ince the transmission of monetary policy is generally thought to occur via the
impact of short rate changes on longer term (real) rates, it is this portion of the new
information on rates that corresponds most closely to the relevant policy shock.”
(BC, p. 959). We argue that this interpretation may not be justied, since some
maturities react more strongly and consistently during FOMC meetings; these are
generally the ones at the upper end of the spectrum. This cannot be aligned with
the “levels eect” interpretation of BC, which seems to leave out important infor-
mation about how monetary policy shocks aect the economy. Instead, we argue
that communication shocks are at least as important as the actual level surprise.
While this is in line with the interpretation of GSS, our novel method of obtain-
ing the shocks allows for identication of more precisely dened monetary policy
4As these shocks represent changes in expectations that may or may not be accurate ex post
(i.e., news and noise shocks), and specically relate to Federal Reserve communication on FOMC
meeting days throughout our sample from 1994, we choose to label them “communication shocks”.
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communication shocks that pertain to given dates in the future, since we do not
apply a factor structure to the data. We are also able to extract monetary policy
communication shocks across multiple horizons. Additionally, our approach lends
itself to a hybrid VAR study, since within our Romer and Romer (2004) type spec-
ication, we need to be able to cumulate shocks meaningfully, and it is unclear
how to achieve this with the GSS path factor.
We will show that monetary policy communication shocks create signicant
contractions of industrial production, while pure action shocks do not. They also
explain a larger share of variation in both production and ination at business cy-
cle frequencies and can be better linked to narrative accounts of changes in the
monetary policy stance during the period. However, neither action nor commu-
nication shocks solve the price puzzle in our VAR models, i.e. with these shocks
we also observe an initial increase in prices after a contractionary monetary policy
shock, as in BC. We show that our principal ndings are robust to a variety of spec-
ications. We conclude that surprises in monetary policy communication matter
more for macroeconomic uctuations than surprises in the immediate conduct of
monetary policy.
We then extend our analysis to cover the ZLB period using Eurodollar futures,
which are available at longer maturities than the federal funds futures contracts;
importantly, the further forward contracts remain suciently liquid for analysis
during the period. We oer a decomposition of movements in the prices of these
contracts similar to the one used for the federal funds futures, and study the eects
of these shocks on macro variables using a sample that includes the 2008 nancial
crisis and recovery. The three Eurodollar-derived shocks we employ should be un-
derstood to be communication shocks regarding short-term interest rate changes
during the year-ahead period, orthogonal communication shocks during the two
year-ahead period, and orthogonal communication shocks regarding the three
year-ahead period. We nd the eects of longer-term Eurodollar-derived shocks
to be stronger for ination than for industrial production, with a price puzzle ob-
served only for the more short-term Eurodollar derived communication shock.
These ndings underline our key message that central bank communication has
signicant macroeconomic eects.
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The paper is structured as follows: Section 1.2 discusses related literature, Sec-
tion 1.3 outlines our methodology in detail, Section 1.4 presents our baseline re-
sults, Section 1.5 examines the responses of macro variables to longer-term com-
munication using Eurodollars data, and Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Related literature
Our analysis relates to the high-frequency identication literature, recent research
on forward guidance, and several other empirical papers on the subject of com-
munication by monetary policymakers.
High-frequency identication literature. The literature on identication of
monetary policy shocks employing high-frequency data goes back to Rudebusch
(1998) and Kuttner (2001). Söderström (2001) is an early contribution arguing that
movements in the federal futures rates around an FOMC meeting are a good pre-
dictor of target rate changes implemented in the following meeting. Faust, Swan-
son, and Wright (2004) were the rst to incorporate a structural shock series iden-
tied via changes in federal funds future rates into a VAR together with nancial
and macro variables. GSS aggregate the informational content of the futures using
factor analysis, and argue that two factors are sucient to capture the correlation
over the maturity spectrum. Analogous to the yield curve literature, they refer to
these as the “current federal funds rate target factor” and “future path of policy
factor”. GSS argue that the “path factor” reects soft information on future pol-
icy actions during FOMC meetings and is important for the analysis of the eects
of monetary policy on asset prices. They perform an orthogonalisation of their
shocks similar to ours, but do not use their shocks in a study of the macroeco-
nomic system.
Another decomposition of the movements in futures prices can be found in
Gürkaynak (2005), who identies “timing”, “level” and “slope” surprises. Like ours,
his decomposition omits a factor structure, and assumes observed variation to be
a linear function of three structural shocks. However, our restrictions separately
identify three shocks of a dierent nature: each has the same interpretation, they
merely apply to dierent future horizons. More recently, Swanson (2017) uses a
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factor analysis similar to GSS to distinguish between surprises in federal funds
rate changes, forward guidance and LSAP eects. Three factors suciently de-
scribe the dynamics of underlying high-frequency changes in various returns in
this sample. The factors are then identied by rotating them such that the forward
guidance and LSAP factor have no inuence on yields of short-term assets, and by
minimising the LSAP factor before the ZLB episode. While we nd this method
intuitive, we argue that based on the identication, one cannot rule out an alter-
native interpretation of the factors as action surprise, a non-crisis communication
component and a crisis-time communication component. In any case, Swanson’s
analysis shows the importance of monetary-policy communication for asset prices
during the ZLB episode.
Most closely related to our paper is Barakchian and Crowe (2013, BC in the
following), who show that for samples starting in 1988, monetary policy shocks
identied via widely used recursive schemes lead to signicant increases in out-
put following “contractionary” monetary policy shocks. In contrast, a VAR with
cumulated high-frequency shocks, computed as a single factor of the maturity
spectrum, yields contractionary eects on industrial production in response to
contractionary policy. BC suggest this might be due to a more forward-looking
monetary policy after the 1980s, under which policy rates react contemporane-
ously to, or even before, changes in economic activity.5 They estimate a two factor
model of the jumps across maturities of contract, stating that “in keeping with the
literature on factor models of the yield curve (...), the factors have a natural inter-
pretation as level and slope” (BC, p. 951). Then they opt to use only the rst factor
(the previously mentioned “levels eect”), which explains more than 90% of the
variance across maturities. We suggest, in contrast, that impulse responses to the
monetary policy shock used in BC may in fact be mostly driven by a communica-
tion component.
Other related papers from this literature include Thapar (2008), who also con-
siders only a single monetary policy shock within a novel empirical framework,
and Gertler and Karadi (2015). The latter use an instrumental variable approach to
safeguard against simultaneity in a VAR including both a monetary policy shock
5For a similar argument, see Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002).
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measure and credit costs. However, the authors note that in the case that no fur-
ther nancial variables are considered, a recursive VAR such as the one we employ
is appropriate for an analysis of monetary policy shocks. Lakdawala (2016) uses
their methodology in conjunction with the two GSS shocks to distinguish between
federal funds rate and forward guidance shocks. The author nds the expected re-
sponse of industrial production to a contractionary federal funds rate shock, but an
expansionary eect for contractionary forward guidance communication, which
is rendered insignicant when controlling for the information set of the Fed us-
ing Greenbook and Bluechip forecast data. The dierences in the ndings of Lak-
dawala (2016) relative to our own could be explained by the shorter horizon of our
communication shocks (within six months as opposed to one year), or by the way
the external instruments approach includes data from earlier periods (the sample
for the external instruments begins in 1979). Finally, Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco
(2017) adjust the instrument in Gertler and Karadi (2015) to account for autocorre-
lation and central-bank information revelation. Using a Bayesian local-projections
approach, they nd univocally negative eects of a contractionary monetary pol-
icy shock. However, they do not identify the eect of communication surprises.
Forward guidance. Our paper also relates to a growing literature on forward
guidance, i.e. the deliberate steering of the public’s expectations by central banks
sharing internal forecasts or committing to longer-term policies. 6 However, in
our extension using Eurodollar futures we also nd an increased role of forward
guidance as a driver of macroeconomic uctuations after 2008, in particular for
ination. This strong eect, which increases in the horizon of communication, is
in line with the predictions of DSGE models, as studied by Del Negro, Giannoni,
6See e.g. Campbell, Evans, Fisher, and Justiniano (2012), Ben Zeev, Gunn, and Khan (2015), or
Nakamura and Steinsson (2016). Campbell et al. (2012) introduce a conceptual distinction between
“Delphic” forward guidance, or transmission of private information, and “Odyssean” forward guid-
ance, which represents explicit commitments to a future policy course. Our baseline communica-
tion shocks incorporate both forms of information. More closely related to our paper is Bundick
and Smith (2016), who use jumps in federal funds futures rates as measures of forward guidance,
employing them in a SVAR model, and nd their eects to be comparable to conventional mone-
tary policy shocks. However, they do not oer a comparative assessment of the eects of monetary
policy actions and communication about future actions on macro variables, since they do not or-
thogonalise action and communication shocks with respect to each other, as we do in this study.
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and Patterson (2016) and McKay, Nakamura, and Steinsson (2016).7
Othermeasures of central bank communication. Finally, there are two other
related papers with shocks to central bank communication: Neuenkirch (2013) uses
an indicator of monetary policy communication to distinguish target-rate from
communication shocks in a recursively identied VAR for the euro area. Although
the author’s setup and sample are very dierent from ours, he also nds an impor-
tant role for communication, in particular for the transmission of monetary policy
to industrial production. Hansen and McMahon (2016) use results from compu-
tational linguistics analysis to distinguish FOMC communication regarding cur-
rent economic conditions from forward guidance in a broader sense. They nd
no strong eect on real variables, which is in line with our Eurodollar analysis
focusing on forward guidance, but not with our baseline results for the sample
1994 to 2008: The dierence here might be explained by the fact that their com-
munication shock aims to solely capture central bank revelations about the state of
the economy, while we capture all central bank announcements that aect market
expectations regarding future monetary policy actions.
1.3 Methodology
This section introduces our data, and outlines how we obtain changes in antic-
ipated policy rates from changes in the price of futures contracts dened over
calendar months. We then present a Cholesky decomposition that delivers identi-
cation of monetary policy action and communication shocks. Finally, we explain
how we incorporate our shocks into a structural VAR model in order to examine
their eect on macroeconomic variables.
1.3.1 Data
Federal funds futures contracts were introduced on October 3, 1988, by the Chicago
Board of Trade, and are the most widely used futures contract tied to the federal
7These papers address the so-called “forward guidance puzzle”, an observed tendency for im-
plausibly large eects of monetary-policy news shocks in the standard New Keynesian framework.
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funds rate.8 The use of these futures limits our sample to the period before the
ZLB, since trading in the shorter maturity contracts eectively ceased at the onset
of this period.9
Federal funds futures contracts allow market participants to place a bet in
month t on the average eective federal funds rate during the concurrent or fu-
ture months, denoted by r¯t+m, with m ≥ 0.10 A buyer of the contract on day d
in month t can commit to borrow federal funds at a xed rate at the end of the
month t+m, and we denote this futures rate by f (m)d,t . Under no arbitrage, we have
that the futures rate f (m)d,t reects the market expectations of the average eective
federal funds rate r¯t+m:
f
(m)
d,t = Ed,t[r¯t+m] + δ
(m)
d,t , ∀m ∈ H,
where δ(m)d,t is a risk-premium term, andH denotes the set of available maturities of
contracts. Since Kuttner (2001), authors have argued that the jumps in the federal
funds futures market observed on FOMC meeting days capture a surprise compo-
nent of monetary policy, and that one can use these surprises to identify monetary
policy shocks. As the futures rate can be expected to incorporate all information
available to the markets, a change in the futures rate over a small time window
around FOMC statements should reect changes in market expectations about fu-
ture policy, i.e. policy “surprises”. Assuming no change in the risk-premium δ(m)d,t
for that short time window,11 a policy surprise can be computed as the dierence
in the futures rate at the end of the FOMC meeting day from that at the end of the
8See Moore and Austin (2002). In principle our method can be applied to any country where
futures contracts relating to monetary policy variables are traded. We follow the majority of the
literature and focus on the federal funds futures market in the U.S.
9We examine the ZLB period using Eurodollar futures in Section 1.5. However, our short base-
line sample makes the likelihood of structural breaks in the transmission of monetary policy less
likely (see e.g. Boivin and Giannoni, 2006 and D’Amico and Farka, 2011).
10The time index t here is at monthly frequency, reecting the denition of the underlying of
the contract as a monthly average (we use a bar in our notation to emphasise this). Throughout
we let t refer to the month, which is the frequency of our VAR, and we let d denote the particular
day in given month t.
11Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) have shown that the risk-premium in the federal funds futures
market is sizeable and time-varying, but only at business-cycle frequencies.
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previous day,
∆f
(m)
d,t ≡ f (m)d,t − f (m)d−1,t = ∆Ed,t[r¯t+m], m > 0.
Note that for contracts on the current month, agents will already have observed
a component of the realization of Ed,t[r¯t+m], because d − 1 days of that month
(whose length isM days) have already elapsed. We follow Kuttner (2001) in scaling
the futures rate for the concurrent month, ∆f (0)d,t , up by the ratio of number of days
in the month, M , over the number of days remaining after the meeting, M − (d−
1).12 Thus we obtain a “corrected” measure ∆f ∗(0)d,t :
∆f
∗(0)
d,t =
M
M − (d− 1) ·∆f
(0)
d,t .
One issue with this correction is that the scaling factor becomes very large
at the end of the month (up to 31 for M = d = 31). We therefore again follow
Kuttner (2001) and use the change in the futures rate of next month (∆f (1)d,t in
place of ∆f ∗(0)d,t ) for meetings on the last three days of a month (see Kuttner, 2001,
p. 529f).
Although federal funds funds contracts are now available for maturities as far
as three years into the future, only the rst six maturities of futures are considered
liquid enough to be treated as ecient nancial markets over our time-period (see
BC, p. 959). We use daily changes in futures rates around FOMC dates for the
maturities m ∈ {0, 5}. GSS nd that using intraday or daily data makes virtually
no dierence for the post-1994 sample.13
1.3.2 From futures rate changes to expected policy rate changes
The federal funds futures prices give us changes in market expectations about
policy rates on FOMC meeting days. In our analysis below, we are interested in
12We take into account that the overnight rate refers to the night after day d. See Hamilton
(2008), p. 378.
13“[F]or samples that exclude employment report dates, or samples that begin in 1994, the sur-
prise component of monetary policy announcements can be measured very well using just daily
data.” (GSS, p. 66)
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changes in expectations about: 1) the current policy rate, 2) the policy rate set at
the next FOMC meeting, and 3) the policy rate set at the FOMC meeting after this.
To analyse surprises regarding current and future rate decisions, we rst need to
extract measures of the market expectation of average rates within certain inter-
vals: between the current and the next FOMC meeting, between the next meeting
and the meeting after, and so on.
However, our six usable futures maturities are dened over calendar months,
while meeting days are unevenly spread out across the months in the maturity
spectrum.14 Although we are able to use six rate jumps that span the next six
months into the future (and therefore always at least three future meetings), the
futures contracts cannot represent six individual policy surprises, since there are
at most three further meetings during this period—monetary policy can change
at most another three times. To obtain average rates expected by the markets be-
tween meeting dates, we follow a linear extraction method. Similar methods are
used in GSS and Gürkaynak (2005), however, we add an iterative weighted aver-
aging procedure to reduce noise and use all available information.
Let ∆ρjd,t, j ∈ {0, I, II} denote the change in the expected rate for the jth
future meeting, taking place in month t+m(j) (here the exact month of the future
meeting will vary, which is whym is a function of j).15 Recall that the expectation
revision always occurs during the contemporaneous meeting indexed by day d
and month t. Thus,
∆ρjd,t = ∆Ed,t[r¯t+m(j)].
We can create up to three such anticipated rates: from the current meeting to the
next, ∆ρ0d,t, from the next to the one after that, ∆ρId,t, and from this (third) meeting
to the fourth, ∆ρIId,t (the construction of ∆ρIIId,t would require longer maturities).
14FOMC meetings take place roughly every six weeks, usually in late January, April, July and
October and mid March, June, September and December. The meetings for late July and October
often take place in early August and November instead.
15As the anticipated rate changes ∆ρjd,t are valid for the time between two meetings (on average
six weeks), we index them by Roman numerals (0, I, II) to dierentiate them from the monthly fu-
tures rate changes ∆f (m)d,t . We neglect the appropriate expectations operator to ease the notational
burden. Also note that our ∆ρjd,t notation would correspond tomp0,mp1, andmp2 in Gürkaynak
(2005).
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Figure 1 illustrates the timing with an example: the FOMC meeting taking place
on May 17, 1994 and the three meetings that followed (those of July 6, August 16
and September 27). The gure displays the ve calendar months into the future
from the month of the meeting, and the jumps in the futures rate for the contract
associated with that month, ∆f (m)d,t .
Figure 1: Illustration of the Conversion of ∆f (m)d,t to ∆ρ
j
d,t
t
May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov
17th 6th 16th 27th
∆f
∗(0)
d,t ∆f
(1)
d,t ∆f
(2)
d,t ∆f
(3)
d,t ∆f
(4)
d,t ∆f
(5)
d,t
∆ρ0d,t ∆ρ
I
d,t ∆ρ
II
d,t
Notes: The timeline shows the months May to November 1994, as labelled below the axis.
Above the axis are the days of FOMC meetings. The jumps in the monthly futures rates,
∆f
(m)
d,t , are indicated below the axis, above it are the jumps in expected federal funds rates
between meetings, ∆ρjd,t. Months without FOMC meetings are marked by a thick line.
To extract the anticipated policy rates changes ∆ρjd,t, we work iteratively for-
ward, starting with ∆ρ˜0t , which is simply the corrected jump16 in the futures rate
for the concurrent contract,
∆ρ˜0d,t = ∆f
∗(0)
d,t .
Since contracts are dened over average interest rates for calendar months, we
know the price of the futures contract for the month of the next meeting, f (I)d−1,t,
must be a weighted average of the expected interest rate carried forward from
the previous meeting, and that expected to be set in the next (indexed 0 and I ,
respectively),
f
(I)
d−1,t =
dI − 1
MI
Ed−1,t[r0] +
MI − (dI − 1)
MI
Ed−1,t[rI ] + δ(I)d,t . (1)
16The tilde notation reects the fact that these jumps are preliminary values and will subse-
quently undergo a weighted averaging procedure.
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Here dI refers to the day of the next meeting, and MI to the number of days in
the month of the next meeting. When we lead Equation 1, before dierencing, we
obtain the expression
f
(I)
d,t − f (I)d−1,t =
dI − 1
MI
·∆ρ˜0d,t +
MI − (dI − 1)
MI
·∆ρ˜Id,t,
where ∆ρ˜jd,t = Ed,t[rj] − Ed−1,t[rj], and we assume the risk premium does not
change within the meeting day (∆δ(I)d,t = 0). Therefore:
∆ρ˜Id,t =
MI
MI − (dI − 1)
(
[f
(I)
d,t − f (I)d−1,t]−
dI − 1
MI
·∆ρ˜0d,t
)
. (2)
We can derive a similar expression for ∆ρ˜IId,t. Because the futures rate jumps are
likely to be noisy, and since such noise could be weighted up by the scaling terms,
we utilise the extra information represented by changes in futures rates for calen-
dar months without meetings. Thus, if there is no meeting in the month following
the meeting, we create a nal version of ∆ρ0d,t by taking a weighted average of this
measure with the jump in the next month’s futures rate, as follows:
∆ρ0d,t =
M0 − (d0 + 1)
M0 − (d0 + 1) +M1 ·∆ρ˜
0
d,t +
M1
M0 − (d0 + 1) +M1 ·∆f
(1)
d,t .
We are therefore using the fact that the jump in the price of next month’s contract
is an equally valid measure of the surprise for the case that there is no meeting
next month (since a single target rate will hold over the whole period). We employ
the same strategy to create ∆ρId,t and ∆ρIId,t, whenever there is no meeting in the
month following a given meeting.17 This approach ensures that the futures rate
changes that occur towards the end of the month (with higher d) will get a smaller
weighting in the convex combination.
As mentioned by Gürkaynak (2005), a potential limitation of this method is the
possibility of rate changes during unscheduled meetings. The FOMC can deviate
17In the case that there is a meeting next month we do not perform the weighting. Further,
we perform this operation during the iterative extraction, in the sense that where appropriate the
weighted version of the previous surprise is used to extract the next, which then may be weighted,
etc.
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from its published meeting schedule if circumstances require it and has done so
seven times in our sample.18 If markets were to incorporate an endogenous prob-
ability of emergency meetings into their pricing, this could be problematic for our
identication scheme. However, given that we take dierences of futures prices
on meeting days, the occurrence of unscheduled meetings will only bias our shock
measures when the market expectations about the likelihood of an unscheduled
meeting are changed on account of news delivered during the day of the previous
(scheduled) FOMC meeting. From inspection of the minutes, the committee has
never mentioned unscheduled meetings during the meetings that preceded them.
Therefore, we do not believe that unscheduled meetings present a serious concern.
1.3.3 From expected policy rate changes to structural shocks
Given the surprises in the policy rates, ∆ρjd,t, we want to obtain the structural
shocks that generate these changes in expectations. We know that target rate
changes by the Fed are highly persistent (shown in Coibion and Gorodnichenko,
2012, for example), and therefore that any rate decision communicated during the
FOMC meeting will also shift market expectations across the spectrum of maturi-
ties towards this rate. This is what GSS and BC refer to as their “target factor” and
“level factor”, respectively. Thus an unexpected policy rate change by the FOMC
will lead to an updating of expectations about the current month’s rate, but also
about future rates, as the rate is likely to persist: Without any additional infor-
mation about the FOMC’s future course of policy action, markets can take the set
policy rate to be the new status quo. We will call these surprise announcements of
immediate policies “action shocks”.
We also aim to quantify the eects of an important second component to FOMC
meetings, namely communication about the future. We therefore posit the exis-
tence of orthogonal information about future policy changes contained within the
announcement. The central banker may reveal surprise information about a rate
change, and simultaneously deliver independent surprise information relating to
future policy. Additional surprise communication about potential policy actions
in these future meetings ought to aect all futures rates after the future meeting
18The dates were 01/03/2001, 08 and 17/10/2007, 01 and 22/09/2008, 03/11/2008 and 10/08/2008.
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(and associated expected policy move), but not rates before them. The six avail-
able futures contracts permit identication of two such monetary “communication
shocks”. We thus dene this communication as the linear component of the expec-
tations jump vector that does not aect the pricing of those futures preceding the
meetings to which they apply. Action shocks may aect all futures rates through
policy persistence, but the current rate expectations will not be aected by any
communication shocks. This recursive system motivates the use of a Cholesky
decomposition of the expectations jump vector.
Formally, the changes in expectations about the future monetary policy rate,
∆ρjd,t, j ∈ {0, I, II}, are decomposed into three orthogonal shocks: surprises
about monetary decisions today (the action shock, εAd,t), the decision at the next
meeting (termed a “near communication shock”, εNCd,t ) and the decision at the meet-
ing after this (termed a “far communication shock”, εFCd,t ) as follows:
∆Rd,t ≡
∆ρ
0
d,t
∆ρId,t
∆ρIId,t
 =
m11 0 0m21 m22 0
m31 m32 m33
 ·
 ε
A
d,t
εNCd,t
εFCd,t
 = M · Ed,t. (3)
The shocks εjd,t, j ∈ {A, NC, FC}, are orthogonal to each other by construc-
tion. We obtain M as the lower Cholesky decomposition of var(∆Rd,t), M =
chol (var(∆Rd,t)). Rearranging, we obtain the expression for the vector of struc-
tural shocks:
Ed,t = M
−1 ·∆Rd,t.
Note that these operations are conducted at the frequency of the meetings,
in the sense that we extract structural shocks from a jump vector with observa-
tions only on meeting days. Because we restrict our analysis to days with sched-
uled meetings only, there is never more than one meeting per month, meaning
that we can drop the d subscript from our shock series. We enter a zero value to
the shock series for the months without meetings, as in BC. Because of concerns
about outliers in the series, we winsorise the expectation revisions series at 1%
before extracting our shock series. The main results are qualitatively robust to not
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winsorising.19
Figure 2: Shock Series
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Notes: The gure displays the three shocksSjt , j ∈ {A,NC,FC} – dubbed “Action”, “Near
Communication” and “Far Communication” shock, respectively. We also display the shock
series of Barakchian and Crowe (2013), formed of the rst principal component of the six
federal funds rate maturities, for reference. The R2 from regressions of the BC shock on
the Action, Near Communication and Far Communication shocks respectively are: 0.358,
0.144, 0.187.
Figure 2 shows the action shock series, the near and far communication shock
series, as well as the BC shock series (the rst factor) to serve as a basis for com-
parison.20 There is evidence of increased volatility of the shock series around the
19The response of industrial production to the action shock diers slightly. There is an outlier
on 15/10/1998, when the Federal Reserve released a statement after the close of the federal funds
futures market, meaning that the end of the next day’s futures price needs to be used. This generates
a very large (10 standard deviation) action shock.
20For a discussion of correlations between our shock series and other series available in the
literature, see Appendix Section A.1. To summarize, our action shock is signicantly positively
correlated with both factors in BC and the rst GSS factor. Our communication shocks are posi-
tively correlated with only the rst BC factor and the second GSS factor. All our shocks are posi-
tively correlated with the shock of Nakamura and Steinsson (2016), and both action and the rst
communication shock with an updated Romer and Romer (2004) shock series. We conclude from
this investigation that our shocks capture information from all these existing shock series, but that
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2001 period, after the bursting of the dotcom bubble and the events of September
11. We also see increased volatility in the run-up to the nancial crisis. The rela-
tionship of the BC factor shock and our shocks varies: some BC factor shocks are
simply “split” into several smaller shocks of equal sign by our decomposition (like
the monetary tightening and then easing around 2001), indicating that action and
communication surprises were closely aligned at that time. For other episodes, to
the contrary, our shock decomposition reveals some counteracting movements in
monetary policy: With the onset of the Financial Crisis in 2007, surprise action
and short-term communication have an easing eect, while medium-term com-
munication about a quarter into the future seems to have mostly underwhelmed
market expectations.
Finally, we cumulate the shocks over time to form a time series of policy sur-
prises in levels, as in BC and Romer and Romer (2004).21 We thus attain three
monthly time-series in levels, Sjt , j ∈ {A,NC, FC} where:
Sjt =
t∑
i=0
εjt , j ∈ {A,NC, FC}.
1.3.4 Baseline VAR setup
We want to gauge the eect of our three measures of policy surprises on (sea-
sonally adjusted) monthly industrial production (IP) and consumer price ination
(CPI). As we wish to understand the eect of all three shocks, we specify the fol-
they are not reducible to any of them. Furthermore, the “level factor” interpretation of BC regarding
their shock may be questioned, given its signicant positive correlation with our communication
shocks.
21Note that these series are I(1) by construction, and will be entered directly into the VAR in
this form. The specication also matches the treatment of the federal funds rate and macroeco-
nomic variables in the monetary policy shock literature, including BC, whereby all variables are
commonly entered in levels. Further, the argument of Sims, Stock, and Watson (1990) should hold,
insofar that “the OLS estimator is consistent whether or not the VAR contains integrated compo-
nents, as long as the innovations in the VAR have enough moments and a zero mean, conditional
on past values of [the vector of endogenous variables]” (p. 113).
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lowing structural VAR:
Yt ≡

log(IPt)
log(CPIt)
SAt
SNCt
SFCt
 = Cc + Cd · t+
lags∑
l=1
ClYt−l + D · t (4)
We estimate the model with a constant Cc and a deterministic trend Cd, using
twelve lags in our baseline model.22 As in Romer and Romer (2004) and BC, the
VAR is recursive, so that monetary policy surprises cannot aect IP and CPI in the
same period (but are allowed to react to them). One feature of this specication is
that the unanticipated shocks are allowed to respond endogenously to variables
in the VAR. This results in a loss of eciency if the jumps are indeed orthogo-
nal to macroeconomic variables. However, to the extent that the jumps represent
endogenous information revelation on the part of the central banker, the specica-
tion allows us to control for this by orthogonalising the jumps with respect to (at
least part of) their information set. We need to make the assumption that markets
do not observe the monthly observations on industrial production and ination in
real time, which we nd to be plausible. This argument is also made in Bundick
and Smith (2016).
1.4 Results
Here we present the main ndings of our VAR analysis.23 We trace the dynamic
eect of our shocks on the monthly aggregates of IP and CPI, using impulse re-
sponses as well as historical and forecast-error variance decompositions. The main
conclusion we draw from our analysis is that monetary policy aects production
through surprises in communication about future policy decisions, as much as sur-
22The Bayesian information criterion proposes one lag, and the likelihood ratio test 14. We settle
for twelve lags as in Faust et al. (2004). We show that our results are robust to dierent numbers
of lags in Section 1.4.2.
23For the VAR analysis, we gratefully acknowledge the use of code from the VAR toolbox of
Ambrogio Cesa-Bianchi, kindly made available on his personal website: https://sites.google.
com/site/ambropo/MatlabCodes.
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prises regarding the decision on the target policy rate itself. Moreover, we docu-
ment a price puzzle, i.e. the signicant positive response of CPI to a contractionary
policy surprise, for our shocks that the inclusion of commodity prices does not sat-
isfactorily resolve. However, when the local projection approach is used instead
of a VAR, we do chart a signicant fall in the price level in response to a contrac-
tionary far communication shock.
1.4.1 VAR analysis
Figure 3 shows the impulse responses to an action shock SAt , to a near commu-
nication shock SNCt , and to a far communication shock SFCt , respectively, on log
production and consumer prices. Throughout the structural shocks are 10 basis
points rate increases, unless stated otherwise (for a justication of this size see
below).
We see that the reaction of production (IP) to a rise in the (expected) inter-
est rate is negative at the 90% condence level only for the two communication
shocks. The size of the contractions is comparable, although the near commu-
nication shock displays greater signicance. The action shock, on the contrary,
displays a reaction of production which is instead positive with borderline signi-
cance (75% interval). The response does attain 90% signicance at the 17th horizon.
The reaction of ination (CPI) depicts the price puzzle at 75% signicance for the
action and far communication shock, and at 90% signicance for the near commu-
nication shock. For the near and far communication shocks, the median impulse
response is negative at longer horizons, although insignicant.24
24We are aware that the statistical signicance of our ndings is rather marginal. However, the
fact that signicance is retained over many robustness checks below makes us condent about the
results.
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Figure 3: Responses of log(IPt) and log(CPIt) to Our Shocks
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Notes: Impulse responses from our ve-variable VAR, including log(IPt) and log(CPIt) and
three cumulated shock series Sjt , j ∈ {A,NC,FC} – action, near communication and far
communication shock, respectively. The median response and condence intervals were
obtained from bootstrapping the VAR 500 times, the graph depicts the latter at 90% (red)
and 75% (blue shadow) signicance levels. Responses are shown to a 10 basis point positive
shock to the interest rate.
The increase in IP after an action shock (i.e. after an unexpected interest rate
increase by the central bank) and the CPI increases after all of our shock measures
are both puzzling. A likely cause is that our VAR misses one important aspect
of recent monetary policy: The fact that a forward-looking central bank might
react to forecasts or expectations of an economic overheating by raising rates –
implying the rate rise takes place simultaneously to, or shortly before, increases in
IP or prices. Apparently the VAR does not pick up the dynamics caused by forward-
looking monetary policy suciently for the action shock (a criticism that is voiced
about recursively identied monetary-policy VARs in BC).25 We will show below
25As might be expected from these analyses, and given the ndings of BC, our near communi-
cation and far communication shocks improve upon results that can be obtained from studying
the eects of contractionary shocks under the Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996) identi-
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that including commodity prices mitigates this problem.
In magnitude the eects of our shocks are large relative to the literature. Ramey
(2016) summarises existing estimates of the eects on industrial production of 100
basis points rises in the federal funds rate, and the maximum reported decrease
is typically less than 5% (from BC), and usually closer to 1% (Christiano et al.,
1996, nd 0.7% after 24 months). Our near communication shock would deliver a
negative 9.6% trough 19 months after the shock hits. However, a 100 basis point
increase far exceeds the standard deviation of our shock series (7.66, 6.36, and 6.66
basis points for the action, near and far communication shock respectively).26 Since
our shock series are measures of purely unanticipated changes in the federal funds
rate, they are small relative to the shock series employed in existing research that
does not use high-frequency identication. The stronger eect of our shock series
relative to that of BC is interesting, and could be explained by the fact that our
communication shocks are seen to have stronger, negative eects relative to the
action shock. To the extent the BC shock amalgamates all three shock series, it
would follow that their estimated eect should be smaller than ours.
To contrast our ndings with those from the existing high-frequency identi-
cation literature, we compare our shock responses to the ones from the single
factor used in BC, called a “level shock” by the authors. Figure 4 plots again the
responses from Figure 3, and contrasts each of them with the BC factor shock,
by superimposing the results from their 3-variable VAR system on those from our
5-variable VAR system. We see that the eects of the BC shock mimic the eects
of our communication shocks. While the signicance of the IP contraction for the
BC shock seems driven by the far communication component, the signicance
of the price puzzle is likely driven by the action and near communication shock
components.
BC make a very convincing case that monetary policy in the U.S. has become
more forward-looking after 1994. We believe that also central-bank communica-
cation scheme for our sample, which are plotted in Appendix Section A.2. Such a purely recursive
identication scheme, within a three-variable SVAR including log industrial production, log CPI,
and the federal funds rate, delivers a signicantly positive response to both industrial production
and CPI in response to a contractionary shock.
26This is why we choose to report our estimates in terms of 10 basis point rises.
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tion, and its reception by the markets, has become more forward-looking during
this time. This is reected in our nding that, in post-1994 data, it is not monetary-
policy surprise rate changes themselves, but rather surprise central bank commu-
nication about its future course of action that aects economic activity in the way
expected from a “monetary policy shock”.
Figure 4: Comparison to Barakchian and Crowe (2013)
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Notes: Impulse responses from our ve-variable VAR, including log(IPt) and log(CPIt) and
three cumulated shock series Sjt , j ∈ {A,NC,FC} – action, near communication and far
communication shock respectively (all in blue), together with the responses to the factor
(“level”) shock from Barakchian and Crowe (2013) in red, estimated in a 3-variable system
(thus identical responses are repeated across each row). The median and condence inter-
vals (at 90%, blue for our VAR and dashed red for BC) were obtained from bootstrapping
each VAR model 500 times. Responses are shown to a 1 standard deviation positive shock
to interest rates.
Table 1 depicts the relative shares of our three shocks in a forecast error vari-
ance decomposition of both macro variables at 12, 18, 24 and 36 month horizons.
As our VAR system is rather small, we are not interested in the absolute share ex-
plained by our shocks, nor the share relative to the two additional (non-identied)
shocks in the system. We therefore only show the relative contribution of our three
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monetary-policy shocks, standardised to add up to unity.27 The share of the near-
communication shock is usually larger than that of the action shock. At any rate
central bank surprise communication (understood to be the combined eect of the
two communication shock series) seems to have larger eects on both production
and ination than surprise actions at business cycle frequencies—we hold that this
is an interesting nding for the high-frequency identication literature.
Table 1: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition at Business Cycle Frequency
Horizon (months) SAt SNCt SFCt
IPt
12 39.47 53.05 7.48
18 40.80 44.25 14.95
24 40.59 37.73 21.68
36 34.58 40.02 25.40
CPIt
12 26.85 60.26 12.89
18 19.67 61.32 19.01
24 15.35 61.52 23.13
36 26.74 54.71 18.55
Notes: Relative contribution of our shocks to a forecast-error variance
decomposition of IP and CPI at the 12, 18, 24 and 36 month horizons
from our baseline 5-variable VAR. The identied three shocks are Sjd,t,
j ∈ {A,NC,FC}– action, near communication and far communi-
cation shock respectively. As we are only interested in the relative
importance of our shocks, we present the contribution of the three
shocks as a percentage of their combined contribution.
Investigating the price puzzle. We examine whether the inclusion of com-
modity prices is able to resolve the price puzzle, or the counter-intuitive reaction
of IP to the action shock. We suspect our VAR specication above might not ac-
count suciently for the role of central bank forecasts in their policy-making and
27The absolute size of the contributions is large in general. The near communication shock ex-
plains about 29% fo the variance at a 36-month horizon. However, this is likely due to our small
SVAR system, and in the same order of magnitude as in BC, who nd that their shock explains
around 50% of variance at a 24-month horizon.
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communication. As suggested by Christiano et al. (1996), we include commodity
prices in our VAR to correct this source of misspecication, since commodity prices
are strong predictors of future ination.
Figure 5: Impulse Responses of log(IPt) and log(CPIt) in a VAR with Commodity
Prices
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Notes: Impulse responses from our six-variable VAR, including commodity prices
log(PCOMMt), log(IPt) and log(CPIt) and three cumulated shock series Sjd,t, j ∈
{A,NC,FC} – action, near communication and far communication shock respectively.
The median response and condence intervals were obtained from bootstrapping the VAR
500 times, the graph depicts the latter at 90% (red) and 75% (blue shadow) signicance lev-
els. Responses are shown to a 10 basis point positive shock to the interest rate.
We can see that the inclusion of commodity prices (ordered rst in the VAR)
has a notable eect on the impulse responses: the reaction of IP to the action
shock is no longer signicantly positive (except just after impact) and seems to be-
come slightly contractionary, although insignicantly so, after around three years.
Moreover, the price puzzle is only borderline signicant, although we still do not
see the expected decrease in prices. It is notable also that the long-term response
of prices to the action shock does change from positive to negative, although it
remains insignicant. However, it must be emphasised that the price puzzle re-
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mains a wide-spread issue in existing monetary-policy VAR research and the high-
frequency identication literature, including BC and Thapar (2008).
We prefer to use the specication with commodity prices to examine the con-
tribution of our shocks to the historical variation of industrial production, since
the action shock in this case has no counter-intuitive expansionary eect. Given
the puzzling responses of prices, we choose to examine only variation in industrial
production.28
Figure 6: Historical Decomposition of log(IPt)
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Notes: Historical decomposition of log(IPt) in our 6-variable VAR, including the vari-
ables log commodity prices, log(IPt) and log(CPIt) and three cumulated shock series Sjt ,
j ∈ {A,NC,FC} – action, near communication and far communication shock respec-
tively. The bar plots are stacked, so their height above (below) the zero-axis represents the
cumulative historical contribution of our monetary shocks to industrial production above
(below) its unconditional mean. We also display the federal funds rate (right-hand scale)
for reference. Grey areas denote NBER recession periods.
In the historical decomposition shown in Figure 6, we can see that the action
shock has a strong counter-cyclical inuence on industrial production during the
boom prior to 2001. After this, however, we see that the share of production swings
28We discuss the decomposition of CPI for the Eurodollar case below.
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associated with action shocks is small and fairly constant over time, and does not
display strong systematic patterns during the Great Moderation and nancial cri-
sis period. This suggests that surprise rate announcements have become less im-
portant throughout the sample. On the other hand, the eects of the near and far
communication shock, i.e. surprise announcements about potential central bank
policies around one and three months into the future, seem to move in four larger
cycles over the sample: two dovish, from around 1999 to 2001 and from 2006 to
mid-2008, and two hawkish, from 1996 to 1998 and from 2002 to 2006.
The rst expansionary episode (1999-2001) coincides with the last phase of the
so-called “Greenspan put”, i.e. the conjecture that the Fed systematically eased pol-
icy in reaction to deteriorating stock market conditions during the period. The sec-
ond contractionary episode (2002-06) was one of unstable growth and several cor-
porate scandals involving American enterprises. Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan
himself, in testimony to Congress, hinted at the need for improved nancial reg-
ulation (see Greenspan, 2002). However, within a year his position seems to have
turned into strong support for nancial innovation.29
Generally we nd mixed evidence for the “monetary excesses” view of John
Taylor, who argues that monetary policy had remained too lax for too long and
contributed to an unsustainable housing boom in the U.S. during the period pre-
ceding the nancial crisis (Taylor, 2009). Between 2002 and 2006, the eects of
monetary surprises are predominantly contractionary in their contribution to uc-
tuations in industrial production, although there is some evidence of an expan-
sionary contribution after 2006. In the context of an emerging nancial crisis,
the expansionary contributions of all shocks from late 2007 capture appropriately
counter-cyclical policy statements. To summarise, distinguishing between central
bank action and communication shocks adds detail to our understanding of the
recent monetary policy history of the U.S., and our novel monetary policy com-
munication shocks seem well in line with common narratives.
29“Two years ago at this conference I argued that the growing array of derivatives and the related
application of more sophisticated methods for measuring and managing risks had been key factors
underlying the remarkable resilience of the banking system, which had recently shrugged o severe
shocks to the economy and the nancial system”, see Greenspan (2005).
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1.4.2 Robustness
Figure 7 displays the impulse responses of our standard 5-variable VAR (with
twelve lags), as well as responses for the same VAR with diering numbers of
lags (one, six and 14, the latter being the value suggested by the likelihood ratio
test).
Figure 7: Robustness Check – Dierent lags
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Notes: The graphs depict the impulse responses of log(IPt) and log(CPIt) in our baseline
5-variable VAR with 12 lags (median blue, 90% condence band in red), as well as VARs
with one, six and 14 lags (median response). The median response and condence inter-
vals were obtained from bootstrapping the VAR 500 times, the graph depicts the latter at
the 90% signicance level. Responses are shown to a 10 basis point positive shock to the
interest rate.
We can see that the responses mostly fall into the 90% condence bands, except
for the specication with one lag at certain horizons. Note that we cannot use more
lags (BC use 36), since we would have insucient degrees of freedom for our 5-
variable VAR.
We also estimate separate three-variable VAR systems, loading in one shock
at a time. We do this to respond to any concerns regarding the eciency of our
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baseline VAR: In our 5-variable system, the shocks are allowed to respond endoge-
nously to each other, when in fact these interaction eects should be limited, given
the shocks are orthogonal to each other by construction and externally identied.
Figure 8 displays the results, and we can see that our principal ndings are robust.
The price puzzle does become more pronounced for the action and near commu-
nication shocks, however.
Figure 8: Robustness Check – Separate 3-Variable VAR Systems
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Notes: Impulse responses of log(IPt) and log(CPIt) to monetary policy shocks, ob-
tained from estimation of three separate 3-variable VAR systems (displayed in consecu-
tive columns). Each of the respective 3-variable VARS contains one of the three cumulated
shock series Sjd,t, j ∈ {A,NC,FC} – action, near communication and far communica-
tion shock respectively. The median response and condence intervals were obtained from
bootstrapping the VAR 500 times, the graph depicts the latter at 90% (red) and 75% (blue
shadow) signicance levels. Responses are shown to a 10 basis point positive shock to the
interest rate.
Furthermore, since our shocks are identied outside the VAR system, it is not
necessary to estimate all interactions between variables as part of a VAR. In fact,
our analysis lends itself to the local projection approach of Jordà (2005). Under this
approach, we simply run separate forecasting regressions of our macroeconomic
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variables using the shock as a predictor, while controlling for lags of macroeco-
nomic variables. This approach avoids compounding potential errors, as can hap-
pen during the iterative procedure used to compute VAR responses.
Following Ramey (2016), for a given period t, we project future realizations
of the vector of macro variables Yt+q ≡ [log(IPt+q), log(CPIt+q)] onto its lags
(Y t−1, Y t−2, ..., Y t−l), and (respectively) the lagged value of our externally iden-
tied shock series, jt−1, j ∈ {A,NC, FC}. Therefore we estimate
Yt+q = D
c
j +
L∑
l=1
Dqj,lYt−l + 
j
t−1 + u
q
t+q, q = 0, 1, 2, ..., Q, j ∈ {A,NC, FC},
whereDcj is a vector of constants, and theD
q
j,l are coecient matrices for given
lags l, and horizons q up toQ, for the respective shock j. Here we include two lags
of the endogenous variables (L = 2), and we are loading the shocks into the es-
timation without rst cumulating them. Further, we mimic the VAR specication
insofar as we do impose the recursiveness assumption for our local projections
(insofar as the shocks are additionally orthogonalized with respect to contempo-
raneous and past values of the macro variables, and they do not aect the contem-
poraneous values of the dependent variable by assumption).
The results are displayed in Figure 9, where we see that IP has an insignicant
negative response to a contractionary action shock at longer horizons. We also see
evidence for the price puzzle for this shock. The results for the near communica-
tion shock are signicantly contractionary for IP in the short to medium term (and
also at horizons after around 3.5 years). The results for prices are signicantly pos-
itive at very short horizons. However, the far communication shock qualitatively
matches the eects commonly understood to result from contractionary mone-
tary policy, albeit at longer horizons than seen typically: we see a signicant fall
in industrial production and prices in response to the shock. This delayed impact
is interesting, and may reect the nature of the shock as a communication shock
relating to future policy. In this sense the local-projection approach is able to fully
resolve the price puzzle for the far communication shock only.
Overall, we believe our analysis is robust to dierent numbers of lags, and
34
changes in the number of variables included in the VAR. Under the local projec-
tion approach, dynamics of the communication shocks change, but sign and sig-
nicance for IP responses remains largely the same. Further, the local projection
approach is able to deliver a signicant fall in prices in response to the far com-
munication shock after roughly three years.
Figure 9: Robustness Check – Local Projection Approach
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Notes: The graphs depict the impulse responses of log(IPt) and log(CPIt) to contrac-
tionary action, near communication and far communication shocks under the local pro-
jection approach. 90% and 75% condence intervals were obtained using Newey-West stan-
dard errors. Impulse responses scaled to show the eects of a 10 basis point positive shock
to the interest rate.
1.4.3 The role of the central bank information set
One known issue with the use of high-frequency movements in futures prices as
measures of monetary policy surprises is that these movements may simply rep-
resent transmission of internal information to markets by the central banker (see
Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco, 2017, for a recent detailed analysis). For example,
the FOMC may reveal results of its private analyses regarding the state of macroe-
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conomic variables as it announces current and future policy. This would contam-
inate our measures of monetary policy shocks, understood in the conventional
manner as exogenous deviations from a policy rule. If the FOMC had a tendency
to reveal new positive forecasts regarding output and ination at the same time as
it increased interest rates, then this would likely bias our estimation of the con-
tractionary eects of policy towards zero, making our results under-estimate the
true responses. To correct for this, we follow Romer and Romer (2004) and BC, and
orthogonalise our shocks with respect to the internal information of the FOMC.30
Our proxy for internal information are variables from the Greenbook forecasts,
which are released ve years after their construction and therefore contain infor-
mation not necessarily known by markets at the time of central bank announce-
ments.
As can be seen in Figure 10, only the far communication shock retains a signif-
icant contractionary impact on industrial production, having been purged of the
informational content from the data releases. The near communication shock con-
tinues to display a marked negative eect on industrial production at the median,
though it is no longer signicant. This suggests that the eects of action and near
communication shocks are partially driven by information revelation, as much as
genuine surprise regarding policy. In the case of the action shock, information rev-
elation seems to explain most of the counter-intuitive expansionary eect on IP.
As the purging mostly aects the rst two shocks, the public seems to take the
information revelation mostly as a description of the current economic situation.
In contrast, communication about potential future policy actions seems to contain
less hidden information about macroeconomic dynamics: While the trough of the
contraction in IP after a far communication shock changes from around 8 percent-
age points in the baseline VAR and the one with commodity prices, to around 5
percentage points, signicance at the 90% condence level is retained. Thus we
nd that our key result, of the importance of FOMC communication about future
policy, is preserved when we control for contemporaneous information revelation
by the FOMC.31
30Similar orthogonalisations are also used in Gertler and Karadi (2015) and Ramey (2016).
31We include the same Greenbook variables as in BC, although like Ramey (2016) we use only the
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Figure 10: The Eects of Shocks Orthogonalised with Respect to Fed Internal In-
formation
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Notes: Impulse responses from our ve-variable VAR, including log(IPt) and log(CPIt) and
three monetary policy shocks. The shocks are orthogonalised with respect to Greenbook
forecasts: Sjt , j ∈ {A,NC,FC} – action, near communication and far communication
shock, respectively. The median response and condence intervals were obtained from
bootstrapping the VAR 500 times, the graph depicts the latter at 90% (red) and 75% (blue
shadow) signicance levels. Responses are shown to a 10 basis point positive shock to the
interest rate.
1.5 Covering the zero-lower bound episode
As discussed previously, following the start of the ZLB period during the nancial
crisis of 2008, our decomposition of federal funds futures movements into action
and communication shocks is no longer possible as these futures prices cease to
move. However, longer maturity interest-rate futures contracts which remained
Greenbook forecasts, while BC employ the dierence between Blue Chip and Greenbook indica-
tors. The variables are: (1) contemporaneous unemployment, (2) contemporaneous output growth
and its lag and rst two leads; (3) the GDP deator and its lag and rst two leads; (3) the dierence
between the output growth forecasts and their previous values; (4) the dierence between the GDP
deator forecasts and their previous values.
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liquid during this time, namely Eurodollar futures, can help us to analyse commu-
nication shocks during the ZLB period.32
Because the contracts are dened over quarters and not months, it is no longer
possible to extract expectations regarding particular meetings for these contracts.
Neither are we able to identify an “action shock” in this case, since the contem-
poraneous Eurodollar future embeds expectations regarding both the most recent
meeting and all future meetings within one quarter. Furthermore, the underlying
for the contracts is the 3-month rate on dollar-denominated assets held abroad, as
opposed to the overnight federal funds rate, which means the contracts are less
tightly linked to the policy decisions of the FOMC.
However, these contracts trade in highly liquid markets, and we still have vari-
ation in the Eurodollar contracts, including the shorter-horizon ED4 contract, dur-
ing the ZLB period. This means that although trading in federal fund rate futures
virtually ceased after 2009, markets were still prepared to speculate on changes
in 3-month interest rates one year into the future. Further, the pricing of these
contracts does move systematically on meeting days of the FOMC, implying that
market participants were updating their expectations for future shorter-term in-
terest rates in reaction to central bank communication.
We propose a similar linear decomposition of the Eurodollar contracts to that
used in our previous analysis. In principle, one could decompose variation across
the pricing of many Eurodollar contracts; we choose to use the ED4, ED8 and ED12
contracts (which represent contracts with horizon of one year, two years, and three
years out, respectively). This selection enables us to capture surprises regarding
market expectations in the medium and longer-term, in response to communica-
tion by policy-makers at the Federal Reserve, without using more contracts than
necessary.33 Thus, we assume the following representation of jumps in our Eu-
32Three month Eurodollar futures take as their underlying the 3-month dollar-denominated LI-
BOR rate. Unlike the federal funds futures contracts, these contracts are dened relative to the
interest rate prevailing on the third Wednesday of the expiration month, and are available across
quarterly horizons, for the next 10 years.
33We check robustness to alternative selections below.
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rodollar contracts on meeting day d in month t:∆ED
(4)
d,t
∆ED
(8)
d,t
∆ED
(12)
d,t
 =
k11 0 0k21 k22 0
k31 k32 k33
 ·
ε
NED
d,t
εMEDd,t
εFEDd,t
 = K · Ed,t. (5)
Here ∆ED(h)d,t is the daily dierence of the Eurodollar contract futures rates at
horizon h on the FOMC meeting day indexed by day d and month t. We call these
shocks “near ED shock”, “medium ED shock”, and “far ED shock”. It is important
to note that the “near ED shock” is quite dierent to the “action shock” discussed
previously. Given that the near ED shock represents the combined eects of all
FOMC communication regarding interest rates during the next year, it cumulates
the eects of action, near communication, and far communication shocks.
Figure 11: Eurodollar Shock Series
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Notes: The gure displays the three Eurodollar shocks Sjt , j ∈ {NED, MED, FED} –
dubbed “Near ED”, “Medium ED”, and “Far ED” shock, respectively.
The shock series are displayed in Figure 11, for our sample period covering
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March 1994 until September 2016.34 A striking feature is the marked shift in volatil-
ity from the near ED shock to the longer-term ED shocks during the ZLB period:
This suggests that before the Great Recession, markets were less likely to receive
important surprise information about monetary policy more than one year into
the future during FOMC meetings. However, with the onset of unconventional
monetary policy, surprise information about the potential course of central bank
decisions two or three years into the future became increasingly important. We
can also see a period of larger volatility of the medium ED shock following the
dot com bust, which is less clearly a feature of the far ED series. This suggests an
increased importance of medium-term information during this period as well.
Figure 12: Responses of log(IPt) and log(CPIt) to Eurodollar Shocks
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Notes: Impulse responses from our ve-variable VAR, including log(IPt) and log(CPIt) and
three cumulated shock series Sjt , j ∈ {NED,MED,FED} – near ED, medium ED and
far ED shock, respectively. The median response and condence intervals were obtained
from bootstrapping the VAR 500 times, the graph depicts the latter at 90% (red) and 75%
(blue shadow) signicance levels. Responses are shown to a 10 basis point positive shock
to the interest rate.
34We again winsorise the expectation revisions at 1% prior to the extraction of the shocks to deal
with outliers.
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We follow the baseline SVAR specication used in the above analysis, enter-
ing our three cumulated shock series at the end of a vector including industrial
production and CPI, with 12 lags. The impulse response functions are displayed
in Figure 12. The near ED shock results in a contractionary yet insignicant eect
on industrial production. However, the shock has a signicant contractionary ef-
fect on prices in the very short-term, before a partially signicant expansionary
eect 12 months out, and a longer-term partially signicant contractionary eect
48 months out. In this sense, the results for the near ED shock cohere with our
previous results; we would expect the near ED shock to be comprised of a mix-
ture of action shocks and near and far communication shocks, and indeed they
have contractionary eects on industrial production, while showing evidence of
the price puzzle.
The medium ED shock shows a short-run contractionary eect on industrial
production, which is insignicant, but leads to a partially signicant expansionary
eect later on. The far ED shock has a clearer contractionary eect on industrial
production, which is also partially signicant. In general, the result that responses
of industrial production are smaller and less signicant than in our previous anal-
ysis may reect the fact that Eurodollar movements are likely a noisier measure of
monetary policy stance than federal funds futures. We also see a swift and persis-
tent fall in the price level after less than a year for both medium and far ED shock.
Further, the medium and far ED shocks show signicant contractions to CPI, of
increasing strength. This would match the predictions of the New Keynesian liter-
ature regarding the eects of forward guidance at increasing horizons on ination
(Del Negro et al., 2016; McKay et al., 2016).35 We reach the conclusion that forward
guidance surprises at longer horizons have a stronger and more persistent eect
on CPI than on industrial production.36
35We should be careful in interpreting the results of the ED shock as forward guidance. First, as
pointed out in Swanson (2017), LSAP announcements might also drive the dynamics of Eurodol-
lar futures. Second, the far ED shock represents surprise communication that aects expectations
three years out, which is longer than U.S. forward guidance extended into the future. However,
as the shock is based on market expectations changed during FOMC meetings, it still captures
anticipation of the medium-term monetary policy stance by the public.
36Our results are robust to choosing dierent ED futures maturities ([ED4, ED8, ED18] and [ED4,
ED8, ED12, ED18]). FEVD analysis underlines the stronger eect on prices relative to industrial
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Moreover, historical decompositions of industrial production and CPI (see Fig-
ures 44 and 45 in Appendix Section A.3) show that from the announcements of
asset purchases and forward guidance in September 2012 onwards, all three ED
shocks have an expansionary eect on IP and CPI, speaking for an eect boost-
ing ination expectations even in the absence of movements in the federal funds
rate. Indeed, it is notable that the timing of these later expansionary contributions
almost exactly coheres with the timing of the FOMC’s explicit forward guidance
statements (2012-2015). These decompositions also give a clue about the relatively
muted eect of monetary policy on IP here: In the direct aftermath of the nan-
cial crisis (2009-11), the communication shocks had a strong stabilising eect on
ination (with the stimulating medium and far ED shocks more than outweighing
the contractionary near ED one), while all three are contractionary for IP. This
could perhaps be explained in terms of central bank communication contributing
to “anchored expectations” (Bernanke, 2010), thereby accounting for the “missing
disination” during this period. Moreover, the explicit long-term commitments
communicated under forward guidance after 2012 have a much more marked ef-
fect on CPI than IP. Both episodes partially explain the larger impact on ination
relative to economic activity in response to our ED shocks. Overall, our analysis of
Eurodollar futures supports our ndings regarding the importance of central bank
communication for the macroeconomy, especially at longer horizons.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the eect of communication surprises during
FOMC meetings on the macroeconomy, and contrasted them with surprises about
actual policy decisions. To distinguish surprise action from surprise communica-
tion, we use a simple Cholesky decomposition of changes within certain maturity
segments of federal funds futures contracts.
For our sample from 1994M3 to 2008M6, we nd that communication surprises
play a more important role in macroeconomic uctuations than action shocks.
Communication shocks lead to the expected contractionary reaction of industrial
production of communication shocks captured by ED futures. For all these results, see Section A.3
in the Appendix.
42
production, explain a larger share of variance in macro variables, and can be easily
aligned with the recent history of U.S. monetary policy. These ndings are robust
to various changes in specication. Moreover, while we nd that our all shocks
display signs of a price puzzle in our VAR systems, we are able to remove this ef-
fect for the far communication shock using the local projection approach. Overall,
our ndings emphasise the crucial importance of central bank communication (in
line with the ndings of Gürkaynak et al., 2005, for asset prices), and of forward-
looking information reception by market participants, even for the period before
the explicit adoption of forward guidance as a policy tool by the Federal Reserve.
In fact, our analysis suggests that researchers ought to think of “monetary policy
shocks”, of the type extensively studied in the literature, more in terms of central
bank communication rather than unanticipated rate changes.
Our baseline analysis based on federal funds futures is only meaningful before
conventional monetary policy hit the zero-lower bound, and these futures mar-
kets became illiquid. Therefore we use longer-term communication shocks derived
from Eurodollar futures to cover the period until late 2016. We nd a shift in the
volatility of the shock series to the longer horizons, suggesting a stronger focus
on long-term communication by the FOMC. Moreover, there are large eects of
central bank communication on ination, with the size of the eect increasing in
the horizon of the shocks, implying that forward guidance has indeed had a strong
inuence on price stability in the U.S.
Our analysis has shown the importance of central bank communication re-
garding future actions for the macroeconomy. However, it is likely that Fed pol-
icy has become gradually more forward-looking over the last twenty years. This
would imply an increasing role for our communication shocks–and a decreasing
role for our action shocks–within our sample. Indeed, this is partially reected in
the larger contributions of the communication shocks in the later part of our his-
torical decompositions (while the action shock yielded large uctuations in pro-
duction only in the pre-2001 part of the sample). Moreover, the Federal Reserve
switched to explicit long-term commitments under a policy of forward guidance
after the nancial crisis. Thus, a time-varying parameter specication, or one with
dierent parameter regimes for the periods before and after explicit forward guid-
43
ance, may represent a promising area of future research for the high-frequency
VAR literature.
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2.1 Introduction
Since the 2008 nancial crisis advanced economies around the world have intro-
duced new macroprudential policy measures. Among the most prominent macro-
prudential policy measures are bank-capital based policy instruments, like capital
ratios, countercyclical capital buers or leverage ratio caps. These policy tools
aim at increasing the resilience of the nancial sector to external shocks, so that
it can maintain its performance under adverse conditions. Policy tools might also
be activated to have a dampening eect on credit dynamics during buoyant times.
However, experience with capital-based macroprudential policies are limited, es-
pecially concerning the transmission mechanism of these policy instruments and
their eects on the real economy.
Identifying the macroeconomic eects of a tightening in bank capital regula-
tion is non-trivial. Bank capital is a highly endogenous variable that uctuates due
to a plethora of fundamental shocks. To identify the eects of bank capital regula-
tion one needs to separate movements in bank capital stemming from changes in
capital regulation from all other drivers of bank capital. Furthermore, not all move-
ments of the bank capital ratio that are exogenous to current macroeconomic and
nancial variables need be the result of capital regulation. Bank capital might be
aected independently of regulation by variables seldom available to the econo-
metrician, like changes in perceptions of bail-out probabilities or increasing in-
centives of counterparties to monitor and price default risk. An empirical analysis
that lumps together movements in bank capital due to bank-sector specic shocks
with those due to regulation might deliver inappropriate policy prescriptions.
We propose a novel strategy to address these pitfalls in identifying the real
eects of changes in bank capital regulation. Rather than identifying exogenous
changes in the aggregate bank capital ratio using statistical identication meth-
ods, we propose a narrative approach in the spirit of Romer and Romer (1989).
Specically, we create a narrative index of tightenings in US capital requirements
for 1980M1-2016M8, based on detailed readings of legislative documents. In par-
ticular, we identify six events where the US supervisory authorities introduced
and tightened capital requirements during that time span. There are two episodes
in the early 1980s, when numerical capital requirements where introduced, two in
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the early 1990s in connection with the rst Basel Accord, and two recent ones as
a reaction to the Financial Crisis. The stated purpose of the regulations and their
often lengthy introduction process both make it unlikely that they were set up as
immediate stabilization policies. Thus, we can take them to be exogenous to the
state of the nancial and business cycle at the date of their introduction.
With the exogenous CRI at hand, we assess the dynamic response of key macroe-
conomic and nancial variables to a tightening in capital requirements. As a bench-
mark, we use the instrumental-variable local projections approach as in Jordà,
Schularick, and Taylor (2015), treating the CRI as an instrument for the changes in
bank capital. Our main results concerning the business-cycle eects of a tightening
in capital requirements can be summarized as follows:
• The (permanent) tightening in capital requirements leads to a delayed but
permanent increase in the aggregate bank capital ratio (as prescribed by
the supervisory authorities). The sluggish adjustment in the capital ratio,
in turn, reects that regulatory changes of bank capitalization usually come
with a phase-in period.
• An unexpected tightening of bank capital requirements has a signicantly
negative short-run eect on total bank loans. Bank lending reacts to the
tightening in capital requirements already within the rst three months.
• The tightening in capital requirements leads to a signicant reduction in in-
dustrial production. Industrial production exhibits a hump-shaped behavior
after the tightening in capital regulation, reacting most strongly with a de-
lay of about one year and returning to the baseline value after around three
years. Ination shows a slow but persistent fall after the tightening.
• The federal funds rate drops signicantly after around one year following a
tightening of bank capital requirements. The reduction in the federal funds
rate is likely a response of the federal reserve to the reduction in industrial
production.
These ndings suggest that banks react to a regulatory capital-requirement tight-
ening in two phases: Initially, banks shrink their balance sheet while the level of
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capital does not change signicantly. The level of bank capital increases only after
some time, but then does so permanently. Once capital has been build up, banks
increase their balance sheet back to the pre-regulation value. Hence, our results
imply that even permanent increases in bank capital have only transitory eects on
overall lending and economic activity. The ongoing cost (of holding more capital
on the balance sheet permanently) therefore seems not to matter for the long-term
path of the real economy.
Our key results are robust to a battery of sensitivity checks. We show that our
ndings are not driven by specic subsamples, by single events in the CRI or by the
benchmark specication of the instrumental-variable local projection regressions.
We also obtain qualitatively very similar results when embedding the CRI as an
endogenous variable in a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) framework and
when using the standard local projection approach of Jordà (2005).
So far, the debate on macroprudential policies has been informed mostly by
ndings from empirical microeconometric studies and structural models. While
both approaches have their merits, we argue there is a gap in the literature inves-
tigating the dynamic macroeconomic eects of capital requirements empirically.38
Empirical approaches to assess the macroeconomic eects of macropruden-
tial policy are still limited, albeit a surge in contributions studying the eects of
changes in bank regulation at disaggregated levels (see, among many others, Ai-
yar, Calomiris, and Wieladek, 2014, Buch and Goldberg, 2015 and Jiménez, On-
gena, Peydró, and Saurina, 2017). Although such microeconometric studies on the
transmission of regulatory changes to credit supply provide a high level of econo-
metric credibility, they cannot disentangle the dynamic transmission of capital
requirements to the economy, nor account for general-equilibrium eects. Thus,
while such microeconometric studies often nd large short-run eects of capi-
tal requirements on bank lending, they necessarily leave open questions about
the transmission to the real economy and whether such changes to credit supply
are permanent or transitory. Evaluating the eectiveness of macroprudential poli-
38In general, our paper is related to a growing literature studying the macroeconomic eects of
shocks originating in the nancial market, e.g. Berrospide and Edge (2010), Elliott, Feldberg, and
Lehnert (2013), Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) or Walentin (2014).
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cies necessarily needs to take into account potential feedback eects between the
banking industry and the macroeconomy. Purely microeconometric studies based
on bank or even loan-level data are not able to provide estimates of these "overall"
eects.
As empirically identifying shocks to capital regulation is dicult, inference on
the macroeconomic eects of macroprudential bank capital policies to date stems
almost exclusively from DSGE models.39 Although progress has been made in in-
corporating features of the nancial sector into these models to make them suit-
able for the analysis of macroprudential policy issues, ndings often remain highly
sensitive to the specic friction included, shock considered or calibration chosen.
It is therefore often dicult to draw strong policy conclusions about the eects of
macroprudential policies on the real economy. Lindé, Smets, and Wouters (2016)
provide a thoughtful discussion about the challenges and shortcomings of cur-
rent macroeconomic models and an overview of recent advances to address these
issues.
There is one other paper investigating dynamic eects of capital requirements
on the macroeconomy: Meeks (2016) studies the macroeconomic eects of changes
in microprudential capital requirements for the UK. For identication purposes,
he exploits features of the UK institutional framework in which microprudential
supervisors operated. Supervisors did not respond directly to contemporaneous
developments in the macroeconomy. From these institutional arrangements, he
derives timing restrictions (e.g. zero contemporaneous restrictions) to identify the
macro eects of changes in microprudential regulation. Like us, he nds a short-
lived contractionary eect on economic activity. Dierent to us, he nds a strong
contractionary eect on mortgage lending and house prices, which indicates some
dierences between the US and UK.
So our paper is - to the best of our knowledge - the rst to assess the dynamic
macroeconomic eects of changes in aggregate capital requirements. Our narra-
tive methodology follows an established tradition in analyzing policy changes.40
39For example, Gerali, Neri, Sessa, and Signoretti (2010), Quint and Rabanal (2014), or Clerc,
Derviz, Mendicino, Moyen, Nikolov, Stracca, Suarez, and Vardoulakis (2015).
40Narrative approaches have been used to analyze e.g. oil price shocks (Hamilton, 1985, Hoover
and Perez, 1994), changes in monetary policy (Romer and Romer, 1989, Romer and Romer, 2004),
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The main results from our analysis – that a permanent tightening of capital re-
quirements leads only to a temporary drop in credit supply and economic activity
– lend strong support to the assertion of Hanson, Kashyap, and Stein (2011), Ad-
mati and Hellwig (2013) and Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig, and Peiderer (2013) that
higher capital requirements are not associated with substantial medium to long-
run costs for the economy. However, the transition period to a better capitalized
banking sector – about two to three years – is costly in terms of output losses.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2.2 we discuss in detail our
CRI. We motivate the specic dates we classify as periods of tightenings in capital
regulation based on legal documents and readings of the then contemporaneous
literature. In Section 2.3 we present our methodology, the main results about the
dynamic eects of a tightening in capital requirement and additional results in-
vestigating the transmission of capital-requirement shocks. We show the results
from a series of robustness checks in Section 2.4 and conclude in Section 2.5.
2.2 A narrative analysis of changes in aggregate bank capital
requirements
In this section, we discuss the key regulatory changes in bank capital requirements
in the US over the past 40 years. Based on detailed readings of the contemporary
legislative and academic literature, we argue that the motives and intentions for
changes in capital regulation were unrelated to short-run business and nancial
cycle considerations. Rather – the documents suggest – changes in capital reg-
ulation are usually slowly drafted and subject to lengthy negotiations between
bankers, politicians and regulators. The motives stated for the changes in bank
capital regulation are virtually always broad, long-lasting and structural in nature.
Furthermore, the regulatory changes are usually drafted such that there is consid-
erable time between the announcement of the nal rule, the date at which the rule
becomes eective, and the date at which the regulations nally become binding
tax policy (Poterba, 1986, Romer and Romer, 2010), government spending (Ramey and Shapiro,
1998, Ramey, 2011) or government asset purchases (Fieldhouse, Mertens, and Ravn, 2017).
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for banks.41 All these factors make us condent that we can consider the series of
capital-requirement changes as predetermined relative to other macro-nancial
variables. We present the key changes in US bank capital requirements in Table 2,
before discussing each of the regulatory changes in turn. The historical evidence
we present here draws on academic articles as well as “nal rules" published in the
Federal Register.42 These nal rules often include a detailed purpose and motiva-
tion, a background and an overview of the rule. We furthermore consider public
comments submitted in response to the proposed rule, and modications to it.
We aim at two objectives: First, to identify the exact date at which US banks can
be expected to have started acting on new regulatory capital requirements. Sec-
ond, by reviewing the historical documents, we want to understand the regulators’
motives and intentions of the changes in capital regulation. We nd no evidence
that they were driven by current business and nancial cycle considerations.
Table 2: Our Capital Requirement Index (CRI)
Date Change
Dec. 1981 FDIC, Fed and OCC set numerical guidelines for CR
Dec. 1983 International Lending and Supervision Act passed
Apr. 1985 Common CR guidelines by FDCI, Fed and OCC for all banks
Dec. 1990 Basel I eective
Dec. 1991 FDIC Improvement Act passed
Dec. 1992 Prompt Corrective Action eective
Jan. 1997 Market Risk Amendment eective
Apr. 2008 Basel II eective
Dec. 2013 Basel II.5 eective
Dec. 2014 Basel III eective
Note: CR = capital requirement(s); FDIC = Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration; Fed = Federal Reserve System; OCC = Oce of the Comptroller of the
Currency. There was no aggregate easing of capital requirements during the
sample.
41The rst two points are also mentioned in Fieldhouse et al. (2017) as indicators of structural
changes when distinguishing between cyclical and non-cyclical portfolio activity of US housing
agencies.
42The Federal Register is the daily ocial journal of the US government, publishing government
agency rules, rule proposals and public notices.
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Dec. 1981: Regulatory agencies set numerical guidelines. From the 1930s
up to the early 1980s, bank supervisors had relied solely on case-by-case decisions
when judging banks’ capital adequacy. No numerical prescriptions existed about
adequate aggregate bank capital ratios.43 However, a series of banking failures
in the 1970s and early 1980s, together with historically low capital ratios, made
supervisors rethink the issue. In December 1981, the three supervisory agencies
in the US, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Federal Reserve
System (Fed), and the Oce of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), for the
rst time announced explicit numerical capital adequacy ratios. The targets varied
across the agencies and for dierent types of banks, but were mostly between
ve and six percent.44 The FDIC’s motives for introducing numerical bank capital
guidelines are stated in the respective statement of policy (Federal Register/Vol.
46, No. 248/Dec. 28, 1981, p. 62693).
This policy statement is intended to clearly set forth qualitative criteria
to be considered in determining adequacy of bank capital, to inject more
objectivity and consistency into the process of determining capital ade-
quacy, to provide nonmember banks with clearly dened goals for use
in capital and strategic planning and to address the issue of disparity in
capital levels among banks in dierent size categories by adopting uni-
form standards regardless of the size of the institution.
Hence, the 1981 change in capital regulation seems not to have been a response to
short-run cyclical developments in the US, but motivated by low frequency con-
siderations. The announcement published in the Federal Reserve Bulletin makes
this assertion even more poignantly (Federal Reserve Bulletin/Vol. 68, No.1/Jan.
1982, p. 33):
43The regulatory capital prescription for individual banks within the scope of “Regulation ABC”
are found to have been largely ineective by Peltzman (1970), Dietrich and James (1983) and Marcus
(1983).
44For banks supervised by Fed and the OCC “[a] minimum level of primary capital to total assets
is established at 5 percent for regional organizations and 6 percent for community organizations.
Generally, regional and community banking organizations are expected to operate above the min-
imum primary capital levels." (Federal Reserve Bulletin/Vol. 68, No.1/Jan. 1982, p. 34) The FDIC
instead imposed “a threshold capital-to-assets ratio of 6 percent and a minimum ratio of 5 percent."
(FDIC, 2003)
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Objectives of the capital adequacy guidelines program are to address the
long-term decline in capital ratios, particularly those of the multina-
tional group; introduce greater uniformity, objectivity, and consistency
into the supervisory approach for assessing capital adequacy; provide
direction for capital and strategic planning to banks and bank holding
companies and for the appraisal of this planning by the agencies; and
permit some reduction of existing disparities in capital ratios between
banking organizations of dierent size.45
The 1981 capital standard changes are generally thought to have had a palpable
eect on the nancial industry: Keeley (1988) and Wall and Peterson (1987, 1988)
nd that the capital ratios were largely binding for banks.
Apr. 1985: Harmonization of capital requirements. These changes are the
result of the International Lending Supervision Act (ILSA) passed by Congress in
1983 in a reaction to the less developed country debt crisis of 1982. Although the
legislative action responded to an immediate banking crisis, the motive for the
ILSA was generally long-term, as argued by Smith (1984), pp. 425f.:
When Congress responded to the debt crisis with legislation in 1983, it
sought not only to address the immediate liquidity problems of the dis-
tressed debtor countries but also to adopt long-range structural reforms
for the international nancial system. The International Lending Super-
vision Act of 1983, passed as part of the debt crisis package, imposes new
controls on foreign lending that are aimed at preventing a recurrence of
the debt buildup.
The ILSA of 1983 species that each “appropriate Federal Banking Agency shall
cause banking institutions to achieve and maintain adequate capital by establish-
ing minimum levels of capital" (Public Law 98-181 – Nov. 30, 1983, Sec. 908, a 1).
45Note that despite the will to “address the long-term decline in capital ratios, particularly those
of the multinational group", no minimum capital requirements were imposed for them: “Capital
guidelines for the relatively small number of multinational organizations will continue to be for-
mulated and monitored on an individual basis (...)” (Federal Reserve Bulletin/Vol. 68, No.1/Jan. 1982,
pp. 33f.)
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It was, however, not until March 1985 that the regulatory agencies issued a nal
ruling with regard to capital adequacy requirements. The new minimum capital
standards were set uniformly at 5.5 percent for the ratio of primary capital to as-
sets. In general, the new standards increased capital requirements for larger banks,
while they reduced them for smaller banks.46
On March 19, the FDIC announced the nal ruling and stated the motives for
the tighter capital requirement (Federal Register/Vol. 50, No. 53/Mar. 19, 1985, p.
11128):
Several factors have, however, emerged over the past few years which are
accentuating the potential demands on bank capital. The deregulation of
interest rates on bank liabilities together with a weakening of loan port-
folios brought about by shocks in the domestic and world economy have
caused a decline in bank protability and increased levels of risk within
the system. The competition for nancial services has intensied on both
an intra-industry and inter-industry basis, placing additional pressures
on bank protability. Further, because of the growing interdependency
within the system, problems in one institution can have repercussions on
other institutions arguing for stronger capital levels in both individual
banks and the system as a whole. Increasing levels of o-balance sheet
risks are also a factor in the need for higher capital.
The excerpt from the nal rule shows that the tightening in capital requirements
was mostly motivated by structural changes in the nancial industry, like dereg-
ulation, increased network eects as well as a growing shadow bank sector. The
change in capital regulation thus aimed at addressing non-cyclical trends and not
short-run nancial imbalances. Moreover, the changes envisaged by ILSA in 1983
led to rules oated for comments by regulators in July 1984 (Federal Register/Vol.
49, No. 141/Jul. 20, 1984, p. 29400), which became eective on April 18, 1985 only
(Federal Register/Vol. 50, No. 53/Mar. 19, 1985, p. 11128), so there was a consider-
46“The minimum primary capital ratio for large banking organizations increased from 5 percent
to 5.5 percent of adjusted total assets, while community banks’ capital requirements fell from 6
percent to 5.5 percent." (FDIC, 2003)
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able lag between design and implementation of the new rules.47
The 1985 regulatory changes seem to have had a large eect on bank capital:
Baer and McElravey (1993) estimate that the resulting shortfall of bank capital was
comparable in magnitude to that which the introduction of risk-weights by Basel
I generated.
Dec. 1990: The Basel I Capital Accord. The next major overhaul in bank capi-
tal regulation in the US occurred in late 1990 with the implementation of the Basel
Accord on Capital Regulation (“Basel I”). With the Basel Accord, capital regula-
tion became based on risk-adjusted asset volumes for the rst time. There was a
long run-up for Basel I: The three US banking agencies rst issued a risk-based
capital proposal for public comment on March 27, 1986 (Federal Register/Vol. 51,
No. 59/Mar. 27, 1986, p. 10602). However, in reaction to the proposal many com-
menters asserted that without similar requirements for foreign banks, the envis-
aged requirements would put US banks at a competitive disadvantage. In light of
these concerns, the US banking agencies began working with the Bank of England
on the development of a common approach. The OCC published a proposal based
upon a joint US/UK risk-based capital agreement in 1987 (Federal Register/Vol. 53,
No. 116/Jun. 17, 1987, p. 23045). The scope of the international convergence ef-
fort expanded further when the Cooke Committee under the auspices of the Bank
of International Settlement in Basel took the US/UK proposal under considera-
tion and addressed the possibility of expanding the agreement to include all of the
countries represented on the Committee.48 The Basel Committee on Banking Reg-
ulation then issued the nal agreement in bank capital regulation in 1988, and the
US published the nal rule in January 1989 (Federal Register/Vol. 54, No. 17/Jan.
27, 1989).
The Federal banking agencies state their motives for the change in capital reg-
ulation – besides concerns about a competitive disadvantage of US banks – in the
nal rule (ibid., p. 4168):
47Note that e.g. Posner (2014) also cites 1985 (and not 1983) as the date of a "major change" in
regulation (p. 4).
48The Cooke Committee on capital regulation was composed of members of the G10 countries
plus Switzerland and Luxembourg.
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These nal risk-based capital guidelines have a twofold purpose: Tomake
capital requirements more sensitive to dierences in risk proles among
banking organizations and to aid inmaking the denition of bank capital
uniform internationally.
The nal regulation was the outcome of a lengthy discussion in an international
organization. Furthermore, although the nal rule was published in 1989, banks
and regulators were supposed to take actions to implement the rules only from
1991 onwards (the eective date of the amendment was December 31, 1990, see
Van Roy, 2008). Full implementation had to be guaranteed by December 31, 1992.
Hence, we treat the change in capital regulation due to the introduction of the
Basel Capital Accord as principally unrelated to the business and nancial cy-
cle because of the lengthy negotiations and the pre-announced enforcement and
mandatory compliance dates.
Again, there is evidence in the literature that the Basel I regulations aected
bank capital signicantly. Berger and Udell (1994) nd that “capital-decient banks
[i.e. those with risk-based capital below the new standards] represent more than
one-fourth of the nation’s total banking assets” (p. 588). Jacques and Nigro (1997),
using a 3 stage-least squares approach, conclude that “the risk-based capital stan-
dards brought about signicant increases in capital ratios and decreases in portfo-
lio risk of banks which already met the new risk-based standards" (p. 544). There
is some disagreement about the main channels of adjustment, in particular for
weakly capitalised US banks: Haubrich and Wachtel (1993) argue that they mainly
shifted to less risky assets (government securities instead of mortgages and com-
mercial loans), while Van Roy (2008) nds they mainly increased their capital hold-
ings. However, both papers agree that there were substantial eects on bank cap-
ital ratios.
Dec. 1992: The FDIC ImprovementAct and PromptCorrectiveAction. Al-
most contemporaneous with Basel I, US Congress passed a law with strict new
guidelines for FDIC bank resolutions. This FDIC Improvement Act had as main
goals “to require the least-cost resolution of insured depository institutions, to im-
prove supervision and examinations, to provide additional resources to the Bank
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Insurance Fund” (Public Law 102-242 – Dec. 19, 1991, preamble). The central pre-
scription was to use “prompt corrective action to resolve the institutions at the
least cost to the insurance funds" (ibid., Section 121). For this aim, the FDIC was
supposed to classify banks as “well capitalized", “adequately capitalized", “under-
capitalized", “signicantly undercapitalized" and “critically undercapitalized" (ibid.,
Section 132). For example, banks with capital ratios of at least 10 percent total risk-
based, at least 6 percent Tier-1 risk-based, and at least 5 percent leverage were cat-
egorised as well-capitalised (FDIC, 2003). On the other hand, banks with less than
two percent of tangible equity to total assets were considered “critically undercap-
italized" and to be placed in receivership within 90 days (Federal Register/Vol. 57,
No. 189/Sep. 29, 1992, p. 44869). The act species that aected regulators should
“promulgate nal regulations [which] shall become eective not later than 1 year
after the date of enactment [Dec. 19, 1991]" (ibid.). Thus, on December 19, 1992, the
prompt corrective action provisions by the FDIC became eective (Federal Regis-
ter/Vol. 57, No. 189/Sep. 29, 1992, p. 44866).
The timing of this regulatory change is less clear-cut than for other dates in
our indicator. The fact that Congress had passed very specic rules and a tight
implementation deadline in this act seems to have induced banks to increase capi-
tal pre-emptively as to avoid the risk of falling under the prompt corrective action
scheme. Aggarwal and Jacques (2001) suggest that both adequately capitalised and
under-capitalised banks increased their capital ratio as a response to the provision.
In particular, the authors show that the majority of weak banks increased their cap-
ital holdings substantially between the passing of the FDIC Improvement Act in
December 1991 and the prompt corrective action becoming eective in December
1992. To be consistent with the use of eective dates elsewhere, however, we only
include the December 1992 date into our index, but show robustness to adding the
December 1991 date as well.
Jan. 1997: Market Risk Amendment. There were two legislative changes af-
fecting capital requirements in the years between the introduction of prompt cor-
rective action and the Financial Crisis. First, in January 1997, the Basel I framework
was complemented to include measures of market risk. However, as banks were
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free to develop their own internal models to assess these risks, it is not clear a priori
whether this had a tightening or easing eect on overall capital requirements. For
example, in a recent study on European banks, Gehrig and Iannino (2017b) nd
that while the Market Risk Amendment reduced the riskiness of the least risky
quartile of banks, it signicantly increased it for the upper quartile (mostly larger
banks with more developed internal models).
Thus, its eect on capital requirements overall seems not to have been very
large – e.g. Posner (2014) does not include this legislation into his enumeration of
"the major changes to [capital adequacy] regulations" between 1981 and 2013. We
thus choose not to include this date into our baseline specication, but show that
results are robust to including this date.
Apr. 2008: Basel II. Second, in April 2008 Basel II became eective after another
round of long international negotiations – a rst publication on the topic in June
2004, the rst proposed rule had been issued in September 2006 (Federal Regis-
ter/Vol. 72, No. 235/Dec. 7, 2007), and the eective date for the US was in fact more
than a year later than in Europe. Basel II was designed around the three pillars
of minimum capital requirements, supervisory review and market discipline. The
rst pillar was thought to set appropriate capital ratios via regulation on credit risk
(since Basel I), market risk (since the Market Risk Amendment) and operational
risk (new in Basel II). The second pillar aimed to improve supervisory oversight
of banks by setting up a framework to deal with systemic and liquidity risk, but
also reputational and legal risks. Finally, the third pillar intended to increase mar-
ket discipline on banks by introducing more unied disclosure requirements for
banks. However, Basel II seemed outdated by the time of its introduction, which
roughly coincided with the Financial Crisis.
As with the Market Risk Amendment, it is disputed whether the introduction of
Basel II had palpable eects on US banks’ capital – rst because its capital require-
ment rules were rather pro-cyclical (Repullo and Suarez, 2013), second because its
introduction largely coincided with the onset of the Financial Crisis. In a blog post,
Gehrig and Iannino (2017a) state:
The main drivers of [the evolving capital shortfalls during the 1990s and
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2000s] appear to be the self-regulatory options introduced into the Basel
process with the amendment for market risk (1996) and culminating in
the introduction of internalmodels for credit risk in Basel II (2006). Rather
than providing incentives for better risk management for the larger and
internationally active banks, precisely those sophisticated banks used in-
ternal models to carve out even more equity in order to increase return
on equity and at the same time reduce resilience.49
Moreover, as Basel II is not represented in the index by Cerutti, Correa, Fiorentino,
and Segalla (2016), we will not include it either into our baseline CRI. However,
we again will show that our ndings are robust to including this date.
Jan. 2013: Basel II.5. Even before Basel II had became eective in the US, the
Basel Committee met to discuss amendments about capital adequacy and Value
at Risk models (Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011). The resulting
package of supplements set up in a reaction to the Financial Crisis came to be
known as Basel II.5, eective in the US by January 1st, 2013 (Federal Register/Vol.
77, No. 169/Aug. 30, 2012, p. 53060). In a nutshell, it included a move from Value at
Risk to Stressed Value at Risk, eorts to include credit margins and default risk in
risk weights, new charges for securitized assets on banks balance sheets and a new
measure to correlate asset positions on banks’ portfolios. Moreover, it intended to
correct the treatment of trading and banking bank book capital (see Pepe, 2013).
The regulators stated several goals that they hoped to achieve by the mea-
sures (Federal Register/Vol. 77, No. 169/Aug. 30, 2012): The motivation for mod-
eling standards mentions the objective to “provide banks with incentive to model
specic risk more robustly” (p. 53072). Similarly, the regulatory changes on debt
and security positions aim at increasing “risk sensitivity, transparency, consistency
in application, and reduced opportunity for regulatory capital arbitrage” (p. 53074).
None of these stated goals implies stabilization policies; instead they all suggest
long-term objectives. Dierent to Basel II, Basel II.5 did have eects on bank capital
according to Cerutti et al. (2016). Therefore, we include it into our index.
49Note that the dates refer to the implementation dates for European banks instead of the eec-
tive dates for US banks.
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Jan. 2014: Basel III. Shortly after Basel II.5, the Basel III framework was adopted
in the US, representing the latest stage of this reform package to date. Its main
content features stronger capital requirements, a minimum capital-to-assets ratio
and liquidity requirements. Of most interest for us is the increase in minimum
Tier 1 capital (CET1) from 4% over risk-weighted assets under Basel II to 6% un-
der Basel III (from 2015 on). Specically, this 6% minimum risk-weighted capital
ratio is composed of 4.5% of CET1, plus an extra 1.5% of “Additional Tier 1”. On
top of this, Basel III introduced two more capital buers: A discretionary counter-
cyclical buer, which enables national supervisors to require up to additional 2.5%
of CET1 capital over risk-weighted assets when nancial conditions are good, and
a mandatory capital conservation buer of 2.5% of risk-weighted assets (only from
2019 onwards). With a nal rule published in October 2013, it became eective
already on January 1, 2014. The motivation for Basel III by the US regulators men-
tions the avoidance of future banking crises as its main goal, while downplaying
the immediate eects on banks (Federal Register/Vol. 78, No. 198/Oct. 11, 2013, p.
62026):
The nal rule addresses [several weaknesses which became evident dur-
ing the nancial crisis] by helping to ensure a banking and nancial
system that will be better able to absorb losses and continue to lend in
future periods of economic stress. This important benet in the form of a
safer, more resilient, and more stable banking system is expected to sub-
stantially outweigh any short-term costs that might result from the nal
rule. (...)
The agencies’ analysis also indicates that the overwhelming majority of
banking organizations already have sucient capital to comply with the
nal rule. In particular, the agencies estimate that over 95 percent of all
insured depository institutions would be in compliance with the mini-
mums and buers established under the nal rule if it were fully eective
immediately [i.e. October 11, 2013].
There do not yet exist not many studies on the eects of the Basel III regulatory
changes. However, an early OECD study estimated a small negative eect of the
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Basel III implementation on growth in its member countries, even though bank
capital ratios should rise substantially (Slovik and Cournède, 2011). We follow
Cerutti et al. (2016) in including Basel III in our index.
While this section has presented arguments for the choices of our baseline CRI,
we nd our main results in the next section robust to various other CRI specica-
tions, as detailed in Section 2.4.
2.3 Main results
2.3.1 Dynamic eects of tightening capital requirements
The above section showed that our CRI variable can be considered exogenous to
the current state of the economy. With this exogenous CRI at hand we are in a
position to explore the dynamic eects of a regulatory bank capital requirement
tightening on macroeconomic variables. To do so, we will treat the CRI as an in-
strument for the regulatory capital requirement shock, and apply an instrumental-
variable local projection (IVLP) approach (as described in Jordà et al., 2015, see also
Ramey, 2016, and Fieldhouse et al., 2017).50 In our case, the idea is to think of the
CRI as some - maybe noisy - measure of the “true" capital requirement shock.
Using the IVLP approach, we thus extract exogenous movements in the capital
ratio of the banking system, denoted by CRt, which are due to the changes in the
capital regulation as indicated by our dummy indicator. So in the rst stage we
regress aggregate bank capital CRt+h on our exogenous capital requirement in-
dicator CRIt+h, some deterministic regressors c (a constant and linear trend) and
xt, a collection of control variables which are included both in the rst-stage and
second-stage regression.51 So our rst-stage regression is given by
CRt = c+ α(L)xt−1 + φ(L) · CRIt + ut. (6)
50We show robustness to using a SVAR approach below.
51Stock and Watson (2017) argue that including such controls will help ensure the exogeneity
of the instrument to other variables and leads and lags, plus it will reduce the error variance. The
vector of control variables xt is lagged by one period and consists of (log) industrial production,
the (log) PCE deator, federal funds rate, (log) total lending, as well as term and Baa spread.
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From this regression, we generate predicted values ĈRt+h of the capital ratio, in-
terpreted as a regulation-induced increase in banks’ capital ratio. We then estimate
the eect of these changes on various variables of interest, yt, by regressing them
on ĈRt+h and the same deterministic regressors c and controls xt as in the rst
stage above. The second-stage regression thus takes the form
yt+h = c
h + βh(L)xt−1 + γh(L) · ĈRt + ut. (7)
The sequence of parameter estimates {γh1 }H1 gives the impulse response of yt+h to
an exogenous movement in banks’ capital ratio due to a tightening in regulatory
capital requirements. Hence we are obtaining the impulse-responses horizon-by-
horizon.52 Standard errors are computed using the heteroscedasticity and auto-
correlation consistent covariance estimator of Newey and West (1987). FOr our
baseline model, we use monthly data from 1980M1 to 2016M8.
The consistency of the parameter estimates in the instrumental variables setup
depends crucially on the validity of the instrument. A valid instrument must satisfy
two conditions: instrument relevance and instrument exogeneity. Instrument rele-
vance refers to the condition that our instrument, i.e. the CRI, must be suciently
highly correlated with the structural shock. We test this statistic by calculating the
rst stage rk Wald F-statistic suggested in Kleibergen and Paap (2006). We show
the rst-stage F-statistic below the respective IRF plots. Usually, it is well above the
critical value of 16.38 reported in Stock and Yogo (2005).53 Hence, our instrumental
variable usually does not suer from weak identication and the CRI is indeed a
relevant instrument for the bank capital ratio. Concerning the exogeneity of our
instrument, we are unfortunately unable to explicitly test for the exogeneity of
the instrument. Equation (7) is just-identied, which makes it impossible to ap-
ply a test of over-identifying restrictions like the Sargan-Hansen test (see Hansen,
1982).
52See Barnichon and Brownlees (2016) for an alternative system-wide approach to generate re-
sponses for the case of erratic responses, based on smoothed local projections. As we obtain rela-
tively stable dynamics in the responses, we do not apply this method.
53Note that the rst-stage F-statistic is the same for our baseline variables here, while it diers
for the other variables, which are added one by one to the system.
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We start by assessing the eects of a unit shock to the CRIt dummy to banks’
capital ratio CR, i.e. we show the impulse responses from our rst-stage local pro-
jections regression in eq. (6).
Figure 13: Local projection of CR on CRI
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Note: xt = [log(IP), log(PCE de.), FFR, log(Total Loans), Term Spread, Baa Spread]’; βh(L) =
βh0L + . . . β
h
nL
n and γh(L) = γh0 + γh1L + . . . γhmLm, with n = m = 2. Deterministic terms
include a constant, trend and squared trend. The black solid (dashed) lines show the 1 standard
deviation (1.65 standard deviation) condence intervals, based on heteroskedasticity and autocor-
relation consistent standard errors.
As shown in Figure 13, the bank capital ratio increases permanently following
an exogenous tightening in capital requirements. The increase in capitalization is
sluggish, with the response of the capital ratio becoming signicant only after 18
months. While the permanent increase should be expected as the legal changes
coded in the dummy variable specify permanent increases in the capitalization of
banks, the sluggish behavior in the capital ratio might reect the phase-in peri-
ods of regulatory bank capitalization changes. The fact that bank capital increases
permanently – which is by no way implied by our identication – gives further
condence that our narrative approach does indeed identify exogenous changes
in capital requirements. In fact, if our dummy variable simply captured some other
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sort of temporary recessionary demand shocks, there would be no reason for banks
to permanently increase their capital ratio. The statistically signicant increase
comes also at a meaningful size: The long-run increase after a “representative”
CRI tightening in our sample is about 40 basis points, showing that our narrative
events in fact pick up decisive regulatory events.
Next, we assess the eect of a CRI tightening on our control variables xt: We
thus use future values of the controls as dependent variable in the second-stage
regression in eq. (7). We present the results in Figure 14 and top of Figure 15.
Figure 14: Eects of capital requirement shock - baseline variables
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Note: Eect of a unit increase in the capital requirement dummy variable based on IV local projec-
tion regressions. The red solid lines show the point estimate. The black solid (dashed) lines show
the 1 standard deviation (1.65 standard deviation) condence intervals, based on heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.
An unexpected tightening of bank capital requirements leads to a signicant
reduction in industrial production on impact, followed by a borderline signicant
slump until a trough is reached after around one year, around 2.5% below the base-
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line value. The price level also decreases slightly on impact, and then again after
around 3.5 years. The decrease is overall economically small though: It hardly sur-
passes 1 bp.
The federal funds rate drops signicantly after around one year following a
tightening of bank capital requirements. The reduction in the federal funds rate
is likely a response of the Federal Reserve to the reduction in economic activity
as witnessed by the drop in industrial production. The strong negative response
of the federal funds rate might explain part of the swift recovery in industrial
production 18 months after the shock.
The tightening in capital requirements has a negative short-run eect on total
bank loans. Bank lending drops signicantly within two months after the cap-
ital requirement change and remains below its baseline value until around 18
months later with borderline signicance. The timing suggests that after a reg-
ulatory capital-requirement tightening, banks in fact contract their balance sheets
by reduced lending for about one and a half years, before building up capital and
restoring lending to previous levels (or higher). Lending drops by around 3% on
maximum.
The term spread (Figure 15) shows a less clear response. It falls by around one
percentage point roughly one year after the regulatory change, maybe also due to
the policy response in the federal funds rate. After that, there is no unambiguous
pattern to observe.
The Baa spread, in contrast, rises signicantly less than a year after the CRI
tightening, and remains elevated for about two years. This speaks for heightened
risk aversion in the nancial sector and more dicult borrowing conditions for
smaller and younger companies.
To sum up briey our baseline result, we nd that an unexpected increase
in capital requirements generates a drop in bank lending, industrial production
and prices. With these variables still depressed after around one year, and the Baa
spread widening, monetary policy seems to react with easing measures and after
around 18 months lending and economic activity are back to their baseline values.
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Figure 15: Eects of capital requirement shock - credit and interest rate spreads
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Note: Eect of a unit increase in the capital requirement dummy variable based on IV local projec-
tion regressions. The red solid lines show the point estimate. The black solid (dashed) lines show
the 1 standard deviation (1.65 standard deviation) condence intervals, based on heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.
2.3.2 Transmission channels
In the following, we investigate in more detail through which channels capital re-
quirement tightenings are transmitted to the real economy. For each of the plots
below, we use the respective variable as dependent variable yt in our second-stage
regression (7). Throughout this section, we include two lags of the endogenous
variable into the vector of control variables. The rst-stage F-statistics (given be-
low the respective plots) are usually well above the critical threshold of 16.83 in
Stock and Yogo (2005).
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Loan sub-aggregates
We rst disentangle the aggregate of total bank loans into its main components.
Specically, we analyze the responses of consumer loans, commercial and indus-
trial (C&I) loans and real estate loans to the CRI shock. The responses of the loan
sub-aggregates might help understand which type of borrower is aected most
in terms of a reduction in credit supply: entrepreneurs, consumers or mortgages
holders.
Figure 16: Eects of capital requirement shock - Loan subaggregates
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Note: Eect of a unit increase in the capital requirement dummy variable based on IV local projec-
tion regressions. The red solid lines show the point estimate. The black solid (dashed) lines show
the 1 standard deviation (1.65 standard deviation) condence intervals, based on heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.
We present the results for the loan sub-aggregates in Figure 16. The impulse
responses show that banks mainly reduce mortgage loans, while consumer loans
and C&I loans are not changed signicantly. Mortagage loans – which comprise
residential and non-residential real-estate lending – drop strongly after the in-
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crease in capital requirement and keep falling for 18 months after the shock. They
reach a trough with residential loans being 6% below their baseline value and their
level remains rather depressed. Consumer loans fall insignicantly and seem to
experience a faster recovery. C&I loans increase, if anything, after a CRI tighten-
ing. These ndings can be contrasted with those in den Haan, Sumner, and Ya-
mashiro (2007). The authors nd an increase of C&I loans after monetary pol-
icy contractions, while real-estate and consumer loans fall. However, for non-
monetary shocks, they nd an initial increase in real-estate and consumer loans,
while C&I loans fall strongly. In fact, it seems that an exogenous increase in regu-
latory capital requirements thus aects bank lending much like a (contractionary)
monetary policy shock.
The results from this exercise help to better understand the drop in indus-
trial production after the increase in capital requirements. The strong reduction
in mortgage loans suggests that the tightening in capital requirements aects in-
dustrial production mostly by a fall in construction. As mortgage loans comprise
both residential and non-residential mortgages, the question whether household
or rms are more aected cannot yet be answered. We will explore this below.
The reaction of total bank assets gives further evidence about how a regula-
tory capital tightening aects bank lending: Total assets fall signicantly on im-
pact, by about 2% after two months, and remain signicantly depressed for about 8
months.54 After that, they quickly revert to their pre-regulation value and increase,
if anything, over the next four years. This is further evidence for a relativley quick
contractionary adjustment dynamic of capital requirement changes.
Credit spreads
In the two bottom plots of Figure 15 we show the responses of the C&I loan rate
spread and the mortgage rate spread. We see that while C&I loan volumes seems
to increase after a CRI tightening, also the spread increases, by up to 2 percent-
age points after around one year. This might reect a worsening of companies’
54This is in line with Laderman (1994), who found that bank holding companies tended to meet
the 1990 risk-based capital requirements of Basel I by reducing their asset growth rather than stock
issuance, at least on impact.
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credit quality during the downturn in economic activity, or an increase in credit
demand by entrepreneurs. On the other hand, the mortgage spread increases sig-
nicantly only after about 9 months and remains elevated for about one year. To-
gether with the fall in mortgages volumes, this indicates heightened risk aversion
towards mortgages borrowers and a shortening of credit supply in this segment.
Households
To analyze whether it is rather households or companies that suer from lower
mortgage issuance after a regulatory capital tightening, we look at data from the
Federal Reserve on the nancial accounts of both households and corporate non-
nancial companies.
Figure 17: Eects of capital requirement shock - Household liabilities
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Note: Eect of a unit increase in the capital requirement dummy variable based on IV local projec-
tion regressions. The red solid lines show the point estimate. The black solid (dashed) lines show
the 1 standard deviation (1.65 standard deviation) condence intervals, based on heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.
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Turning to households rst, Figure 17 shows some key liability positions of
the aggregated household sector. Total liabilities are not aected strongly on im-
pact, but have fallen signcantly by about three years after the CRI tightening.
This deleveraging of households seems reected by a fall in mortgages and other
loans, rather than by consumer credit. While this would be in line with the dy-
namics in bank lending above, reactions are not signicant enough here to come
to a denitive conclusion.
Figure 18: Eects of capital requirement shock - Household consumption
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Note: Eect of a unit increase in the capital requirement dummy variable based on IV local projec-
tion regressions. The red solid lines show the point estimate. The black solid (dashed) lines show
the 1 standard deviation (1.65 standard deviation) condence intervals, based on heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.
Figure 18 looks at the dynamics of some key household consumption aggre-
gates. While personal consumption expenditures and consumption of services de-
pict some fall, especially on impact (though only borderline signicant), only non-
durable consumption decreases signicantly, by around 3% after one year. Surpris-
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ingly, durable consumption, which would include housing, does not fall strongly.
Altogether, the evidence here speaks rather against a strong fall in household mort-
gages and residential construction as a driver of the real-economic dynamics after
a CRI tightening.
Nonnancial companies
Next, we turn to nonnancial companies (NFCs), in particular corporations.
Figure 19: Eects of capital requirement shock - Corp. NFC loans
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Note: Eect of a unit increase in the capital requirement dummy variable based on IV local projec-
tion regressions. The red solid lines show the point estimate. The black solid (dashed) lines show
the 1 standard deviation (1.65 standard deviation) condence intervals, based on heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.
Figure 19 shows the dynamics of several corporate NFCs’ loan types. While
loans from depository institutions seem rather to increase, other loans and ad-
vances fall signicantly, reaching a trough after one year. Moreover, mortgages to
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corporate NFCs fall immediately, and up to about 7% after one year (with border-
line signicance). Thus, companies seem much more aected than households by
banks cutting back their mortgage issuance.
Figure 20: Eects of capital requirement shock - Corp. NFC debt securities
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Note: Eect of a unit increase in the capital requirement dummy variable based on IV local projec-
tion regressions. The red solid lines show the point estimate. The black solid (dashed) lines show
the 1 standard deviation (1.65 standard deviation) condence intervals, based on heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.
How do rms react to this decrease in credit availability? Figure 20 shows the
dynamics in several securities that rms can use as an alternative to bank credit.
However, both commercial paper and corporate bonds in general seem to decrease,
if anything, after a CRI tightening. In contrast, municipal securities, which can
only be issued by local governments, states or related agencies and are often used
for infrastructure nancing, show a signicant increase on impact. So while public
institutions might step in to some degree, there is no evidence that (corporate)
companies balance the fall in bank mortgage. This suggests they are the more
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likely candidate for a reduction in construction which could partially explain the
fall in industrial production above.
The fact that commercial mortgages fall more strongly on impact than do
household mortgages is consistent with Hancock and Wilcox (1997), who nd
that real-estate lending to rms is much more strongly aected by negative bank-
capital shocks than mortgages to single families. They suggest that this larger elas-
ticity of commercial mortgages might arise from this market being less liquid than
the one for residential mortgages.
Fixed investment
Looking at the responses of investment further conrms our hypothesis that it
is a fall in company rather than household mortgages that explains a fall in real
activity. Figure 21 shows the (interpolated) private residential and non-residential
xed investment. While the former falls with borderline signicance, reaching a
trough after one year, the latter shows no decrease on impact. However, residential
investment shows a fall more than three years out after the CRI tightening, which
is partially reected in the second (borderline signicant) drop in bank mortgages
(Figure 16).
Figure 21: Eects of capital requirement shock - Investment
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Note: Eect of a unit increase in the capital requirement dummy variable based on IV local projec-
tion regressions. The red solid lines show the point estimate. The black solid (dashed) lines show
the 1 standard deviation (1.65 standard deviation) condence intervals, based on heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.
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Asset prices
Figure 22 depicts two asset prices with great importance for the macroeconomy.
First, we see that house prices do in fact not react strongly to a CRI tightening on
impact, but start falling after around 18 months and remain below their baseline
value after that. This is in line with the dynamics of housing starts, which follow a
similar (though more volatile) trajectory. Again, this underscores the second drop
in mortgages, which seems to derive from households and residential mortgages
rather than rms. Stock prices, the second important asset depicted here, remain
mostly unaected rst, but show a signicant downturn after around 2.5 years.
Figure 22: Eects of capital requirement shock - Asset prices
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Note: Eect of a unit increase in the capital requirement dummy variable based on IV local projec-
tion regressions. The red solid lines show the point estimate. The black solid (dashed) lines show
the 1 standard deviation (1.65 standard deviation) condence intervals, based on heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.
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Financial uncertainty
To investigate further how regulatory capital requirement changes aect the -
nancial sector, we show their impact on the nancial uncertainty indicators as
developed in Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015).
Figure 23: Eects of capital requirement shock - Financial uncertainty
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Note: Eect of a unit increase in the capital requirement dummy variable based on IV local projec-
tion regressions. The red solid lines show the point estimate. The black solid (dashed) lines show
the 1 standard deviation (1.65 standard deviation) condence intervals, based on heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.
Figure 23 plots the reaction of the uncertainty indicators with a horizon of
one, three and twelve months, as well as the risk as measured by the NFCI risk
index. Although the latter is constructed very dierently, dynamics are surpris-
ingly similar: Uncertainty does react on impact, but increases when the economic
activity falls after around one year and remain elevated up to a second peak in
uncertainty and risk after around 32 months (although the condence bands for
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the uncertainty measures are too wide for conclusive evidence). Thus, increases
in regulatory capital, for all the stabilizing eect they might have on the nancial
sector, seem not to have decreased nancial uncertainty for the recent US history.
2.4 Robustness
Our main ndings indicate that an exogenous tightening in capital requirements
reduces bank lending temporarily, which leads to a short-lived drop in economic
activity. In this section we perform a battery of robustness checks to our model
setup to ensure that these key ndings are not only driven by specic modelling
choices.
Excluding the crisis period
One potential concern with our sample period is the combination of capital re-
quirement changes before and after the Great Recession: After 2008, the economic
environment was characterized by deleveraging, monetary policy facing the zero-
lower bound and operating with unconventional monetary policies and the imple-
mentation of explicitly "macroprudential" policies for the rst time. A valid con-
cern therefore is that our simple baseline model might not appropriately capture
the specic post-crisis feature of the economy. In order to test whether includ-
ing the post nancial crisis period is important for our results, we re-estimate the
model over the sample 1980M1 to 2006M12.
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Figure 24: Robustness 1: Excluding 2008-2016
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Note: Grey shaded area show the 1 standard deviation condence interval from the alternative
model (baseline control variables together with two lags of the new dependent variable). The lines
show the impulse responses and condence intervals from the baseline.
We show the results from this exercise in Figure 24. The grey line and shades
are the point estimates and 95% condence bands of the IV local projections based
on the sample without the post-crisis period. We plot them together with the base-
line results (the red and the black lines) for better comparability. The impulse
responses based on the shorter sample excluding the post-crisis period are very
similar in shape and magnitude to the baseline results. In fact, for industrial pro-
duction, ination and the federal funds rate, the point estimate is almost always
within the condence intervals of the baseline model. The capital requirement
shock generates a slightly stronger drop in total bank lending if we exclude the
post-crisis period. However, the shape is still very similar and the main qualitative
message continues to hold. Altogether, our results are not particularly sensitive to
excluding the post-crisis period.
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Including ILSA and FDICIA
We have chosen not to include the dates when Congress passed legislation that
nally led to changes in capital requirements. However, it would be conceivable
that banks reacted already to this legislation by raising their capital holdings or
curtailing lending. In particular the FDICIA with the clear announcement of the
prompt corrective action measures to be adopted by regulators might have had
this eect, as stressed e.g. by Aggarwal and Jacques (2001).
Figure 25: Robustness 2: Including ILSA and FDICIA
10 20 30 40
-0.05
0
0.05
IP
Robust First Stage F-Statistic: 23.3086
10 20 30 40
#10-3
-20
-10
0
PCE
Robust First Stage F-Statistic: 23.3086
10 20 30 40
-2
0
2
4
FFR
Robust First Stage F-Statistic: 23.3086
10 20 30 40
-0.05
0
0.05
Total Bank Loans
Robust First Stage F-Statistic: 23.3086
10 20 30 40
-2
-1
0
1
2
Term Spread
Robust First Stage F-Statistic: 23.3086
10 20 30 40
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
BaaSpread
Robust First Stage F-Statistic: 23.3086
Note: Grey shaded area show the 1 standard deviation condence interval from the alternative
model. The control variables in the alternative model consist of the baseline control variables to-
gether with two lags of the (new) dependent variable. The lines show the impulse responses and
condence intervals from the baseline.
We therefore check our results for robustness to including the dates when both
ILSA and FDICIA were passed (Dec. 1983 and Dec. 1992, respectively) into our CRI
index. The results, shown in Figure 25, show that our results are robust to including
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these dates; if anything, the reactions become longer-lasting and more signicant.
Including Market Risk Amendment and Basel II
Moreover, we left the dates of the adoption of the Market Risk Amendment (MRA)
and Basel II out of our baseline CRI. Although the literature is somewhat undecided
as to whether these dates represent actual capital requirement tightenings for the
majority of US banks, it could be that including these dates matters. After all, these
were the largest changes in bank capital regulation between the early 1990s and
the Great Recession, and in particular Basel II dominated the headlines of nancial
regulation before the crisis.
Figure 26: Robustness 3: Add Market Risk
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Note: Grey shaded area show the 1 standard deviation condence interval from the alternative
model. The control variables in the alternative model consist of the baseline control variables to-
gether with two lags of the (new) dependent variable. The lines show the impulse responses and
condence intervals from the baseline.
Figures 26 and 27 show the results when including the eective dates of MRA
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(Jan. 1997) and Basel II (Apr. 2008) to our CRI indicator. We include all of these
gures because for the case of including Market Risk Amendment, we actually do
get a positive eect on industrial production. However, all other variables show
reactions consistent with our baseline results (even more drastic for the case of
lending and ination, for example). Furthermore, the rst-stage F-statistic is only
above 12 in this case, so quite a bit below the critical value of 16.83. Looking at
the case where Basel II is added, we see both stronger negative eects and a high
rst-stage F-statistic above 30.
Figure 27: Robustness 4: Add Basel II
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Note: Grey shaded area show the 1 standard deviation condence interval from the alternative
model. The control variables in the alternative model consist of the baseline control variables to-
gether with two lags of the (new) dependent variable. The lines show the impulse responses and
condence intervals from the baseline.
As we believe that the MRA and Basel II are comparable in that they both com-
bined features that might have led to capital tightenings for some (smaller) banks,
but for easings for others (larger banks with risk modelling divisions), we also
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add both eective dates to our CRI in Figure 28. In this case, lending and ination
decrease drastically, while industrial production rst declines with borderline sig-
nicance before increasing. These results have a sucient rst-stage F-statistic,
so we conclude that our main ndings are robust to both MRA and Basel II.
Figure 28: Robustness 5: Add Market Risk and Basel II
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Note: Grey shaded area show the 1 standard deviation condence interval from the alternative
model. The control variables in the alternative model consist of the baseline control variables to-
gether with two lags of the (new) dependent variable. The lines show the impulse responses and
condence intervals from the baseline.
Using nal rules instead of eective dates
Another concern is about the potential announcement eects of regulatory capital
requirement changes. While we have argued above that banks might wait until
new capital requirements become eective and use the phase-in periods to adjust
their capital ratios, it is also possible that they start acting as soon as the rules
become available in their nal form, i.e. with the publication of the nal rules of
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the respective regulation.
To test for this possibility, we re-run the analysis using the publication dates
of the nal rules instead of the dates when the regulation became eective (see
Table 11 in the Appendix). As Figure 29 shows, we nd in fact very similar eects
when using these dates. However, the F-statistic of the rst stage regression on
bank capital is far below the critical value of 16.83, casting doubt on the reliabil-
ity of the results. While we cannot rule out that (some) banks start acting upon
the publication of nal rules, we take our main results to be also robust to this
specication.
Figure 29: Robustness 6: Only Final Rules
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Note: Grey shaded area show the 1 standard deviation condence interval from the alternative
model. The control variables in the alternative model consist of the baseline control variables to-
gether with two lags of the (new) dependent variable. The lines show the impulse responses and
condence intervals from the baseline.
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Variation in the lag structure in the local projections
Setting the lag length in an IV local projection regression is a delicate task. It is
in principle possible to use information criteria to set the lag length, which might
then dier for each single horizon. This approach would, however, lead to highly
erratic impulse response estimates. As a benchmark case we estimate models in-
cluding 2 lags of the control variables and 2 lags of the CRI itself. Here we show
that our main ndings do not change when varying the lag length for either the
dummy indicator or the control variables between 2 and 12 lags.
Figure 30: Robustness 7: Varying lag length of controls
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Note: Blue dashed lines are the point estimates of model in which we increase the lags of the control
variables from 2 lags to 12 lags. The lines show the impulse responses and condence intervals from
the baseline.
Figure 30 contains the results from models in which we keep the lag length of
the control variables at 2, but vary the lags of the dummy indicator between 2 and
12 lags. Similarly, Figure 31 shows results from models keeping the lag length of
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the dummy indicator at 2, but varying the lags of the control variables between
2 and 12 lags.55 In both cases, results are very close to our baseline specication.
Altogether, our results seem not driven by the specic lag structure in the local
projections.
Figure 31: Robustness 8: Varying lag length of shock
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Note: Blue dashed lines are the point estimates of model in which we increase the lags of the CRI
from 2 lags to 12 lags. The lines show the impulse responses and condence intervals from the
baseline.
Using a SVAR approach
Finally, we also want to compare the robustness of our results to employing a
structural vector autoregression (SVAR) instead of our instrumental-variable local
projections approach. As argued e.g. by Barnichon and Brownlees (2016), the SVAR
is more ecient, but is generally less robust to model misspecication. So while we
choose to stick with the more robust approach in the baseline, it will nevertheless
55For our monthly data, a maximum lag length of 12 seems to be a reasonable choice.
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be interesting to see whether results remain similar when we relax the assumption
that the CRI is fully exogenous to the state of the business and nancial cycle.
Instead, here we allow other key macroeconomic and nancial variables to aect
the CRI variable by modelling it jointly with other variables in a VAR. For this let
Yt be a (7× 1) vector containing the (cumulated) CRI and the six variables in our
set of controls above.56 We assume that the dynamics of Yt are governed by the
following vector-autoregressive process:
Yt = c1 + c2 · t+
L∑
l=1
AlYt−l + ut,
where c1 is a constant, c2 · t a linear trend, Al a (7 × 7) coecient matrix and
l = 1 . . . L are lags, with L being 36 for our monthly data.57 The reduced form
residuals ut are Gaussian with mean zero and positive denite covariance matrices
Σu = E(utu
′
t).
The reduced form residuals are related to the structural shocks t according to
ut = A0t, with E(t′t) = In. The impact eects are captured in the orthogonal
invertible Gaussian (7 × 7) matrix A0 that satises Σu = A0A′0. We identify the
capital requirement tightening shock using zero contemporaneous restrictions on
the matrix A0. Specically, we impose the timing restrictions that all other vari-
ables in the system can react contemporaneously to the shock. That is, we apply
a Cholesky decomposition to Σu with the CRI ordered rst in Yt.
56For reference, these variables are (log) industrial production, (log) PCE deator, the federal
funds rate, (log) total lending, as well as term spread and Baa spread.
57The lag length is larger than in the local projections approach. As the VAR impulse responses
are more sensitive to misspecication due to their iterative construction, we want to ensure white-
ness of the VAR residuals. We have also experimented with other lags for the SVAR and nd our
results there robust to a version with 24 and 12 lags: While inference becomes less clear-cut for
fewer lags, qualitative results are very similar.
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Figure 32: Robustness 9: Using an SVAR
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Note: Reactions to a unitary shock to the CRI index (a tightening of capital requirements). Blue line
gives the median, red dashed lines and blue shaded area give the 90% and 68% condence bands,
respectively. SVAR specications as in text.
Figure 32 shows the impulse responses to a unitary innovation in the CRI (i.e.
a regulatory capital-requirement tightening of standard size of 1) in the SVAR. We
plot the median responses together with the 90% and 68% condence bands (red
dashed line and blue shade, respectively). The quantitative eects are comparable
to our baseline specication, with total lending and industrial production declining
by around 2%, the federal funds rate reacting by 100 basis points and signicant
reactions to term and Baa spread. However, under the SVAR the reaction of the
ination (the PCE deator) is much smaller and less signicant, and while the term
spread reacts more strongly (increasing by around 100 instead of 50 basis points
at the maximum), the reaction of the Baa spread is smaller (50 instead of 100 basis
points). Still, overall the dynamics of the responses are quite similar, with the SVAR
generally producing smoother reactions. Moreover, the statistical signicance of
our results improves: Total bank lending now is reduced at the 90% signicance
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level on impact and mostly remains signicant until more than 12 months after
the capital tightening. Also the hike in the term spread now is signicant at the
90% signicance level. Figure 33 claries the similarity of responses by plotting the
68% condence bands of the SVAR impulse responses together with the 68% and
90% bands for our baseline model. Except for ination and the later policy rate,
dynamics overlap to a large degree. Overall, we hold our ndings to be robust to
using a SVAR specication.
Figure 33: Robustness 10: SVAR vs. IVLP
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Note: Reactions to a unitary shock to the CRI index (a tightening of capital requirements). Blue line
gives the median, red dashed lines and blue shaded area give the 90% and 68% condence bands,
respectively. SVAR specications as in text. Grey shaded area show the 68% condence interval
from the SVAR model, specied as described in the text. The lines show the impulse responses and
condence intervals from the baseline (instrumental-variable local projections, IVLP) model.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we aim to ll a gap in the literature on the potential eects of
macro-prudential capital requirement policies. So far, inference is drawn mainly
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from either microeconometric empirical studies neglecting dynamic and general-
equilibrium eects, or from structural models depending heavily on the frictions
and shocks included as well as the calibration used. We suggest a novel narrative
indicator of aggregate regulatory capital requirement changes for the US from
1980M1 to 2016M8. The indicator includes six episodes of exogenous capital tight-
enings.
Using instrument-variable local projections of changes in this capital require-
ment indicator on various macro-nancial variables, we conclude that aggregate
capital tightenings lead to rather short-lived credit crunches and contractions in
economic activity. In particular, banks reduce their credit supply for around 18
months, before permanently rising their capital levels and restoring lending. In-
dustrial production falls by around 3 percentage points after 12 months before
recovering, helped by monetary policy easing.
The lessons for macroprudential capital requirement policies seem clear: While
there is a transitory cost associated with the introduction of higher capital levels,
it seems not very high historically. However, it should be noted that our analysis
cannot capture potential non-linearities associated with ever-higher levels of cap-
ital requirements. On the other hand, it could well be that better communication
of macroprudential policies would reduce the transitory balance-sheet shrinking
of banks once this tool is rmly established. With a Basel IV framework already
being drafted, research on this topic is likely to continue for some time into the
future.
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3 Spoilt for Choice on QE? Which Assets to Pur-
chase to Combat Disination
(single-authored)58
Keywords: Quantitative Easing, Business Cycles, Unconventional Monetary Pol-
icy
JEL classication: E32, E43, E58
58I thank Fabio Canova, Juan Dolado, Peter Karadi, Dominik Thaler and seminar participants at
the European University Institute and Bundesbank for valuable comments and discussions.
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3.1 Introduction
Motivation. On December 8, 2016, the ECB announced that its asset purchase
programmes (APPs) would be extended to at least December 2017. By then, the
APPs on the balance sheet of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) will
amount to more than €2.4trn, a stock worth around 22.4% of the euro area’s 2016
annual nominal GDP. Purchases of public debt represent the lion share of the
APPs (see Table 3 and Figure 50 in the Appendix), but the ESCB has addition-
ally purchased covered bonds and asset-backed securities, and since June 2016
also corporate-sector bonds directly. The ECB homepage on APPs denes them as
“includ[ing] all purchase programmes under which private sector securities and
public sector securities are purchased to address the risks of a too prolonged pe-
riod of low ination”59. However, few studies have aimed to gauge the eect of
these massive purchases on GDP and ination for the euro area (EA). No struc-
tural model has yet aimed to distinguish between the asset classes that the ESCB
is currently buying.
Table 3: Overview of the Asset Purchase Programmes by ESCB
Name Assets targeted Introduced on € mn (Jun. 2017)
[Round 1]
Securities Markets public and private 10 May 2010 99,628
Programme debt securities
Covered bond PP 1 covered bonds 2 Jul. 2009 9,478
Covered bond PP 2 covered bonds 3 Nov. 2011 5,987
[Round 2]
Public sector PP government bonds 9 Mar. 2015 1,609,327
Covered bond PP 3 covered bonds 20 Oct. 2014 222,630
Asset-backed securities PP securitised loans 21 Nov. 2014 24,135
Corporate sector PP corp. sector bonds 8 Jun. 2016 96,620
Σ 1,952,712
Source: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/index.en.html
This paper aims to ll this gap by investigating dierences in the purchases of
59see https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/index.en.html
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various asset classes, showing the main transmission mechanisms, and addressing
the question as to which APP appears most eective in ghting disinationary
pressures. To do so, I build a DSGE model with a role for purchases of three assets
(see also the beginning of Section 2 for a non-technical summary of the model).
The three assets and the associated model frictions are:
1. Government bonds (as in the public-sector purchasing programme [PP] or
PSPP), are held by banks and households. This gives purchases of govern-
ment bonds a role through a bank balance-sheet channel (higher prices of
bonds improve banks’ balance sheets and allow them to lend out more, see
e.g. Gertler and Karadi, 2013), and through a preferred-habitat channel (higher
bond prices reduce the yield of bonds and thus of household savings, encour-
aging households to save less, see e.g. Ellison and Tischbirek, 2014, or Chen,
Cúrdia, and Ferrero, 2012). There is a countervailing eect, as the purchases
reduce a source of good collateral for banks (see next point), but this eect
turns out to be quantitatively less important here.
2. Financial assets (as in the asset-backed security and third covered-bond PP
or ABSPP and CBPP3), securitised by highly leveraged, specialised nancial
institutions which only deal with other banks. Their pooling of corporate
loans or bonds gives the securitised assets a higher collateral value than the
underlying loans or bonds themselves. Thus purchases of these securitised
assets will improve bank balance sheets, but will also reduce the collateral
available to banks, diminishing their lending capacity.
3. Private-sector loans or bonds (as in the corporate sector PP or CSPP), i.e.
individual rms’ borrowing from a bank in order to buy capital. The mod-
elling of these bonds follows Gertler and Karadi (2011). Direct purchases of
corporate bonds will increase their value and thus improve bank balance
sheets. This allows banks to increase their leverage and lending, leading in
turn to an investment-driven boom in the economy. Therefore, purchases
of private-sector bonds represent the eects of a "pure" bank-balance sheet
channel, against which the other purchases above can be measured.
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To the best of my knowledge, my DSGE model is the rst to capture these three
distinct asset classes that are currently bought under the APPs. The model is then
used to investigate which of the APPs has the best potential to stabilise ination af-
ter a disinationary shock in an environment characterised by a zero-lower bound,
i.e. when conventional monetary policy is no longer applicable.
The results suggest that government bonds (as in the PSPP) are the most suit-
able asset class to stabilise ination in such a situation. The reason is the relative
strength of the preferred-habitat channel in stimulating households’ consumption.
Purchases of loans (CSPP) are more eective that those of nancial assets (ABSPP,
CBPP), as in my model the latter assets have a considerable collateral value for
commercial banks. Thus, while purchases of securitised assets will increase their
value, the reduction in volumes will be detrimental to commercial banks’ leverage.
Related literature. There are many empirical papers investigating the eect of
the US and UK quantitative easing (QE) programmes after the crisis, and some
for the EA case. For the US, the main programmes were the Large-Scale Asset
Purchases (LSAPs) by the Federal Reserve from November 2008 to March 2010.60
The Bank of England’s Asset Purchase Facility were in operation from March 2009
to February 2010.61 Papers like Lenza, Pill, and Reichlin (2010), Christensen and
Rudebusch (2012), Baumeister and Benati (2013), and Weale and Wieladek (2016)
compare evidence from both US and UK. For the EA, Giannone, Lenza, Pill, and
Reichlin (2012) investigate the rst round of asset purchases and Altavilla, Carboni,
and Motto (2015) the second, larger round of APPs. See also Den Haan (2016) for
a survey.
The consensus of the empirical literature on the asset-purchasing programmes
is threefold: First, they did have an impact on GDP and ination, and have cush-
ioned the eect of the Great Recession in the countries that enacted measures.
Second, however, this eect seems small and strongest in times of acute nancial
60See e.g. in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011; 2013), Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and
Sack (2011), Hamilton and Wu (2012), or Chung, Laforte, Reifschneider, and Williams (2012).
61See for example Meaning and Zhu (2011), Joyce, Lasaosa, Stevens, and Tong (2011), Joyce and
Tong (2012), Kapetanios, Mumtaz, Stevens, and Theodoridis (2012), and McLaren, Banerjee, and
Latto (2014).
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distress. Third, purchases potentially aects the macro-economy through several
channels:62
• A signalling channel, i.e. the idea that APPs send a signal about an ex-
tended period of dovish monetary policy. This channel is somewhat hard
to distinguish from forward guidance and usually not modelled explicitly;
however, one of its predictions should be that the shorter yield spectrum is
aected more strongly than the longer one as the central bank nds it easier
to commit to the near than the distant path of its policy.63
• The local supply or scarcity channel proposes that as assets are not per-
fect substitutes for one another (in particular in times of nancial distress
and market malfunctioning), a decline in the supply of certain asset classes
will bid up their price and reduce their yield.
• In contrast to the local supply channel, the portfolio rebalance channel
(Tobin, 1961 and 1969) suggests that nancial markets will disseminate lower
yields from the assets targeted under QE to other asset classes as well.64
According to the related duration channel, eects should be strongest for
longer maturities because their yields are more sensitive to changes in the
short-term rate.
• Finally, the credit premium or bank balance-sheet channel suggests
that by easing the balance-sheet constraint of leveraged market participants,
62This follows Altavilla et al. (2015), however, I stress the close relation of portfolio rebalance
and duration channel. See also Bauer and Rudebusch (2014) on the signalling channel and D’Amico
and King (2013) on the local scarcity channel.
63I will not investigate this channel below, although it could be included as a time-varying risk
premium on the return on capital (which gets reduced by purchases) in a potential estimation of
the model. See footnote 72 on page 99.
64When announcing the PSPP on January 22, 2015, ECB President Draghi re-
ferred to this channel when saying that the APP would “substitute bonds with cash,
and therefore banks, at that point, will have more incentive to lend to the pri-
vate sector, households and companies” (ECB press conference, January 22, 2015,
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2015/html/is150122.en.html). However, ECB
Board member Benoît Cœuré has hinted also at a scarcity, duration and signalling
channel as potential transmissions for PSPP (in an interview on March 10, 2015
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2015/html/sp150310_1.en.html).
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QE will compress credit premia required by these leveraged arbitrageurs
and thereby facilitate the functioning of nancial markets (see e.g. Draghi,
2016a,b). Besides this direct eect, the credit spread reductions ease invest-
ment and stimulate aggregate demand, giving rise to a feedback loop or gen-
eral equilibrium eect as the probability of default declines and further
reduces risk premia.
In my model, purchases of all three assets will aect the economy through the
bank-balance sheet channel (purchases increase the prices of assets, which re-
stores banks’ balance sheets and allows them to lend out more, which increases
investment and thus output). An opposite eect derives from the reduction of good
collateral in the case of purchases of government debt and securitised assets. En-
abling the commercial bank in the model to equate asset returns (or not) allows me
to gauge the importance of a local-supply channel (versus a portfolio-rebalancing
channel). I do not nd that the dierence has large eects on the model dynamics.
Moreover, by the fact that households also hold government debt I can allow for
a preferred-habitat eect on households’ savings decision, which turns out to be
very important for the relatively large eect of public-debt purchases on ination.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 outlines the model and Section
3.3 its calibration. Section 3.4 presents some initial results, while Section 3.5 ex-
amines the eectiveness of asset purchases in alleviating disinationary pressures
under a zero-lower bound environment. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The model
This section presents the setup of my model. I try to keep it as small as possible,
but include what is needed to distinguish the three asset classes meaningfully. The
behaviour of households and rms is standard. A competitive capital-producer
subject to adjustment costs creates a price for capital. To allow for the analysis of
nominal variables like ination, I include a retail sector with some market power.
On the other hand, my model does not include labour market frictions and has a
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closed-economy setting, which reects a choice for parsimony.65
In order to break the irrelevance result for central-bank asset purchases by
Wallace (1981), I introduce two frictions: First a moral-hazard friction à la Gertler
and Karadi (2011), implying that bankers can divert funds, which will lead to an en-
dogenous bank balance-sheet constraint.66 The main bank in the model, the “com-
mercial bank”, will hold three assets on its balance sheet: rm bonds or loans, secu-
ritised nancial assets created by specialised “wholesale banks”, and government
debt. The wholesale bank introduces heterogeneity into bank lending to rms: It
operates under higher leverage, can adjust its balance sheets more quickly and the
securitised assets it creates are better collateral for commercial banks than rm
loans. While the government bonds are also better collateral, they have another
peculiarity: Households use them to save besides bank deposits, and bonds and
deposits are assumed to be imperfect substitutes to households, even though both
deliver a safe return. This allows purchases of government bonds to have a stim-
ulatory eect on the economy both by a bank-lending or credit-premium channel
(as they improve commercial banks balance sheet situation) and by a preferred-
habitat channel: As households have preferences as to always save via public debt
to some degree, reduced yields on government bonds by central-bank purchases
will induce them to save less and spend more instead.
65One would expect both frictions to increase the eectiveness of asset purchases (whose in-
ationary eect would lighten labour market rigidity and reduce the real exchange rate), so my
results can maybe be seen as a lower bound of the stimulatory eect of APPs. Also note that pub-
lications like De Santis (2016) and Bundesbank (2016) mention the exchange-rate channel of the
APPs, but to my knowledge no structural model investigates it.
66Cúrdia and Woodford (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) are other early contributions
including a role for asset purchases in DSGE models.
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Figure 34: Balance sheet for rms, commercial and wholesale banks and govern-
ment
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Note: D deposits; S loans; A assets; N net worth; B gov. bonds; K capital; see text for details
[graph not to scale of calibration].
The nancial frictions that give a role to the dierent asset classes in the model
are shortly discussed upfront in a non-technical manner. Figure 34 shows the
transmission of household savings (in the form of deposits Dt) into investments
(in the form of capital Kt or government bonds Bt) via the balance sheets of the
nancial-sector agents (to be read from right to left). As the net worth of both com-
mercial and wholesale banks, N ct and Nwt , is nally consumed by households, it
also represents savings in a larger sense. Commercial banks nance loans to rms
Sct , and holdings of bonds Bct and nancial assets Act , by their net worth N ct and
deposits Dt. A costly-enforcement problem due to the possibility that bankers di-
vert funds leads to endogenously determined constraints on their balance sheets
and a nancial accelerator through changes in their balance sheet composition.
Note that there are no defaults of these loans in the model,67 and that there will be
67See Kuehl (2016) for a contribution that does model rm loans with default.
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no dierence between rm loans or bonds for simplicity. In fact, I will call Sct both
“loans” and “(corporate) bonds” interchangeably below. Moreover, nancial assets
Awt are created by wholesale banks from securitised loans or bonds Swt , and held
by commercial banks as Act . Firm capital Kt must consist of either direct loans Sct
or securitised borrowing, Swt . Kt and government debt Bt are the only types of
nal investment.
In the following, the model is outlined in detail. Derivations of rst-order con-
ditions, as well as an overview of all model equations in levels and log-linearised
form can be found in Appendices C.1, C.2 and D.
3.2.1 Households
Households save via both bank deposits and domestic bonds.68 Their savings pref-
erences are represented by a CES composite index over depositsDt and bond hold-
ings Bht:
Savt =
[
κ
1
s
s D
s−1
s
t + (1− κs)
1
s (Bht )
s−1
s
] s
s−1
,
where κs is the steady-state share of bonds in savings Savt, and s the elasticity of
substitution between the two assets. The aggregate return on savings is given by
the identity
RhtSavt = RtDt +RbtBht ,
where Rht, Rt and Rbt are the (safe) gross real return on household savings, de-
posits and government bonds.69 Note that these savings preferences induce house-
holds always to hold some part of their savings in domestic bonds. Thus, purchases
of bonds by the central bank, which drive up their price and lower their yield Rbt,
will induce households to save less. This eect will be bigger, the smaller κs, and
68The latter is justied by the fact that life insurance schemes and pension funds savings, which
constitute a large part of household savings, are largely based on government bond holdings in the
EA (see the calibration below).
69I will denote gross interest rates/returns by capital letters and net interest ones by small letters
throughout.
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the more inelastic households’ bond demand, i.e. the smaller s.
Households solve the problem70
max
Ct,Lt,Savt
∞∑
t=0
βtxdt
(
(Ct − hCt−1)1−σ
1− σ − χxlt
L1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
)
(8)
s.t. Ct + Savt + Tt = wtLt +Rht−1Savt−1 + Πt. (9)
The household receives utility from consumption Ct, subject to external habits at
degree h, and disutility from supplying hours or labour Lt. β is its discount factor,
σ its inter-temporal elasticity of substitution of consumption, ϕ the inverse Frisch
elasticity and χ is a disutility parameter that helps pin down the steady state of Lt.
Utility in every period is subject to an exogenous AR(1) shock to inter-temporal
preferences, xdt (reducing patience and spurring consumption at the expense of
savings and investment), and to intra-temporal preferences, xlt (a “labour supply
shock” shifting the consumption/leisure trade-o towards leisure).71
The budget constraint for households (in real terms) further species their be-
haviour: Besides consuming and saving, households receive lump-sum transfers Tt
from the government and central bank. Households nance their expenditures by
(real) wage income wtLt, the returns from savings, Rht−1Savt, and the combined
prots of retailers, capital producers, and banks, Πt.
3.2.2 Productive rms
Competitive rms combine existing capitalKt−1 and labourLt to create output Ypt
according to a Cobb-Douglas production function with capital share α and subject
to a stochastic AR(1) variation in total factor productivity xpt:
Ypt = xptK
α
t−1L
1−α
t (10)
70All rst-order conditions and resulting model equations are derived in Appendix C.1.
71All shock processes are outlined in Subsection 3.2.10.
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They rent capital Kt−1 at the (net) real return of productive capital rpkt and sell
their output Yt to the retailer at price Ppt, solving the prot maximisation problem
max
Kt−1,Lt
PptYpt − rpktKt−1 − wtLt s.t. (10)
A rm buys its capital stock from the capital producer and nances the pur-
chase via bank loans St from banks commercial and wholesale banks (loans are
idiosyncratic from the rm’s perspective). As returns on capital are perfectly ob-
servable for the commercial bank, the rm can pledge all its returns on capital to
the banks. While its outlays for the productive capital stock in period t − 1 will
be Qst−1Kt−1 (where Qst is the price of capital), its returns in t are [(1− δ)Qst +
rpkt]Kt−1. This denes the gross return on capital as72
Rst =
(1− δ)Qst + rpkt
Qst−1
. (11)
3.2.3 Capital producers
Capital producers are owned by households, thus discounting at %t. At the end
of period t, they obtain non-depreciated old capital (1 − δ)Kt−1 from the rms,
mend it with the consumption good and sell the new capital Kt back to the rms.
They undergo a cost of unity for this mending, implying investments of size It,
subject to an investment-specic technology shock xit as in Justiniano, Primiceri,
72In a potential estimation, one could include a risk-premium term ηt here to capture announce-
ment or signalling eects that might aect investment over and above the bare fundamentals. Eq.
(11) would become
Rst =
(1− δ)Qst + rpkt/ηt
Qst−1
,
where the risk premium could be aected by asset purchases as
log(ηt) = −ψsSgt − ψbBgt − ψaAgt .
So for ψi > 0, i ∈ {s, b, a}, asset purchases will lower the risk premium, giving asset purchases
an additional expansionary eect via a not further specied “market sentiment” or “signalling”
channel. This possibility is, however, not pursued in the following.
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and Tambalotti (2011):
Kt = xitIt + (1− δ)Kt−1 (12)
New capital trades at price Qst as there are quadratic adjustment costs when
changing the level of investment It from its level in the previous period, so the
capital producers solve
max
It
eEt
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt
%t
%0
[
Qst − 1− χI
2
xit
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2]
It
}
.
3.2.4 Retailer
The retailer is owned by the households, so it shares their discounting settings. It
buys output from the productive rm at price Ppt and transforms it into a retail
good without incurring any cost. Due to monopolistic competition, a retailer z has
some pricing power when setting its price Pt(z) according to the demand Yt(z).
Specically, I assume the demand function
Yt(z) = (Pt(z)/Pt)
−p Yt,
where Yt is total demand and p the price elasticity of substitution between goods.
Nominal price-setting frictions arise from retailers being able to adjust their price
only with probability (1− γ), while indexing it to lagged ination at degree κp if
no resetting is possible. The retailer thus resets its price optimally at P ∗t solving
max
P ∗t
eE0
{ ∞∑
i=0
γiβi
%t+i
%0
[
P ∗t
Pt+i
i∏
j=1
(1 + pit+j−1)κp − Ppt+i
](
Pt+i(z)
Pt+i
)−p
Yt
}
.
(13)
3.2.5 Commercial banks
Some household members become commercial bankers every period. As bankers,
they cannot consume, but will maximise their bank’s net worth. With some exoge-
nous probability, bankers retire back to being households and consume their whole
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net worth.73 Commercial banks manage households’ deposits and guarantee a safe
return Rt on them. Bank j operates by combining its net worth (or equity) N ct (j)
with deposits Dt(j) borrowed at gross rate Rt, in order to nance loans to rms
and the holding of bonds and nancial assets. Since there is no friction between
rms and commercial banks, the value of its loans Sct (j) corresponds to the value
of capital,Qst. Moreover, bank j holds bondsBct (j) at priceQbt and buys nancial
assets Act(j) from the wholesale bank (see below) at price Qat. The balance sheet
identity for any commercial bank equates its balance-sheet assets (loans, bonds
and nancial assets) to its liabilities (deposits and net worth):
QstS
c
t (j) +QbtB
c
t (j) +QatA
c
t(j) = Dt(j) +N
c
t (j) (14)
The commercial bank cannot raise new equity to increase its net worth, so N ct (j)
only grows through retained earnings. As there is no friction between rms and
commercial banks, the later earn the stochastic (gross) return on capital Rst+1 on
loans Sct (j). Moreover, they earn a return Rbt+1 from bonds Bct (j) and Rat+1 from
nancial assets Act(j). The law of motion of an existing commercial bank j’s net
worth is given by
N ct+1(j) = Rst+1QstS
c
t (j) +Rbt+1QbtB
c
t (j) +Rat+1QatA
c
t(j)−RtDt(j) (15)
In the following, I will neglect the qualier j and directly use the fact that all
commercial banks are symmetric in equilibrium and can be treated as one aggre-
gate commercial bank. The return on government bonds and assets is given by
Rbt =
rb +Qbt
Qbt−1
(16)
Rat =
ra +Qat
Qat−1
. (17)
73This assumption rules out that banks’ net worth grows large enough to fully nance their
operations.
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Dene the commercial-bank leverage of bank loans over net worth as
φct =
QstS
c
t
N ct
(18)
Now we come to the frictions that give a role to nancial intermediation in the
rst place. The central assumption is a moral-hazard problem as in Gertler and
Karadi (2011): Commercial bankers can choose to transfer (“divert”) the deposits
they receive back to their households. Depositors will then force the banker into
bankruptcy and recover some of the assets, but a share λc of the diverted deposits
cannot be recovered due to costly enforcement. This will lead to an endogenous
bank leverage, as banks will only receive deposits up to an incentive-compatibility
constraint, eq. (20) below. The second important assumption adds a role for Bct
andAct : I assume that depositors consider both bonds and nancial assets as better
collateral against fund diversion than loans. That assumption can be justied by
the more liquid nature of assets like bonds or securitised loans as compared to
rm loans, whose valuation may be possible only for the commercial banks which
have a close client relationship with the rms.74 This implies that banks have an
additional value of holding these assets instead of loans on their balance sheet:
As Bct and Act are harder to divert, they can be pledged to depositors to a higher
degree, allowing banks to operate under higher leverage and thus increasing their
prots.
Technically, I assume that bonds Bct and nancial assets Act have an additional
collateral value ∆b and ∆a, respectively. The agency problem in combination with
the higher collateral value of assets leads to the incentive compatibility constraint
(20) below: The continuation value of the bank has to be at least as large as the
share λc of loans and nancial assets that can be diverted, where it is harder for
bankers to divert bonds and assets by a factor ∆b and ∆a, respectively.
Bankers operating the commercial bank have the sole objective of maximising
74See Gertler and Karadi (2013). Meeks, Nelson, and Alessandri (2014, p. 14) state further argu-
ments why this assumption seems justied for the case of asset-backed securities. Here, this higher
collateral value can be motivated by the fact that government debt Bct is generally less prone to
default than corporate debt, and by interpreting Act as a pool of rm loans whose return is more
easily observed by the public.
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the discounted net worth of the bank.75 A commercial bank’s value function thus
is
Vct = max
Sct ,B
c
t ,A
c
t
Et
{ ∞∑
t=0
(1− θc)θtcβt
%t+1
%t
N ct+1
}
(19)
s.t. N ct+1 = Rst+1QstSct +Rbt+1QbtBct +Rat+1QatAct −RtDt (15)
Vct ≥ λc [QstSct + ∆bQbtBct + ∆aQatAct ] (20)
This means a commercial bank maximises the net worth of its members which
go back to households every period (a share 1 − θc), subject to the evolution of
net worth (15) and the incentive-compatibility constraint that its continuation (or
“going-concern”) value Vct is at least as large as the value of assets that can be
diverted, eq. (20). We can employ a guess-and-verify approach to show that the
going-concern value Vct can be re-written as a function that is linear in QstSct ,
QbtB
c
t , QatAct and N ct :
Vct = µstQstSct + µbtQbtBct + µatQatAct + νtN ct ,
where µst, µbt, µat and νt are the discounted expected values of expanding the
existing commercial banks’ loans (µst), bonds (µbt), nancial assets (µat) and net
worth (νt) by a marginal unit, respectively, holding the other items constant (see
Appendix C.1 for a detailed derivation). This allows us to rewrite the incentive
compatibility constraint as
φct ≤
νt(
1 + ∆b
QbtB
c
t
QstSct
+ ∆a
QatAct
QstSct
)
(λc − µst)
Intuitively, the equation species that ceteris paribus the endogenous commer-
cial bank leverage will be higher when the marginal value of net worth, νt is high.
It will be lower when the fraction of assets that can be diverted, λc, is high, but this
eect will be attenuated when banks have incentives to remain in business due to
75In fact, this setup is equivalent to banks maximising dividend payments for the case that these
are only feasible with an exogenous probability θc every period.
103
a high marginal value of loans, µst. The reason why the marginal values of bonds
and assets, µbt and µat, do not show up in this equation is that in equilibrium rms
will always choose to hold bonds and assets as to keep µbt and µat as a constant
fraction of ∆b and ∆a of µst, respectively. This is due to the following arbitrage
conditions:
µbt = ∆bµst
µat = ∆aµst
So the bank will hold assets such that the net value of the assets on its balance
sheet will co-move at a ratio that is determined by the degree of asset pledgeability.
This optimal adjustment of balance-sheet assets will equate returns between asset
groups perfectly in the absence of further frictions, as suggested by the portfolio-
rebalancing channel. However, there is empirical evidence for the existence of a
local-scarcity channel (under which asset returns are not fully equated): Altavilla
et al. (2015) show that the announcements of APPs by the ESCB aect the spreads
of various asset classes dierently (see the calibration in Section 3.3 below). There-
fore, I introduce a wedge into the arbitrage conditions above by assuming a diver-
sion premium in the collateral value of an asset that decreases in the amount of it
purchased: ∆j will be higher (i.e. it will be relatively harder to divert asset j), the
more of it is purchased.76 I introduce this premium as
∆bt = ∆b exp{ηbBgt − ηsbSgt } (21)
∆at = ∆a exp{ηaAgt − ηsaSgt } (22)
Thus, when the central buys government bonds Bgt or a securitised asset A
g
t , it
will also increase this asset’s collateral value (i.e. of Bct or Act ) relative to loans Sct ,
76This assumption of a diversion premium is a simple way to introduce dierences in yields
resulting from purchases. A microeconomic underpinning could be that government purchases
will raise public attention to the assets bought, making them harder to divert. Alternatively, the
market perception of the safety of the assets might be raised, allowing rms to intermediate more
deposits for each unit of the asset held on its balance sheet. The result in any case is a divergence
of spreads, with the spread decreasing more for the asset that is being purchased. This prohibits a
perfect rebalancing of bank portfolios and gives rise to the local-scarcity eect of purchases.
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which increases the spread of the asset and makes it more worthwhile to hold on
the commercial bank’s balance sheet. Similarly, when the central bank purchases
loans Sgt , the relative collateral value of Bct and Act will diminish.
Finally, note that the aggregate law of motion of commercial bank net worth
deviates slightly from the net worth of existing commercial banks, equation (15):
Only a fraction θc of bankers continues from one period to the other, carrying
over the last period’s net worth grown according to (15). The existing net worth is
subject to a valuation shock xnt, representing a disturbance to the nancial sector
itself as after 2007. Moreover, there are transfers from households to new entrants
into the commercial banking business. Like Gertler and Karadi (2011), I assume
that these transfers equal a constant fraction ωc of existing banks’ loans and -
nancial assets:77
N ct = θc
[
(Rst −Rt−1)Qst−1Sct−1 + (Rbt −Rt−1)Qbt−1Bct−1
= + (Rat −Rt−1)Qat−1Act−1 +Rt−1N ct−1
]
/xnt
= + ωc(QstS
c
t−1 +QbtB
c
t−1 +QatA
c
t−1) (23)
3.2.6 Wholesale banks
While commercial banks are a stand-in for the more “standard” savings banks in
Europe, wholesale banks are an umbrella concept capturing specialised services
within the nancial sector. In particular, wholesale banks are supposed to capture
any nancial intermediation creating assets “held for trading” or held-to-maturity
outside of the originating institution.78 Their existence allows for some hetero-
geneity within the banking sector: Wholesale banks do not deal with households
77Note that in Meeks et al. (2014), transfers occur at last period’s market price for loans, Qjt−1,
instead.
78The modelling of this type of securitising bank goes back to Meeks et al. (2014). For example,
one could imagine wholesale banks as traders originating and distributing specialised corporate
bonds (valued by banks due to their superior collateral value, e.g. due to their higher liquidity).
Alternatively, we could picture them as shadow banks creating securitised assets from commercial
banks’ loans, an interpretation taken e.g. in Meeks et al. (2014). In this case, the higher collateral
value derives from the fact that under securitisation, several loans are bundled, so that a potential
lemons problem becomes attenuated. Yet another interpretation could be as equity-nanced hedge
funds or funds of funds whose shares are held by commercial banks.
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directly, have a higher leverage than commercial banks and survive with a lower
probability (θw < θc), which makes their net worth react faster to shocks. Also,
they generate the third type of assets: Be they covered bonds or securitised loans,
these assets are more liquid than loans and therefore a better collateral.
Analogous to above, some household members become wholesale bankers ev-
ery period. Like commercial bankers, wholesale bankers have the sole objective of
maximising nal net worth, but they operate with a dierent technology: They are
experts in creating liquid nancial assets based on corporate debt, and selling them
to the commercial banks. Wholesale banks’ balance sheet assets Swt (newly ac-
quired bonds, non-securitised loans, direct investments via hedged funding) priced
at Qst, are equal to their liabilities, nancial assets Awt originated and distributed
to the commercial banks at price Qat, and the wholesale bank net worth Nwt (I
aggregate over individual banks at once):
QstS
w
t = QatA
w
t +N
w
t (24)
Wholesale bank leverage is dened as balance-sheet assets over net worth
φwt ≡
QstS
w
t
Nwt
. (25)
The wholesale bank’s value function is
Vwt = max
Swt
Et
{ ∞∑
t=0
(1− θw)θtwβt
%t+1
%t
Nwt+1
}
(26)
s.t. Nwt+1 = (Rst+1 −Rat)QstSwt +RtNwt
Vwt ≥ λwQstSct
This means that analogous to commercial banks, wholesale banks maximise the
consumption by retiring bankers (at retirement rate 1 − θw), subject to a law of
motion of (individual) net worth Nwt (j) and an incentive-compatibility constraint
prescribing that the value of the bank operations Vwt be larger than the bank loans
that can be diverted. As above, we can use a guess-and-verify approach to show
that Vwt can be re-written as a linear function of QstSwt , QatAwt and Nwt (again
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see Appendix C.1). Moreover, wholesale banks are also subject to an endogenous
balance sheet constraint: Their bankers can divert funds like commercial bankers.
However, I assume that the fraction of diverted funds that cannot be recovered, λw,
is lower than for commercial banks, leading to a less costly enforcement problem
and a higher leverage for wholesale banks. This assumption can be justied both
intuitively (wholesale bankers operate in more formalised markets, e.g. the bond
market) and empirically: The leverage ratios of commercial banks are lower than
those for more specialised nancial intermediaries.79 As above, an incentive com-
patibility constraint ensures that leverage is contained such that the continuation
value of wholesale banks surmounts the gains from diversion:
φwt =
νwt
λw − µwt
, (27)
where νwt and ηwt are the discounted expected value of expanding the existing
wholesale bank balance-sheet assets QstSwt and net worth Nwt by a marginal unit,
respectively, while holding the respective other constant (see Appendix C.1).
Net worth can only be increased by retaining earnings from the share of non-
retiring wholesale bankers, θw. Moreover, entering bankers obtain a constant share
ωw of total intermediated funds in the wholesale banking sector QstSwt−1, so that
the law of motion for aggregate wholesale-bank net worth is given as
Nwt = θw[(Rst −Rat)φwt−1 +Rat]Nwt−1 + ωwQstSwt−1. (28)
79For example, the ratio of total assets/liabilities to capital and reserves between 2010 and 2016
is 13.72 for Credit Institutions, but 59.81 for Financial Vehicles (Source: ECB Statistical Warehouse
Database). The corresponding model assumption is that wholesale bankers’ ability to divert assets,
i.e. the relative share that can be diverted λw , is lower than that for commercial banks. One possible
motivation is that as wholesale banks deal with other bankers and not households, their counter-
parties will be harder to steal from. The assumption that their net worth reacts faster to shocks
is due to the fact that shadow banks and hedge funds in reality largely rely on other banks and
investors for the funding of their net worth. This funding can be withdrawn at short notice, leading
to more unstable funding than that of commercial banks’ capital (see Doyle, Hermans, Molitor, and
Weistroer, 2016).
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3.2.7 Monetary policy
The central bank has two roles in the model: Under conventional monetary policy,
it sets the nominal return on short-term bonds,
Rpt = Rt · pit+1
according to a Taylor rule with the objective of stabilising ination around a target
(or steady-state) ination level of pi. I assume that the policy reaction is persistent
at degree ρR, and that a shock xrt captures surprise actions by conventional mon-
etary policy:
Rpt = R
ρR
pt−1
[
Rp ·
(pit
pi
)κpi]1−ρR
xrt (29)
Moreover, the central bank has several options for unconventional monetary
policy: It can buy government debt Bgt , acquire nancial assets A
g
t or directly in-
termediate loans Sgt . These purchases can be modelled in two ways: First, as an
exogenous AR(1) shocks, like xst in the case of loan purchases. Second, purchases
can be undertaken as a reaction function to a fall in ination, to proxy the moti-
vation behind ESCB’s current APPs. This gives purchases as
Sgt = −Ψpis(pit − pi) +K · xst (30)
Bgt = −Ψpib(pit − pi) +B · xbt (31)
Agt = −Ψpia(pit − pi) + Aw · xat. (32)
Note that I will shut o the reactions functions (Ψpij = 0) if not otherwise stated.
The central bank renances these purchases by increasing reserves for the
banks. Reserves get the same return as deposits and cannot be diverted, so that they
enlarge banks’ balance sheet without aecting leverage.80 The asset-purchases
generate seigniorage, which is redistributed to households in the form of lump-
sum transfers. There is a potential eciency cost τp > 0 for the central bank to
80See Gertler and Karadi (2013), pp. 22f., for why this would be equivalent to assuming the central
bank nances purchases by issuing some short-term debt directly to households.
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hold any of the assets, reecting potentially less ecient intermediation by central
bankers than banks (see the goods market clearing condition below). Finally, the
(quarterly) APPs aect the size of the central bank balance sheet CBBSt relative
to steady state annual GDP as
BSt ≡ CBBSt
4 · Y =
QstS
g
t +QbtB
g
t +QatA
g
t
4 · Y . (33)
3.2.8 Welfare
As bankers only can consume their net worth once returned to the households,
overall welfare is given by a value function for households’ per-period utility, (8).
Households derive utility from consumption and leisure as specied above, and
discount future welfare by the discount factor β:
Wt = xdt
(
(Ct − hCt−1)1−σ
1− σ − χ
L1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
)
+ βWt+1. (34)
3.2.9 Market clearing
Productive rms’ total capital stock will equal the lending to them via loans Sct ,
bonds or securitised loans Swt and direct government intermediation S
g
t :
Kt = S
c
t + S
w
t + S
g
t (35)
The supply for long-term assets is xed at B. Markets for bonds and nancial
assets clear:
B = Bct +B
h
t +B
g
t (36)
Awt = A
c
t + A
g
t (37)
Finally, goods markets clear: Output is used on private and (exogenous) gov-
ernment consumption, investment, adjustment costs for capital producer, and the
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central bank cost of intermediating bank balance sheet items:
Yt = Ct + It
[
1 +
χI
2
xit
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2]
+Gt + τp (S
g
t + A
g
t +B
g
t ) (38)
3.2.10 Shocks
The shocks to inter-temporal preferences (“preference shock”) and intra-temporal
preferences (labour-supply shock), total factor productivity, investment technol-
ogy, commercial banks’ net worth, monetary policy, government consumption,
and the three types of asset purchases (j ∈ {s, b, a}) follow AR(1) processes:81
log(xjt) = ρj log(xjt−1) + σjεjt ∀j ∈ {d, l, p, i, n, r, g, s, b, a} (39)
3.3 Calibration
Non-nancial sectors. I calibrate the model to quarterly EA data for the ZLB
episode (2009Q1 to 2015Q4); all calibrated parameters are summarised in Table
4. Some “standard” DSGE model parameters – elasticity of consumption σ, habit
parameter h, inverse Frisch elasticity ϕ, Calvo parameter γ – are taken from the
posteriors of Smets and Wouters (2003). Although their paper does not include -
nancial frictions, its core model is very similar to mine, the data are comparable
and the values are in line with other models estimated for the EA like Christoel,
Coenen, and Warne (2008). However, due to the lack of additional nancial fric-
tions, I set the (quarterly) investment adjustment costs χI to 3, a value lower than
their suggest 6.77, but larger than the 1.728 in Gertler and Karadi (2011). The cap-
ital share α is set to the value of 0.4 and the Frisch elasticity to 0.276. The degree
of retailer price indexation κp is set to zero. As deposit rates during 2009-14 were
far below the value of 4% p.a. implied by the standard discount factor of β = 0.99,
I choose them to take a lower 2%, yielding β = 0.995. The depreciation rate is
set to δ = 0.025. The government share G/Y is calibrated to 0.196 in line with
data from the area-wide model, see Appendix D.2. Moreover, I assume a zero net
ination steady state, so pi = 1. The degree of interest-rate smoothing ρR is set to
81Note that not all shocks are used in the following analysis.
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0.9 and the Taylor rule weight on ination is 1.5 (while for the analysis conducted
at the ZLB below, φpi = 0). The elasticity of substitution between retailer inputs,
p, is 4.167, implying a steady-state price markup of around 30 percent.
Financial sector. I set the survival probability of commercial bankers to θc =
0.9, while for wholesale banks I specify θw = 0.75. This means net worth accumu-
lation for wholesale banks is less persistent than for commercial banks and swings
in asset prices aect the former more strongly, as observed during the nancial cri-
sis. The values are both between the 0.972 chosen in Gertler and Karadi (2011) and
the considerably lower estimates for the US in Canova, Ferroni, and Matthes (2016).
The eciency cost of the central bank holding assets on its balance sheet, τp, is
set to zero. In fact, an eciency cost larger than zero will mechanically increase
output in the fashion of an aggregate demand shock (like government spending in
my model), which I hold to be undesirable.82 The loan spread is calibrated as the
dierence between loans and deposit rates between 2009 and 2016 (see Appendix
D.2), so we have [Remps − Remp]/4 = 0.0056 for the empirical series. Similarly,
Rb−R is calibrated as the dierence between a synthetic 10-year EA government
bond yield and deposit rates as [Rempb − Remp]/4 = 0.0038. As returns on securi-
ties are harder to come by, I set their return to a suggestive intermediate value:
Ra = (Rs − Rb)/2, implying that securitised debt has a collateral value between
that of corporate loans and government bonds. The pledgeability of bonds and -
nancial assets relative to loans, ∆b and ∆a, implicitly dene the bond and asset
spread, Rb − R and Ra − R (see below). Moreover, I set the spread between the
composite household returns,Rh, and the returns on deposits,R, to half the spread
between bond yields and deposits, to a (quarterly) 0.0019. The motivation is that
EA households hold similar amounts of their savings in deposits and life insurance
and deposits (see the calibration of s below).
Shocks. The persistence of the asset purchase shocks is set to 0.9755, as the
quarterly autocorrelation of the sum of SMP and PSPP is 0.9758 and that of CBPP1-
82My simulations suggest that this channel actually drives the output reaction to asset purchases
in Gertler and Karadi (2013) to a non-negligible degree.
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3 and ABSPP is 0.9751. The persistence of all other shocks is set to a suggestive 0.7.
The standard deviation of shocks is set to 0.1 if shocks are not targeted to certain
macroeconomic eects (see below).
Table 4: Calibration choices
real economy nancial sector
capital share α 0.4 CB survival probability θc 0.9
discount factor β 0.995 WB survival probability θw 0.75
depreciation rate δ 0.025 CeB cost of holding APPs τp 0
intertemp. elast. of subst. σ 1.35 SS loan spread Rs −R 0.0056
Frisch elasticity ϕ 0.276 rel. spread bonds ∆b 0.6892
investment AC χI 3 rel. spread assets ∆a 0.8446
habit parameter h 0.829 SS CB loan leverage φc 4.52
elast. of subst. goods p 4.167 SS WB leverage φw 10
Calvo parameter γ 0.908 SS bonds/loans Ξb 0.3837
Taylor rule weight pit κpi 1.5 SS assets/loans Ξa 0.3720
interest-rate smoothing ρR 0.9 APP reaction parameters Ψpi{s,b,a} 0
SS HH return spread Rh −R 0.0019
SS ination rate pi 1 shocks
SS labour supply L 1/3 persistence APP shocks ρj , j = s, b, a 0.9755
SS gvt. spending / GDP G/Y 0.196 persistence other shocks ρj , j 6= s, b, a 0.7
degree price indexation κp 0 standard deviation σj 0.1
Note: SS = steady state, HH = household, CB = commercial bank, WB = wholesale bank,
gvt. = government, CeB = central bank, elast. of subst. = elasticity of substitution, AC =
adjustment costs.
Finally, I calibrate the values of certain parameters to dene the steady-state
values of certain variables (for details, see Appendix D.1):
• The disutility parameter of supplying labour, χ, is set as to ensure L = 1/3,
a widely used value for the steady-state labour supply or hours.
• The steady-state amount of bonds held by households, B¯h, is set such that
the steady-state shares of total bonds, Bh/B, equals 0.7741 as in the data
(see Appendix D.2). This subsumes all bond holdings of agents other than
deposit-taking corporations.
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• The capital stock K is pinned down in steady state by the choice for the
loan spread Rs − R. ∆b and ∆a are set to target Rb − R = 0.0039 and
Ra −R = 0.0048, see Appendix D.2.
• The shares of bank funds that can be diverted by bankers, λc and λw, are
implied by the (targeted) steady-state leverages of wholesale banks and of
commercial banks with respect to loans, set to φc = 4.52 and φw = 10.
The former value is calibrated to the commercial bank leverage ratio (App.
D.2); for the latter, I put the same value as Meeks et al. (2014) – see their
footnote 24 on the wide array of leverage ratios potentially to consider here.
As stated above, wholesale banks capture a variety of dierent banks. For
shadow banks, and especially investment funds, nominal leverage ratios
(simple asset-to-equity ratios) are usually lower than for commercial banks,
and especially for investment funds (Malatesta, Masciantonio, and Zaghini,
2016). However, a key characteristics of these banks is that their equity can
be withdrawn at short notice, making de-facto funding more unstable (Doyle
et al., 2016). On the other hand, classic nancial vehicles in the securitising
business often have staggering leverage ratios: For example, while the ra-
tio of total assets/liabilities to capital and reserves between 2010 and 2016 is
13.72 for Credit Institutions, it is 59.81 for Financial Vehicles (Source: ECB
Statistical Warehouse Database). These high leverage ratios are also in line
with Bakk-Simon, Borgioli, Giron, Hempell, Maddaloni, Recine, and Rosati
(2012). In conclusion, I set a higher leverage ratio for the wholesale bank as
a portmanteau of all these banks, but check the sensitivity of my results to
φw below.
• Household transfers to entering banks, ωc and ωw, are set as to meet the
values for steady-state bonds and nancial assets over total loans, Ξb and
Ξa. These are calibrated to 0.3837 and 0.3720 using balance sheet data from
the SDW database, see Appendix D.2.
• The share of deposits in overall household savings, κs, is obtained as 0.5196
from the calibration, implying D/Bh = 1.0817. This comes surprisingly
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close to the ratio of household holdings of currency and deposits over house-
hold holdings of life insurance and pensions for the EA, which is 1.0216. The
elasticity between household deposit and government bond holdings, s, also
implied by steady-state relationships, is 0.0335 (see Appendix D.1).
• I calibrate the risk-premium parameters ηb and ηa as follows: Altavilla et al.
(2015) show that around the APP event dates, spreads of Euro Area 5-year
maturity bonds decreased by 35 basis points (bps) relative to German bunds
(taken to represent the risk-free rate).83 At the same time, spreads for bonds
by BBB-rated nancial corporations fell by 27 bps and those of BBB-rated
non-nancial corporations by 22 bps (all these are from the controlled event
study in Table 5, p. 38).84 The announcements considered in this paper are
mostly about the Public Sector PP. So let us take the average eect of Bgt on
public and non-public debt to be 35 and 27 bps, respectively. Now this gives
us a (rough) measure of the eect of Bgt on Rbt−Rt, the public-debt spread
in my model, over Rst−Rt (or Rat−Rt). I extrapolate to other asset classes
and set ηj , j ∈ {b, a, sb, sa} such that the impact eect of the asset bought
on its own spread is always 35/27 = 1.30 as large as for other assets.85
Note that my calibration implies the following values for the share of bank assets
that can be diverted: λc = 0.2551 and λw = 0.1292. Moreover, it implies propor-
tional transfers to entering bankers of ωc = 0.0007 and ωw = 0.0116. While λc
and ωw are in line with recent parameter estimates by Canova et al. (2016), λw and
ωc both lie somewhat below the estimates there. The dierence is mostly due to
the very low interest rates and spreads that prevail under my calibration.
I examine the sensitivity of my simulations to some key parameters below.
83See the 2-day change of their controlled event study in Table 5, p. 38.
84Gagnon et al. (2011) report similar magnitudes for the US LSAP announcements, which were,
however, undertaken during times of more acute nancial distress.
85So for example, Rbt − Rt will react to Bgt 1.30 times as much as the average of Rat − Rt or
Rst −Rt.
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3.4 Results
This section presents results from several simulations of my model. First, the reac-
tions to some shocks widely used in the literature are shown in order to convince
the reader that my nancial sector does not distort the standard model dynamics.
Second, I give some intuition about the dynamics resulting from asset purchases
after a disinationary shock, with a look at the transmission channels and sensi-
tivity of results to some key parameters.
3.4.1 Results for some standard shocks
Here I show some impulse responses for shocks common in the DSGE literature:
A shock to total factor productivity, xpt, as the quintessential supply shock, to
(wasteful) government spending; xgt, as a demand shock; to the Taylor rule pol-
icy rate (monetary policy shock xrt); and to commercial banks’ net worth, as a
stand-in for shocks to the nancial sector (xnt).86 All shocks are chosen to have a
contractionary eect on output, leading to a trough of 1 percentage point below
the steady-state value.
We see that a TFP shock will decrease output and investment, while raising
prices as marginal costs increase. As the marginal productivity of capital falls, re-
turns on lending are depressed and commercial bank leverage φct remains below its
steady-state value for an extended period. A negative government spending shock
will depress overall demand, but simultaneously crowd out household consump-
tion. The resulting increase in savings leads to a rise in investment under my cali-
bration, amplied by an increase in the value of loans and thus banks’ net worth,
leading to an extension of leverage and a fall in spreads. A monetary policy shock
will decrease aggregate demand by increasing savings. This reduces the scope for
investment and depresses bank prots, net worth, and leverage, with the lend-
ing spread increasing strongly. Finally, a negative shock to commercial banks’ net
worth N ct will force banks to reduce lending in order to de-leverage, thus leading
to depressed investment, output and prices.
This illustrates that in spite of the quite complex nancial sector in my setup,
86The non-nancial shocks are those used also in Gust, Herbst, López-Salido, and Smith (2017).
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the model still generates traceable dynamics to standard shocks.87
Figure 35: Responses to several common DSGE shocks
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Notes: Impulse responses (percentage deviations from steady state) to unexpected inno-
vations in TFP technology xpt, (wasteful) government spending xgt, monetary policy xrt,
and the net worth of commercial banks (a nancial shock) xnt, each following an AR(1)
process with persistence parameter ρj = 0.7. All shocks are dened to be contractionary
and lead to a trough of GDP 1% below its steady state.
87Moreover, Subsection D.3.1 in the Appendix shows that my model is able to replicate the im-
pulse responses from the Gertler and Karadi (2013) model under their (US) calibration (and with
the wholesale bank as well as preferred-habitat and local-scarcity channel, which are not included
in their model, switched o). This can be seen as another check for internal consistency of the
model.
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3.4.2 Responses to asset purchases
Figure 36 gives the responses to central bank purchases of bonds Bgt , nancial as-
sets Agt and corporate-sector debt S
g
t under my calibration. These correspond to
ESCB purchases under 1. the public sector PP, 2. the asset-backed securities PP and
covered bond PP and 3. the corporate sector PP. The shocks are calibrated to be of
the same size on the central bank balance sheet, reaching a maximum of 2.42% of
(annual) steady-state GDP, roughly equivalent of the (quarterly) €240bn relative
to the annual EA nominal GDP.88 The autoregressive coecient of the exogenous
shock to the respective asset purchases is set to 0.9755 to reect the strong auto-
correlation of the APPs (up to now). Note that in this experiment, conventional
monetary policy is not yet switched o and will counteract the asset purchases.
88The average EA annual nominal GDP for 2009Q1:2016Q3 was €9,936.8bn according to Eurostat.
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Figure 36: Responses to unexpected purchases of dierent asset classes
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Notes: Impulse responses to unexpected purchases of loans (εst ), bonds (εbt ), and assets (εat ),
each following an AR(1) process with persistence 0.9755.
The bank-balance sheet channel. In the following, I will rst look at the re-
actions to purchases of corporate loans, Sgt . These are solely driven by the bank-
balance sheet channel, which (to a varying degree) is common to all asset pur-
chase shocks here. I will then look at the additional transmission channels specic
to other asset purchases. We see that in fact all shocks increase the central-bank
balance sheet by 2.42% on impact (rst plot). The purchases increase the prices of
the targeted assets and thus reduce their yields, which is also visible in a spread
reduction. There are strong co-movements in asset prices, or, in terms of Altavilla
et al. (2015), there is considerable portfolio rebalancing as the commercial bank
adjusts all of its asset holdings. However, spreads are most strongly reduced for
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the respective assets being purchased, in line with the local-scarcity channel.89
We see that the leverage of commercial banks is generally increased by the rise
in asset prices. The resulting increase in lending translates into higher investment
on impact, with a hump-shape due to capital adjustment costs. After some time,
however, investment falls below its steady-state value as the eect of purchases
recedes and the capital stock slowly moves back to its steady state. The investment
boom greatly determines the dynamics of output and ination, pulling them up
and later down with it. Consumption generally acts as a “buer”, in that it will
increase when the capital stock is large but investment is already receding.
As a side note, it should be mentioned that in my model, a rise in asset prices
after central-bank QE will always stimulate investment as banks will mechani-
cally increase lending when their balance-sheets allow them to. However, as doc-
umented in Altavilla, Canova, and Ciccarelli (2016), this mechanical increase in
lending might not be empirically valid. Banks could instead choose to invest in
other assets like housing or foreign investment, which are not modelled here. In-
stead, the focus is on the relative importance of the bank-balance sheet lending
channel for my two types of banks, and compared relative to the preferred-habitat
of government bond purchases.90
The role of the wholesale bank and collateral value. Comparing the pur-
chases of Sgt and A
g
t , we see that purchases of the securitised nancial asset have
smaller and less persistent expansionary eects, which furthermore turn negative
relatively quickly (after 6 instead of 15 quarters).
In general, there are several reasons why the transmission mechanism diers.
89The reduction is around 150 basis points (bps) on average, which is larger than the empirical
estimates of Altavilla et al. (2015), who, however, focus only on impact eects (within one or two
days).
90An estimation could test the degree of pass-through of APP measures to lending by having
an exogenous disturbance term between aggregate lending to rms, and the amount of productive
capital Kt, as in
Kt = S
c
t + S
w
t + S
g
t − xPTt
If the estimation picks up large values for xPTt, this would be evidence for a weak pass-through
rate of bank balance sheets restoration by APPs to lending and investment in the real economy.
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First, the increase in Qat by the asset purchases will not only increase commercial
banks’ balance sheets, but also reduce wholesale bank leverage, as their liabilities
rise. This eect is relatively subdued as wholesale banks have a relatively high
steady-state leverage (so their net worth is reduced relatively less), but it will re-
duce lending to rms in the form of Swt . Moreover, the eects on the interest-rate
spread are less persistent because the leverage eect on wholesale banks recedes
more quickly (their survival probability θw is relatively low, meaning that there
is a faster adjustment in net worth through transfers from the households instead
of retained earnings). On the other hand, the eect of the increase in collateral
value ∆at by the purchases, introduced via the (assumed) local-scarcity channel,
is quantitatively not very important for the results, as the next subsection shows.
Finally and importantly, securitised assets Act are a source of good collateral for
commercial banks, which they value because it is hard to divert and thus allows
them to lever up. Reducing the amount of Act available to commercial banks will
allow them to lever up less than for purchases of corporate bonds Sgt . Although
purchases will increase the price Qat of the asset (with positive repercussions for
banks’ balance sheets), their quantity available to banks is reduced (decreasing
banks’ leverage opportunities). This negative eect has rst been mentioned in
Meeks et al. (2014).
Overall, my model thus suggests that purchases of securitised nancial assets
as in the asset-backed securities PP and the covered bond PPs are less eective
than direct purchases of corporate debt as in the corporate sector PP.91
The preferred-habitat channel. Of the three assets purchased by the central
bank, I allow only government debt to be held by households. As households’ reac-
tion to changes in relative interest rates is not fully elastic (they have a “preferred
habitat” for saving via public debt), purchasesBgt will deprive households of some
of their savings vehicles. In fact, while (real) deposit ratesRt increase together with
91The fact that purchases Agt are less eective could of course be due to my calibration. Even
with a higher leverage for wholesale banks, the high collateral value of assets for commercial banks
is due to my calibration of ∆a. While I calibrate this value using interest-rate spreads, an estimation
could give insights into which value is suggested by the model likelihood. Note that conveniently
for an estimation, the empirical equivalents of Agt , ABSPP and CBPP1-3, reach back to the very
start of the APPs in 2011.
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the policy rateRpt as ination rises, in the case of government bond purchases the
return on bonds will fall, reducing the overall return on household savingsRht and
inducing households to consume more. In fact, for purchases of Bgt , consumption
shows no initial crowding-out, dierent to purchases of Agt and S
g
t . Instead, con-
sumption increases strongly by a maximum of 55bps over its steady-state value,
pulling output and ination up more than under the other types of purchases. The
eect on consumption is also slightly more persistent than that on leverage (due
to relatively strong habits), smoothing out the response of output and ination
relative to investment for purchases of Bgt . The local-scarcity channel introduced
via the risk premium on the collateral value ∆b of public debt also increases the
eectiveness of Bgt , however to a relatively small degree, as the next subsection
shows. Finally, the purchases of government debt will also make a good source
of collateral scarcer for commercial banks as discussed above (and even more so
than for nancial assets, as ∆b > ∆a). That this negative eect is more than out-
weighed by the preferred-habitat channel highlights its quantitative importance
for the results.
Quantitative eects. The maximum increase in output (for the case of public-
debt purchases Bgt ) is 1.05%, which lies roughly between the estimates from em-
pirical papers (like the 3% reported in Baumeister and Benati, 2013, or the 1.5%
for UK in Kapetanios et al., 2012) and the 0.13% from the DSGE estimated for the
US in Chen et al. (2012) – in the case without a ZLB. The maximum increase in
ination is 27 bps (0.27%), well above the value in Chen et al. (2012), who obtain
an impact of 3bps in the case of the ZLB environment, but of only 1.8bps in the
case without a ZLB. However, it is still far below the estimates from the empirical
literature: Kapetanios et al. (2012) report an eect of around 1.25% for the UK, and
Baumeister and Benati (2013) of 1% for the US. There are several reasons why the
eect on ination here is substantially larger than in the estimated model in Chen
et al. (2012): First, my model includes a bank-balance sheet channel besides the
preferred-habitat channel in their model. Second, in their study the authors obtain
very low parameter estimates for the degree of segmentation and the elasticity of
the risk premium to household debt, both of which mainly govern the eectiveness
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of public-debt purchases.
3.4.3 Sensitivity analysis
Here, I check whether my results are robust to shutting down the premium on
assets’ collateral value (i.e. disabling the local-scarcity channel), and to varying
some central parameters.
Sensitivity to the local-scarcity channel. Figure 37 shows the results from
repeating the analysis above with the local-scarcity channel shut o, i.e. ηb =
ηa = ηsb = ηsa = 0. Thus, purchases of one asset no longer reduce the spreads of
this asset more than others, as banks optimally equate them. In other words, there
is no longer any impediment to perfect portfolio-rebalancing of the commercial
banks balance sheet. Note, however, that the response of the nancial-asset spread
Rat−Rt keeps its more short-lived dynamics as the eect of purchases diminishes
faster. The reason is that wholesale banks’ survival rate is smaller, so that they can
more quickly restore their balance sheets.
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Figure 37: Sensitivity analysis: switching o the local-scarcity channel
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Note: Impulse responses to unexpected purchases of loans (xst), bonds (xbt), and assets
(xat), each following an AR(1) process with persistence 0.9755. The local scarcity channel
is shut o, i.e. ηb = ηa = ηsb = ηsa = 0 (spreads do not react to purchases dierently).
We see that switching o the local-scarcity demand does not aect results
much. The eect on government-bond purchases on investment (through the bank-
balance sheet channel) is somewhat diminished, but it still appears the most pow-
erful type of purchases to revive economic activity and ination. Instead of a maxi-
mum increase in output and ination by 1.05% and 28bps, we now obtain maximum
eects of 1.02% and 27bps. The main transmission is thus rather driven by the other
dynamics (in particular, the preferred-habitat channel of household consumption).
This is reassuring, as the calibration of the local-scarcity channel had to be rather
ad-hoc. However, an estimation of the model could give more denitive answers
on how purchases of dierent assets aect the returns on other asset classes, and
thus help to quantify the local-scarcity channel versus the portfolio-rebalancing
channel.
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Sensitivity to central parameters. This subsection presents some sensitivity
analysis to judge which parameters are most crucial for the model dynamics. There
are graphs for additional parameters in Appendix D.3.2.
First, I look at the steady-state commercial bank leverage ratio φc. This value
is calibrated to the total loans over total capital in the EA, but it could be argued
that total loans underestimate the lending to private rms (which would also be
possibly e.g. via corporate bonds), and an even higher leverage could be suggested.
On the other hand, e.g. Gertler and Karadi (2011) use a slightly lower leverage ratio
of 4 in their calibration for the US. To examine the importance of variations in
the parameter φc, I show impulse responses of a shock to loan-purchases xst for
variations of φc from 75% to 125% of the calibrated value of 4.53 in Figure 38.
Figure 38: Sensitivity analysis: variation of φc
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Note: Impulse responses to an AR(1) loan-purchase shock xst with persistence 0.9755.
We see that results are not much aected: While a smaller steady-state leverage
leads to larger eects of purchases (as they will buy a larger share of assets and
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thus reduce the spread more eectively), the range of maximum output eects
reaches from 99 bps to 67 bps or 124% and 84% of the baseline 80 bps, i.e. less than
the relative variation in leverage.
Moreover, I show the impulse responses to an Sgt shock for varying values of
the commercial bankers’ survival probability θc. Remember that I set this param-
eter to a relatively high value of 0.9, as in e.g. Gertler and Karadi (2011), while
Altavilla et al. (2016) estimate a much lower value for this parameter using US
data (between 0.46 and 0.8 depending on the specication).
Figure 39: Sensitivity analysis: variation of θc
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Note: Impulse responses to an AR(1) loan-purchase shock xst with persistence 0.9755.
The survival rate parameter aects model dynamics to some degree. The smaller
the survival probability, the larger and more hump-shaped is the eect on invest-
ment and output. We also see a signicant undershooting of real activity after
around 28 quarters when θc is smaller than 0.75 (in fact, dynamics appear to be-
come slightly oscillatory). This is a caveat that much smaller values for θc will
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actually change dynamics, however, they are likely only to increase the expan-
sionary (impact) eect of asset purchases.
3.5 Purchases in a zero-lower bound environment
This subsection presents an investigation of how the central bank can use asset
purchases to stabilise ination and reduce business-cycle uctuations after a dis-
inationary shock. In particular, I use a piecewise linear solution method to obtain
simulations at the ZLB, after a series of negative preference shocks.
3.5.1 Which purchases most forcefully revive ination?
At this point I introduce a systematic reaction of the central bank to deviations of
ination: The central bank will buy assets whenever ination is below its steady-
state value. For convenience I reproduce the asset-purchase equations from above:
Sgt = −Ψpis(pit − pi) +K · xst (30)
Bgt = −Ψpib(pit − pi) +B · xbt (31)
Agt = −Ψpia(pit − pi) + Aw · xat (32)
Below, I will distinguish the eects of a disinationary (preference) shock to the
economy with the reaction function parameters Ψpij , j ∈ {s, b, a}, being succes-
sively switched on. There are no exogenous purchases here, so xjt = 0.
A piecewise linear solution. I use the toolbox provided by Guerrieri and Ia-
coviello (2015b) to simulate my model under an occasionally binding ZLB con-
straint. The piecewise linear solution method employed takes the (log-linearised)
rst-order approximation to the model dynamics in two dierent regimes: A “nor-
mal” one in which the nominal policy rate is non-constrainedRtEt{pit+1} = Rpt >
1, and follows the Taylor Rule as in eq. (29). This means that in the normal regime
the nominal rate in the economy can freely deviate from its steady state as long as
Rˆt + pˆit+1 = Rˆpt > −r = −(1/β − 1). Second, a “constrained” regime in which
the policy rate is at the ZLB, Rpt = 1 and Rˆpt = 0, which implies Rˆt = −pˆit+1.
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The piecewise linear solution correctly accounts for moving from one regime to
the other, including agents’ expectations. Moreover, it will select the appropri-
ate amount of periods that the economy remains in the constrained regime. This
comes at the cost of only allowing for simulations at rst-order approximations to
the model dynamics, so that I cannot apply a full-edged welfare analysis here.
Adisinationary shock under the ZLB. To show the eect of asset purchases
in my model, I follow Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015b) in using a series of negative
preference shocks which drive the policy rate to the ZLB.92 The ZLB then increases
the eect of the shock considerably, leading to a drop in output and ination by 8%
and 2% (close to deation) at the maximum. My model requires this relatively dras-
tic series of shocks to reach the ZLB for a signicant amount of time. While other
shocks could be used here, the preference shock is often employed in the literature
as a shortcut to activate the ZLB and create a disinationary environment.
92The shocks are a series of 10 negative preference shocks with a relatively small autocorrelation
of 0.27.
127
Figure 40: Disination at the ZLB and asset purchases
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Note: Impulse responses to a series of unexpected contractionary preference shocks that
drive the economy to the zero-lower bound (ZLB) of nominal rates. The graphs plot the
responses in the case of no asset-purchases (blue cont. line), and in the case where the
central bank reacts to ination by purchasing either loans (ΨpiS > 0; orange dashed line),
government bonds (ΨpiB > 0; yellow dotted line), or nancial assets (ΨpiA > 0; violet thin
line). The reaction parametersψpij are calibrated such that the central bank’s balance sheet
reaches 22.95% of GDP after 11 quarters (roughly in line with the ESCB APP purchases).
To investigate the eectiveness of dierent asset purchases to stabilise the
economy after such a disinationary shock, I calibrate the asset-purchase reac-
tion function parameter Ψpij in a way that the central-bank balance sheet (CBBS)
reaches 22.95% of GDP after 11 quarters.93 Note that dierently to above, I show the
cumulated amount of asset purchases as a share of GDP here in order to illustrate
93As of July 2017, the second round of APPs will accumulate to a total of €2,280bn (€60bn per
month from 2015M3:2016M3 and 2017M4:2017M12, and €80bn per month from 2016M4:2017M3),
which is 22.95% of the average annual EA GDP in 2009Q1:2016Q3 of €9,936bn.
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the overall impact on the central-bank balance sheet.
The asset purchases are able to stabilise output, investment and ination con-
siderably. However, this is possible only via a very large reduction in interest rate
spreads:Rat−Rt,Rbt−Rt andRst−Rt fall by 4.58, 4.91 and 6.11 percentage points
at their trough.94 Note also that investment is relatively less stabilised under the
ZLB than in the results above: The ratio of maximum eects of Bgt on Yt and It
was about 3, while here this relative eectiveness of stabilisation is closer to 2.5.
One reason for this is that the interest-rate spreads are already compressed by the
preference shock, making the bank balance-sheet channel of asset purchases less
eective.
Moreover, for any of the three reaction functions, the ZLB will be hit one period
later than without purchases (3 instead of 2 periods after onset of shocks), and
leave it one period earlier (10 instead of 11 quarters after the onset).
Purchases of government bonds appear most suitable to stabilise ination in
this environment. They prevent a drop in output of 4.09% of its steady state value
and of 1.14% in ination. The reason for their relatively large eectiveness again
is the preferred-habitat channel: Through the preference shock households have
particularly large incentives to save, and purchases ofBgt will considerably reduce
one of the assets by which households can increase savings. This strongly allevi-
ates the eect on consumption and thereby also stabilises output and ination. On
the other hand, welfare will not be aected as drastically as consumption, because
the labour supply recedes together with consumption.
Thus, altogether the relative sizes of the dierent ESCB APPs, with their strong
focus on public debt (see Table 3) seem justied. Note, however, that the reac-
tion function also implies a subsequent increase of purchased assets on the central
bank’s balance sheet of up to 48.7% of GDP (for the case of Ψpib > 0), which is
more than the ESCB currently proposes to buy.95
94These are tremendous decreases, especially given that as Rt is stuck at zero and steady-state
spreads are very low, they also represent almost equally large absolute negative values of the ref-
erence rates. While the yields of several assets have entered negative territory during the recent
ZLB episode, the absolute size of these rates remain far from the ones implied here.
95On the other hand, this analysis abstracts from sovereign debt. Given that the APPs were
introduced in the aftermath of the European Sovereign Debt crisis, there were probably additional
stabilising eects of public-debt purchases.
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3.5.2 Welfare
Obtaining a measure of the eect of APPs on welfare is dicult in this context.
The piecewise-linear solution approach does not allow me to simulate the model
at a second-order approximation of its decision rules, making it impossible to esti-
mate the overall eect of ination stabilisation on welfare in a ZLB environment.
However, to get an idea about the welfare consequences of APPs, I show the eect
on welfare for the case of the particular shock depicted above. As is standard in
the literature, welfare is given by the consumer value function in eq. (8) above.
Focusing on one shock, I can neglect the eect of uncertainty about other shocks.
This yields a simplied measure of the welfare gains of the stabilisation policies
shown in the above subsection.
In particular, I calculate the dierence of the welfare losses in the case of no
stabilisation (∆W0t ) and in the case of the stabilisation of ination by purchases of
Sgt ,B
g
t , orA
g
t (∆Wjt , j ∈ {s, b, a}), for an horizon of 40 periods. I follow Debortoli,
Kim, Lindé, and Nunes (2015) in computing the consumption-equivalent variation
(CEV) units as
CEVjt = 100 ·
(
∆Wjt −∆W0t
C
(
∂U
∂C
|SS
) ) ,
where C
(
∂U
∂C
|SS
)
gives the steady-state increase in welfare for a one-percent in-
crease in steady-state consumption. Then I add up the CEV units across an horizon
of 10 years (40 quarters).
Table 5: Welfare improvement after disination at the ZLB for dierent APPs
ϕs > 0 ϕb > 0 ϕa > 0∑40
h
CEVjh
hor 2.25 bps 8.52 bps 1.65 bps
Note: Average per-period dierence in welfare Wt in consumption equivalents over the
10-year (40-quarter) horizon of the IRFs depicted in Fig. 40.
As we can see from Table 5, welfare is improved considerably under pur-
chases of government bonds, and slightly less so under purchases of other assets.
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The average increase over the 40-period horizon depicted in Figure 40 is 8.52 bps
(0.0852%) of steady-state consumption. This means that agents would be indier-
ent between having the purchases in place or an increase of their consumption by
8.52 bps. Some caveats should also be mentioned: First, while this value seems rel-
atively small, it should be kept in mind that I cannot account for the reduction in
uncertainty nor steady-state gains from it (see e.g. Mendicino, Nikolov, Suarez, and
Supera, 2016, for the context of macroprudential policies). Second, note that the
overall welfare increase relative to no purchases is not as strong as the dierence in
consumption, because labour-supply falls more strongly without purchases, which
in my model increases welfare (there is no disutility from unemployment). If em-
ployment was more stable (e.g. by introducing wage rigidity), welfare gains could
increase. In this light, the absolute welfare gains can maybe seen as a lower bound.
Importantly, however, government bonds have a much stronger eect on wel-
fare than purchases of other assets. The reason lies in the stronger increase of
consumption, which improves household welfare despite the heightened demand
for hours needed to produce it. Thus, also from a (simplistic) welfare point of view,
purchases of government bonds seem preferable among the choices of APPs.
3.6 Conclusion
The asset purchase programmes (APPs) represent the main tool at the ESCB’s dis-
posal in its ght against current disinationary pressures in the euro area. Despite
their importance and massive size, the programmes have as yet been little anal-
ysed in structural models. This paper distinguishes three dierent asset classes in
a DSGE with a nancial accelerator, allowing me to quantitatively assess and com-
pare the public sector purchase programme (PP), the ABSPP and covered bond PP,
and the corporate sector PP in their eectiveness in stabilising ination.
My analysis suggests that (unexpected) purchases of government bonds have
a larger expansionary eect on GDP and ination than those of securitised nan-
cial assets or corporate bonds. Moreover, after a disinationary shock, government
bonds purchases are particularly eective in stabilising ination and increase wel-
fare more than those of other assets. In general, while a bank-balance sheet channel
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is operative for all these purchases, whether I impose local scarcity or allow full
portfolio rebalancing makes not much dierence in my model. On the other hand,
a relatively important preferred-habitat channel of household savings, which is
activated for government bonds but not the other assets, makes purchases of pub-
lic debt particularly powerful. Purchases of securitised nancial assets crowd out
good collateral for commercial banks and thus are less eective than the outright
purchases of corporate bonds.
This paper can only be a rst step in evaluating the relative eectiveness of
the European APPs in a structural context. One could think about including more
frictions to better capture some particularities of the euro area and the ESCB APPs:
Labour market frictions as in Smets and Wouters (2003), or an open-economy set-
ting to capture the strong devaluation and thus competitiveness eects of the
APPs. A potentially even more interesting step in the opposite direction would
be an estimation of a simplied model under a zero-lower bound environment.
For this, one could follow the approach by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015a), who
obtain a measure of model likelihood from the piecewise linear solution instead of
the Kalman lter.96
It is likely that research into the eectiveness of QE measures will continue for
some time, as asset purchases could become more frequently used in the future
by central banks: Tellingly, in her 2016 Jackson Hole speech Janet Yellen stated
that she “(...) expect[s] that forward guidance and asset purchases will remain im-
portant components of the Fed’s policy toolkit.” (Yellen, 2016). In an environment
characterised by secular stagnation and historically low interest rates, episodes at
the zero-lower bound and the use of such unconventional policies both become
more likely.
96Some rst attempts into this direction suggest that the model dynamics might be too rich for
an estimation. I am considering an estimation with a simplied model containing only a preferred-
habitat and bank-lending channel (and no wholesale banks) for the future.
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A Appendix to “Monetary Policy Communication
Shocks and the Macroeconomy”
A.1 Studies of correlations between shock series
In order to better understand how our shock series relate to other high-frequency
monetary shock series available in the literature, this section examines correla-
tions between dierent measures.
We rst examine the relation between our shock series and that of BC. From
Table 6 we note that all our shocks are positively correlated with the shock of
BC, i.e. the rst principal component across maturities of contract. In fact, the
action shock is the most strongly correlated with the BC shock. This is somewhat
surprising, since when we examine the impulse-response functions, we nd that
the communication shocks yield responses closest to those of the BC shock. We
can also see that the far communication shock is slightly more strongly correlated
with the BC shock relative to the near communication shock.
With respect to the second principal component extracted by BC from the fu-
tures jumps, we can see that only the action shock is positively correlated with the
second factor. The far communication shock is more negatively correlated than
the near communication shock. Therefore it is not true that our communication
shock series merely reect information captured by the second factor of BC. This
is heartening, since we know from BC that the second factor explains only a small
fraction of the variance. We can conclude that our structural decomposition of-
fers dierent kinds of information relative to the two factors of BC (although they
restrict their analysis to the rst factor).
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Table 6: Correlation Between Our Shocks and BC Shocks
BC Shock BC 2nd Factor
Action 0.62*** 0.43***
Near Comm 0.39*** -0.37***
Far Comm 0.44*** -0.64***
Notes: Correlations computed on a sample of 119
observations.
When we examine the relation between our shocks and those of GSS (2005) we
nd largely expected results, as displayed in Table 7. Our action shock is strongly
and signicantly correlated with the GSS target shock. Our near and far commu-
nication shocks show an almost identical correlation with the GSS path factor,
although it is smaller, at 0.43. Therefore our shocks should be understood to be
closely related, but not reducible, to those of GSS.
Table 7: Correlation Between Our Shocks and GSS Shocks
GSS Target Factor GSS Path Factor
Action 0.84*** -0.12
Near Comm 0.09 0.43***
Far Comm -0.04 0.43***
Notes: Correlations computed on a sample of 81 obser-
vations.
We moreover nd that the action shock is signicantly correlated with the
Romer and Romer (2004) shock, but the communication shocks are not. When we
examine a longer period, using the series computed by Wieland and Yang (2016),
we nd that the near communication shock correlation coecient rises to a level
comparable with the action shock, and is statistically signicant.
150
Table 8: Correlation Between Our Shocks and Romer and Romer (2004) Shocks
RR Shock Original Sample RR Shock Updated
Action 0.49** 0.22**
Near Comm 0.04 0.21**
Far Comm -0.17 -0.13
Notes: Correlations computed over 23 observations for the original
sample, and over 114 observations for the updated sample. The up-
dated sample was made available in the data appendix of Wieland
and Yang (2016).
Finally, all our shocks are positively correlated to that of Nakamura and Steins-
son (2016). The fact that the correlation structure looks much like those of our
shocks with that of the BC shock, with the greatest correlation for the action
shock, is unsurprising since the Nakamura and Steinsson (2016) shock is also the
rst principal component, although the bundle of futures jumps includes longer
horizon Eurodollar contracts also.
Table 9: Correlation Between Our Shocks and the Nakamura and Steinsson (2016)
Shock
Nakamura and Steinsson (2016) Shock
Action 0.64***
Near Comm 0.51***
Far Comm 0.42***
Notes: Correlations computed over 23 observations for the
original sample, and over 114 observations for the updated
sample.
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A.2 Responses to recursively identied shocks
Figure 41: IRFs from Christiano et al. (1996) Shocks
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Notes: Responses of log(IPt), log(CPIt), and the Federal Funds Rate to a 10 basis point
contractionary shock, identied via the lower triangular restriction of Christiano et al.
(1996). The median response and condence intervals were obtained from bootstrapping
the VAR 500 times, the graph depicts the latter at 90% (red) and 75% (blue shadow) signif-
icance levels.
A.3 Further results using Eurodollars
A.3.1 Robustness checks for the Eurodollar specication
We assess the robustness of our results to dierent selections of Eurodollar con-
tracts, namely [ED4, ED8, ED18] and [ED4, ED12, ED18]. We display the
IRFs in Figures 42 and 43. Results are qualitatively unaected by our choices.
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Figure 42: Responses of log(IPt) and log(CPIt) to Eurodollar Shocks (Using Con-
tracts 4, 8, and 18)
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Notes: Impulse responses from our ve-variable VAR, including log(IPt) and log(CPIt) and
three cumulated shock series Sjt , j ∈ {NED, MED, FED} – near ED, medium ED and
far ED shock, respectively. The median response and condence intervals were obtained
from bootstrapping the VAR 500 times, the graph depicts the latter at 90% (red) and 75%
(blue shadow) signicance levels. Responses are shown to a 10 basis point positive shock
to the interest rate.
153
Figure 43: Responses of log(IPt) and log(CPIt) to Eurodollar Shocks (Using Con-
tracts 4, 12, and 18)
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Notes: Impulse responses from our ve-variable VAR, including log(IPt) and log(CPIt) and
three cumulated shock series Sjt , j ∈ {NED, MED, FED} – near ED, medium ED and
far ED shock, respectively. The median response and condence intervals were obtained
from bootstrapping the VAR 500 times, the graph depicts the latter at 90% (red) and 75%
(blue shadow) signicance levels. Responses are shown to a 10 basis point positive shock
to the interest rate.
A.3.2 Forecast error variance decomposition
We also examine forecast-error variance decompositions of the contribution of our
Eurodollar-derived shocks to movements in macro variables, which are displayed
for the 12, 18, 24 and 36 month horizons in Table 10. We chart economically signif-
icant dierences between the contributions of shocks according to their horizon,
with the further forward Eurodollar shocks typically having a larger contribu-
tion. In general, movements in the medium-term ED communication shock have
a particularly strong forecasting power relative to the other two communication
shocks.
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Table 10: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition at Business Cycle Frequency
Horizon (months) SNEDt SMEDt SFEDt
IPt
12 7.83 87.05 5.12
18 6.11 79.83 14.06
24 6.32 65.03 28.65
36 6.33 54.72 38.95
CPIt
12 9.51 87.49 3.00
18 7.14 78.84 14.02
24 6.13 64.30 29.57
36 5.02 44.75 50.23
Notes: Relative contribution of our shocks to a forecast-error
variance decomposition of IP and CPI at the 12, 18, 24 and 36
month horizons from our baseline 5-variable VAR. The iden-
tied three shocks are Sjd,t, j ∈ {A,NC,FC}– action, near
communication and far communication shock respectively. As
we are only interested in the relative importance of our shocks,
we present the contribution of the three shocks as a percentage
of their combined contribution.
A.3.3 Historical decompositions for the Eurodollar specication
Here we discuss in detail the results of historical decompositions of our ED futures
analysis for both industrial production and prices. What is perhaps most interest-
ing for us is the decomposition of industrial production during and after the Great
Recession, shown in Figure 44.
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Figure 44: Historical Decomposition of log(IPt) Under Eurodollar Specication
-0.06
-0.05
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
Lo
g 
De
via
tio
n
IP
Near ED
Medium ED
Far ED
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Fed. funds rate (right scale)
Notes: Historical decomposition of log(IPt) in our 5-variable VAR, including the variables
log(IPt) and log(CPIt) and three cumulated shock series Sjt , j ∈ {NED,MED,FED}
– near ED, medium ED and far ED shock respectively. The bar plots are stacked, so their
height above the zero-axis represents the cumulative historical contribution of our mon-
etary shocks to industrial production above its unconditional mean. Similarly for their
height below the zero-axis. We also display the federal funds rate (using the right-hand
scale) for reference. NBER recession periods are shown as grey areas.
Surprisingly, the model suggests that from the onset of the crisis in early 2008
to around 2010, communication at all three horizons (1, 2 and 3 years) had a re-
cessionary impact. This would likely reect information about the Fed’s negative
outlook for the economy superseding its communication that these conditions
were "likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for some
time".97 However, almost exactly from the onset of the asset purchases made in
September 2012 onwards, all three ED shocks have an expansionary eect on IP,
speaking for an ination-expectations boosting eect even in the absence of move-
ments in the federal funds rate, which remained close to zero until late 2015. And
just in line with the mentioning of a possible exit of the ZLB in late 2015, the far ED
97See https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/what-is-forward-guidance-how-is-it-used-in-the-
federal-reserve-monetary-policy.htm.
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shock shows a contractionary eect on IP again. We therefore conclude that the
ED shocks seem well-suited to track the recent history of Fed announcements on
market expectations and thus the real economy, just as our federal funds futures
shocks do for the pre-2008 period. The historical decomposition of CPI, shown in
Figure 45, shows a strong positive contribution of the further forward ED shocks
to ination during the ZLB period. This suggests that despite generally weaker ef-
fects on output in the aftermath of the nancial crisis, FOMC communication was
supportive of ination and ination expectations.
Figure 45: Historical Decomposition of log(CPIt) Under Eurodollar Specication
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Notes: Historical decomposition of log(CPIt) in our 5-variable VAR, including the variables
log(IPt) and log(CPIt) and three cumulated shock series Sjt , j ∈ {NED,MED,FED}
– near ED, medium ED and far ED shock respectively. The bar plots are stacked, so their
height above the zero-axis represents the cumulative historical contribution of our mon-
etary shocks to industrial production above its unconditional mean. Similarly for their
height below the zero-axis. We also display the federal funds rate (using the right-hand
scale) for reference. NBER recession periods are shown as grey areas.
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B Appendix to “TheMacroeconomic Eects of Bank
Capital Requirement Changes: Evidence from a
Narrative Approach ”
Table 11: CR changes overview
CR change rules for comment nal rules published eective date compliance date
num. guidelines — — Dec. 17, 1981 (FR46/62693) Dec. 17, 1981 (FR46/62694)
ILSA Jul. 20, 1984 (FR49/29400) Apr. 18, 1985 (FR50/11128) Apr. 18, 1985 (FR50/11128) Apr. 17, 1986 (FR50/11139)
Basel I Mar. 27, 1986 (FR51/10602) Jan. 18, 1989 (FR54/4186) Dec. 31, 1990 (FR54/4186) Dec. 31, 1992 (FR54/4193)
FDICIA/PCA Jul. 1, 1992 (FR57/29226) Sep. 29, 1992 (FR57/44866) Dec. 19, 1992 (FR57/44866) Dec. 19, 1992 (FR57/44866)
Mkt Risk Amend. Jul. 25, 1995 (FR61/47358) Sep. 6, 1996 (FR61/47358) Jan. 1, 1997 (FR61/47358) Jan. 1, 1998 (FR61/47358)
Basel II Sep. 6, 2006 (FR71/55830) Dec. 7, 2007 (FR72/69288) Apr. 1, 2008 (FR72/69288) Oct. 1, 2008 (FR72/69406)98
Basel II.5 Jan. 11, 2011 (FR77/53061) Aug. 30, 2012 (FR77/53060) Jan. 1, 2013 (FR77/53060) Jan. 1, 2013 (FR77/53060)
Basel III Aug. 30, 2012 (FR78/62020) Oct. 11, 2013 (FR78/62018) Jan. 1, 2014 (FR78/62018) Jan. 1, 2014 (FR78/62018)99
\Notes: Sources in parenthesis: FR refers to Federal Register issues as detailed below; after the slash the page number.
FDICIA refers to FDIC Improvement Act (PubLaw\_1991Dec19\_FDICIA)
FR46 refers to Federal Register/Vol. 46, No. 248/Monday, December 28, 1981
FR49 refers to Federal Register/Vol. 49. No. 141/Friday, July 20, 1984
FR50 refers to Federal Register/Vol. 50, No. 53/Tuesday, March 19, 1985
FR51 refers to Federal Register/Vol. 51, No. 59/Thursday, March 27, 1986
FR54 refers to Federal Register/Vol. 54, No. 17/Friday, January 27, 1989
FR57/29226 refers to Federal Register/Vol. 57, No. 127/Wednesday, July 1, 1992
FR57/44866 refers to Federal Register/Vol. 57, No. 189/Tuesday, September 29, 1992
FR61 refers to Federal Register/Vol. 61, No. 174/Friday, September 6, 1996
FR71 refers to Federal Register/Vol. 71, No. 185/Monday, September 25, 2006
FR72 refers to Federal Register/Vol. 72, No. 235/Friday, December 7, 2007
FR77 refers to Federal Register/Vol. 77, No. 169/Thursday, August 30, 2012
FR78 refers to Federal Register/Vol. 78, No. 198/Friday, October 11, 2013
For nal rules for comment on Basel I, consider also Jul. 1986 (BIS) BIS refers to Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (1989)
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C Appendix to “Spoilt for Choice on QE? Which
Assets to Purchase When Combatting Disina-
tion”
C.1 Detailed derivation of model equations
This appendix derives all model equations in detail, from (40) to (85). They are also
listed in Appendix C.2 below.
Households. The households’ problem (9) subject to the budget constraint yields
the rst-order conditions with respect to Ct, Savt, and Lt:
%t = xdt(Ct − hCt−1)−σ − xdt+1βh(Ct+1 − hCt)−σ (40)
%t = β%t+1Rt (41)
χLϕt xlt = (1− α)%tPptYt/Lt (42)
[Excursion: Thehousehold’s savings schedule.] Assume agents’ savings Savt
are given by a CES composite index
Savt =
[
κ
1
s
s D
s−1
s
t + (1− κs)
1
s (Bht )
s−1
s
] s
s−1
,
where Dt and Bht denote savings via deposits and domestic bonds, respectively,
and κs is the equilibrium share of savings via deposits. Agents maximise their
savings Savt given the nominal identity for savings returns:
RhtSavt = RtDt +RbtBht (Sav.)
The solution to their problem
max
Dt,Bht
Savt =
[
κ
1
s
s D
s−1
s
t + (1− κs)
1
s (Bht )
s−1
s
] s
s−1
s.t. Savt =
Rt
Rht
Dt +
Rbt
Rht
Bht
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gives the two rst-order conditions necessary for an optimum
Dt = κs
(
Rt
Rht
)−s
Savt
Bht = (1− κs)
(
Rbt
Rht
)−s
Savt.
Combining these, we obtain
Dt =
κs
1− κs
(
Rt
Rbt
)−s
Bht . (43)
Inserting these back into the savings constraint (Sav.) above, we get the composite
return index Rht:
RhtSavt = RtDt +RbtBht
= Rt · κs
(
Rt
Rht
)−s
Savt +Rbt · (1− κs)
(
Rbt
Rht
)−s
Savt
=
[
κsR
1−s
t + (1− κs)R1−sbt
]
RshtSavt
Rht =
[
κsR
1−s
t + (1− κs)R1−sbt
] 1
1−s (44)
[End of excursion]
Productive rms. Solving the problem of productive rms, subject to their pro-
duction function
Yt = xptK
α
t−1L
1−α
t , (45)
denes the return on productive capital rpkt and wages wt as
rpkt = αPptYt/Kt−1 (46)
wt = (1− α)PptYt/Lt.
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The overall return on capital, (11), is reproduced here:
Rst =
αPptYt/Kt−1 + (1− δ)Qst
Qst−1
(47)
Capital producer. The law of motion of capital is reproduced as
Kt = xit · It + (1− δ)Kt−1. (48)
The rst-order condition of the capital producer denes the price of capital as
Qst = 1 +
χI
2
xit(It/It−1 − 1)2 + χIxit(It/It−1 − 1)It/It−1
=− Et
{
β%t+1
%t
χIxit+1(It+1/It − 1)(It+1/It)2
}
. (49)
Retailer. The output of productive rms, Ypt, equals the product of the nal
consumption good, Yt, and a price dispersion term Dt:
Ypt = DtYt, (50)
where price dispersion100 is dened as
Dt = γDt−1pi−κpt−1 pipt + (1− γ)
(
1− γpiκ(1−γ)t−1 piγ−1t
1− γ
)−p(1−γ)
(A.disp)
The rst-order condition from the retailer problem (13) above is
100In the model log-linearised around a zero-ination steady state, price dispersion will actu-
ally not matter since Dˆt = 0. Therefore, I will not include this equation into the model equation
summary below.
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E0
{ ∞∑
i=0
γiβi
%t+i
%0
[
P ∗t
Pt+i
i∏
j=1
(1 + pit+j−1)γ − p
p − 1Ppt+i
](
Pt+i(z)
Pt+i
)−p
Yt
}
.
(FOC-P)
Closely following derivations in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004), pp. 11-12, for the
symmetric equilibrium, we obtain the recursive optimality conditions:
Ft = PptYt + βγ
%t+1
%t
pi
p
t+1pi
−pκ
t Ft+1 (51)
Ht = Yt + βγ
%t+1
%t
pi
p−1
t+1 pi
κ(1−p)
t Ht+1 (52)
pi∗t =
p
p − 1
Ftpit
Ht
, (53)
where pi∗t is dened as pi∗t ≡ P ∗t /Pt. Moreover, we obtain an expression for the
aggregate price index:
Pt =
[
γ
(
piκt−1P
1−p
t−1
)1−p
+ (1− γ) (P ∗t )1−p
] 1
1−p
or
pi
1−p
t = γpi
κ(1−p)
t−1 + (1− γ)(pi∗t )1−p (54)
Commercial banks. As hinted at in Section 3.2.5 above, we can show that a
commercial bank’s value function is linear in its holdings of loans QstSct , bonds
QbtB
c
t , assets QatAct , and net worth N ct . We can take this linearity as given (fol-
lowing the analogy to the case without nancial assets Act in Gertler and Karadi,
2011), or derive it using a guess-and-verify approach as below.
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[Excursion: The guess-and-verify approach to show linearity of Vct ] The
bank solves the problem
Vct = max
Sct ,B
c
t ,A
c
t
Et
{ ∞∑
t=0
(1− θc)θtcβt
%t+1
%t
N ct+1
}
(19)
s.t. N ct+1 = (Rkt+1 −Rt)QstSct + (Rbt+1 −Rt)QbtBct + (Rat+1 −Rt)QatAct +RtN ct (15)
Vct ≥ λc [QstSct + ∆btQbtBct + ∆atQatAct ] (20)
Guess that the value function Vt is linear in QstSct , QbtBct , QatAct and N ct :
Vt = µstQstS
c
t + µbtQbtB
c
t + µatQatA
c
t + νtN
c
t , (aux.1)
which will be veried below. Denoting the multiplier on constraint (20) by ξt, the
Lagrangian to the above problem is given by
L = Vct + ξt [Vct − λc(QstSct + ∆btQbtBct + ∆atQatAct)]
= (1 + ξt)Vct − ξtλc(QstSct + ∆btQbtBct + ∆atQatAct)
= (1 + ξt)(µstQstS
c
t + µbtQbtB
c
t + µatQatA
c
t + νtN
c
t )− ξtλc(QstSct + ∆btQbtBct + ∆atQatAct)
The consolidated rst order conditions w.r.t. Sct , Bct and Act are
µst =
λcξt
1 + ξt
µbt =
λc∆btξt
1 + ξt
µat =
λc∆atξt
1 + ξt
From this follow two arbitrage conditions between the value of a marginal unit of
loans on the one hand, and bonds or assets on the other:
µbt = ∆bt · µst (55)
µat = ∆at · µst (56)
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Moreover, as long as ξt > 0, we have that
µstQstS
c
t + µbtQbtB
c
t + µatQatA
c
t + νtN
c
t = λc(QstS
c
t + ∆btQbtB
c
t + ∆atQatA
c
t)
or
QstS
c
t =
νt
λc − µstN
c
t −
λc∆bt − µbt
λc − µst QbtB
c
t −
λc∆at − µat
λc − µst QatA
c
t .
Plugging this into (aux.1) and solving, we get
Vct =
λc(∆btµst − µbt)
λc − µst QbtB
c
t +
λc(∆atµst − µat)
λc − µst QatA
c
t +
λcνt
λc − µstN
c
t
(55), (56)
=
λcνt
λc − µstN
c
t .
Like Gertler and Karadi (2011) in their equation (16), I dene the expected shadow
value of a unit of net worth as
Ωt = 1− θc + θc dV
c
t
dN ct
= 1− θc + θc λcνt
λc − µst (aux.2)
With our guess for the form of Vct , (aux.1) from above, we have
Vct = µstQstSct + µbtQbtBct + µatQatAct + νtN ct
= β
%t+1
%t
Ωt+1N
c
t+1
= β
%t+1
%t
Ωt+1 [(Rst+1 −Rt)QstSct + (Rbt+1 −Rt)QbtBct + (Rat+1 −Rt)QatAct +RtN ct ]
Equating coecients, we get the following expressions for the commercial bank’s
discounted expected value of expanding loans Sct , bonds Bct , assets Act , and net
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worth N ct :
µst = β
%t+1
%t
Ωt+1(Rst+1 −Rt) (57)
µbt = β
%t+1
%t
Ωt+1(Rbt+1 −Rt) (58)
µat = β
%t+1
%t
Ωt+1(Rat+1 −Rt) (59)
νt = β
%t+1
%t
Ωt+1Rt (60)
The linear coecients µst, µbt, µat, and νt are described in turn. µst is the dis-
counted expected value of expanding the existing commercial banks’ loans101 by a
marginal unit, holding both assets and net worth constant (i.e., nancing the new
loans by issuing more deposits at rateRt). Intuitively, µst is given by the additional
return of a marginal loan unit in case the banker retires or continues her business.
If she retires (with probability 1−θc), the value-added of the loan unit is the spread
of loan return over the cost of renancing at the savings bank (remember that net
worth is kept constant). If the bank continues (with probability θc), its loan sum
will grow in line with net worth growth and be evaluated at tomorrow’s marginal
value µst+1. µbt and µat are the corresponding value of marginally expanding the
the commercial bank’s bonds and assets, respectively. Finally, νt is the correspond-
ing value of expanding net worth (note that internal renancing saves the bank
the deposit cost Rt).
[End of excursion]
Moreover, dene the ratio of bonds and assets held relative to loans as
Ξbt =
QbtB
c
t
QstSct
(61)
Ξat =
QatA
c
t
QstSct
. (62)
101So the transfers to entering bankers outlined below do not enter.
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Combining (20) with (aux.1) and using some previous results, we get
νtN
c
t = (λc − µst)QstSct + (∆btλc − µbt)QbtBct + (∆atλc − µat)QatAct
(55), (56)
= (λc − µst)(QstSct + ∆btQbtBct + ∆atQatAct)
(61), (62)
= (λc − µst)QstSct (1 + ∆btΞbt + ∆atΞat),
Combine this with the denition of loan leverage above,
φct =
QstS
c
t
N ct
, (63)
to get a reformulation of the incentive compatibility constraint (aux.1):
φct =
νt
(λc − µst)(1 + ∆btΞbt + ∆atΞat) (64)
Using this equation, we can reformulate (aux.2) as
Ωt = 1− θc + θc dV
c
t
dN ct
= 1− θc + θc λcνt
λc − µst
(64)
= 1− θc + θcνt
(
1 +
µst
λc − µst
)
. (65)
The law of motion for net worth, (23), can be re-written as
N ct = θcN
c
t−1
[
Rt−1 + φct−1(Rst −Rt−1)(1 + ∆btΞbt−1 + ∆atΞat−1)
]
/xnt
= + ωc(QstS
c
t−1 +QbtB
c
t−1 +QatA
c
t−1) (66)
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Finally, I just replicate equations (16) and (17), as well as equations (21) and (22)
from above:
Rbt =
rb −Qbt
Qbt−1
(67)
Rat =
ra −Qat
Qat−1
(68)
∆bt = ∆b exp{ηbBgt − ηsbSgt } (69)
∆at = ∆a exp{ηaAgt − ηsaSgt } (70)
Wholesale banks. As stated in Section 3.2.6, we can write the value function
of wholesale banks, Vwt , as a linear function of their intermediated funds QstSwt
and net worthNwt . Again one can derive this using the guess-and-verify approach
below.
[Excursion: The guess-and-verify approach to show linearity of Vwt ] The
Bellman equation for wholesale banks is
Vwt = max
Swt ,A
w
t
Et
{
β
%t+1
%t
[
(1− θw)Nwt+1 + θwVwt+1
]}
.
Guess that Vwt is linear in the coecients µwt and νwt:
Vwt = µwtQstSwt + νwtNwt
Directly plugging the guess into the value function yields
µwtQstSwt + νwtN
w
t = Et
{
β
%t+1
%t
[
(1− θw) ((Rst+1 −Rat+1)QstSwt +RatNwt )
= + θw
(
Qst+1S
w
t+1
QstSwt
QstS
w
t µwt+1 +
Nwt+1
Nwt
Nwt νwt+1
)]}
.
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Matching coecients, we get
µwt = Et
{
β
%t+1
%t
[
(1− θw)(Rst+1 −Rat+1) + θwQst+1S
w
t+1
QstSwt
µwt+1
]}
= Et
{
β
%t+1
%t
[
(1− θw)(Rst+1 −Rat+1) + θwφ
w
t+1
φwt
((Rst+1 −Rat+1)φwt +Rat+1)µwt+1
]}
(71)
νwt = Et
{
β
%t+1
%t
[
(1− θw)Rat+1 + θwN
w
t+1
Nwt
νwt+1
]}
= Et
{
β
%t+1
%t
[(1− θw)Rat+1 + θw ((Rst+1 −Rat+1)φwt +Rat+1) νwt+1]
}
.
(72)
The linear coecients µwt and νwt represent the discounted expected value of ex-
panding the existing wholesale bank balance-sheet assets QstSwt and net worth
Nwt by a marginal unit, respectively, while holding the respective other constant.
The interpretation is similar to the one for commercial banks above (note that for
wholesale banks holding one extra unit of net worth saves Rat+1, as deposits at
rate Rt are not available to them).
[End of excursion]
Equations (25), (27), (28), and (24) are just replicated from above:
φwt =
QstS
w
t
Nwt
(73)
φwt =
νwt
λw − µwt (74)
Nwt = θw[(Rst −Rat)φwt−1 +Rat]Nwt−1 + ωwQstSwt−1 (75)
Awt = (QstS
w
t −Nwt )/Qat (76)
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Monetary policy. The monetary policy reaction functions under unconven-
tional policies are merely replicated from above [(29) to (33)] for convenience:
Rtpit+1 = (Rt−1pit)
ρR
[
Rpi ·
(pit
pi
)κpi]1−ρR
xrt (77)
Sgt = ΨRs [Rst+1 −Rt − (Rs −R)]−Ψpis(pit − pi) +K · xst (78)
Bgt = ΨRb [Rst+1 −Rt − (Rs −R)]−Ψpib(pit − pi) +B · xbt (79)
Agt = ΨRa [Rst+1 −Rt − (Rs −R)]−Ψpia(pit − pi) + Aw · xat. (80)
Market clearing. Again, I just replicate the market clearing conditions [(35) to
(38)] for convenience:
Yt = Ct +Gt + It
[
1 +
χI
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2]
+ τp(S
g
t + A
g
t +B
g
t ) (81)
Kt = S
c
t + S
w
t + S
g
t (82)
B = Bct +B
h
t +B
g
t (83)
Awt = A
c
t + A
g
t (84)
Shocks. As detailed in equation (39):
log(xjt) = ρj log(xjt−1) + σjεjt ∀j ∈ {d, l, p, i, n, r, g, s, b, a} (85)
Additional variables. Here, I derive some additional variables that are used in
plotting results. The central bank balance sheet is given by (33):
BSt = (QstS
g
t +QbtB
g
t +QatA
g
t ) /(4 · Y ) (86)
The nominal policy rate is given by
Rpt = Rtpit+1. (87)
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The spreads of loan, bond and asset rates over deposit rates are simply dened as
prst = Rst+1/Rt (88)
prbt = Rbt+1/Rt (89)
prat = Rat+1/Rt (90)
Welfare in each period is given by household utility (remember that bankers
cannot consume nor work before retiring), see eq. (8):
Wt = xdt
(
(Ct − hCt−1)1−σ
1− σ − χ
L1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
)
+ βWt+1 (91)
The overall amount of deposits is given by
Dt = QstS
c
t +QbtB
c
t +QatA
c
t −N ct . (92)
C.2 Model equations
Households.
%t = xdt(Ct − hCt−1)−σ (40)
%t = β%t+1Rt (41)
χLϕt xlt = (1− α)%tPptYt/Lt (42)
Dt =
κs
1− κs
(
Rt
Rbt
)−s
Bht (43)
R1−sht = κsR
1−s
t + (1− κs)R1−sbt (44)
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Goods and capital production.
Ypt = xptK
α
t−1L
1−α
t (45)
rpkt = αPptYt/Kt−1 (46)
Rst =
rpkt + (1− δ)Qst
Qst−1
(47)
Kt = xitIt + (1− δ)Kt−1 (48)
Qst = 1 +
χI
2
xit(It/It−1 − 1)2 + χIxit(It/It−1 − 1)It/It−1
=− Et
{
β%t+1
%t
χIxit+1(It+1/It − 1)(It+1/It)2
}
(49)
Retailer.
Ypt = DtYt (50)
Ft = PptYt + βγ
%t+1
%t
pi
p
t+1pi
−pκp
t Ft+1 (51)
Ht = Yt + βγ
%t+1
%t
pi
p−1
t+1 pi
κp(1−p)
t Ht+1 (52)
pi∗t =
p
p − 1
Ftpit
Ht
(53)
pi
1−p
t = γpi
κp(1−p)
t−1 + (1− γ)(pi∗t )1−p (54)
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Commercial banks.
µbt = ∆btµst (55)
µat = ∆atµst (56)
µst = β
%t+1
%t
Ωt+1(Rst+1 −Rt) (57)
µbt = β
%t+1
%t
Ωt+1(Rbt+1 −Rt) (58)
µat = β
%t+1
%t
Ωt+1(Rat+1 −Rt) (59)
νt = β
%t+1
%t
Ωt+1Rt (60)
Ξbt =
QbtB
c
t
QstSct
(61)
Ξat =
QatA
c
t
QstSct
(62)
φct =
QstS
c
t
N ct
(63)
φct =
νt
(1 + ∆btΞbt + ∆atΞat)(λc − µst) (64)
Ωt = 1− θc + θcνt
(
1 +
µst
λc − µst
)
(65)
N ct = θcN
c
t−1
[
Rt−1 + φct−1(Rkt −Rt−1)(1 + ∆bΞbt−1 + ∆aΞat−1)
]
/xnt
= + ωc
(
QstS
c
t−1 +QbtB
c
t−1 +QatA
c
t−1
)
(66)
Rbt =
rb +Qbt
Qbt−1
(67)
Rat =
ra +Qat
Qat−1
(68)
∆bt = ∆b exp{ηbBgt − ηsbSgt } (69)
∆at = ∆a exp{ηaAgt − ηsaSgt } (70)
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Wholesale banks.
µwt = Et
{
β
%t+1
%t
[
(1− θw)(Rst+1 −Rat) + θwφ
w
t+1
φwt
((Rst+1 −Rat)φwt +Rat)µwt+1
]}
(71)
νwt = Et
{
β
%t+1
%t
[
(1− θw)Rat + θw ((Rst+1 −Rat)φwt +Rat) νwt+1
]}
(72)
φwt =
QstS
w
t
Nwt
(73)
φwt =
νwt
λw − µwt
(74)
Nwt = θw[(Rst −Rat−1)φwt−1 +Rat−1]Nwt−1 + ωwQstSwt−1 (75)
Awt = (QstS
w
t −Nwt )/Qat (76)
Monetary policy.
Rtpit+1 = (Rt−1pit)
ρR
[
Rpi ·
(pit
pi
)κpi]1−ρR
xrt (77)
Sgt = −Ψpis(pit − pi) +K · xst (78)
Bgt = −Ψpib(pit − pi) +B · xbt (79)
Agt = −Ψpia(pit − pi) + Aw · xat. (80)
Market clearing.
Yt = Ct +Gt + It +
χI
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
It + τp(S
g
t + A
g
t +B
g
t ) (81)
Kt = S
c
t + S
w
t + S
h
t (82)
B = Bct +B
h
t (83)
Awt = A
c
t + A
g
t (84)
Shock processes.
log(xj,t) = ρj log(xj,t−1) + σjε
j
t , ∀j =
{
d, l, p, i, n, r, g, s, b, a
}
(85)
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Additional variables.
BSt = (QstS
g
t +QbtB
g
t +QatA
g
t ) /(12 · Y ) (86)
Rnt = Rtpit+1 (87)
prst = Rst+1/Rt (88)
prbt = Rbt+1/Rt (89)
prat = Rat+1/Rt (90)
Wt = xdt
(
(Ct − hCt−1)1−σ
1− σ − χ
L1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
)
+ βWt+1 (91)
Dt = QstS
c
t +QbtB
c
t +QatA
c
t −N ct (92)
D Log-linearised equations
I will use the fact that in steady state, pi = Qs = Qb = Qa throughout.
Households.
%ˆt = (1− βh)−1
[
xˆdt − βhxˆdt+1 − σ
1− h
(
Cˆt − hCˆt−1 − βh(Cˆt+1 − hCˆt)
)]
(40)∗
Rˆt = %ˆt − %ˆt+1 (41)∗
ϕLˆt = %ˆt + Pˆpt + Yˆt − Lˆt − xˆlt (42)∗
Dˆt = s(Rˆbt − Rˆt) + Bˆht (43)∗
RhRˆht = κsRRˆt + (1− κs)RbRˆbt (44)∗
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Good and capital production.
Yˆpt = xˆpt + (1− α)Lˆt + α
(
ξˆt + Kˆt−1
)
(45)∗
rˆpkt = Pˆpt + Yˆt − ξˆt − Kˆt−1 (46)∗
Rˆst = ξˆt − Qˆst−1 +R−1s
(
rpkrˆpkt + (1− δ)Qˆst
)
(47)∗
Kˆt = (I/K)Iˆt + (1− δ)
(
ξˆt + Kˆt−1
)
(48)∗
Qˆst = χI
(
Iˆt − Iˆt−1
)
− βχI
(
Iˆt+1 − Iˆt
)
(49)∗
Retailer.
Yˆpt = Dˆt + Yˆt (50)∗
Fˆt = (1− βγ)(Yˆt + Pˆp,t) + βγ
[
%ˆt+1 − %ˆt + p(pˆit+1 − κpˆit) + Fˆt+1
]
(51)∗
Hˆt = (1− βγ)Yˆt + βγ
[
%ˆt+1 − %ˆt + (p − 1)(pˆit+1 − κpˆit) + Hˆt+1
]
(52)∗
pˆi∗t = Fˆt + pˆit − Hˆt +
1
p − 1 ˆpt (53)
∗
pˆit = γκpˆit−1 + (1− γ)pi∗t (54)∗
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Commercial banks.
µˆbt = ∆ˆbt + µˆst (55)∗
µˆat = ∆ˆat + µˆst (56)∗
µˆst = %ˆt+1 − %ˆt + Ωˆt+1 + RsRˆst+1 −RRˆt
(Rs −R) (57)
∗
µˆbt = %ˆt+1 − %ˆt + Ωˆt+1 + RbRˆbt+1 −RRˆt
(Rb −R) (58)
∗
µˆat = %ˆt+1 − %ˆt + Ωˆt+1 + RaRˆat+1 −RRˆt
Ra −R (59)
∗
νˆt = %ˆt+1 − %ˆt + Ωˆt+1 +Rt (60)∗
Ξˆbt = Qˆbt + Bˆct − Sˆct − Qˆst (61)∗
Ξˆat = Qˆat + Aˆct − Sˆct − Qˆst (62)∗
φˆct = νˆt + ψˆt +
µs
λc − µs µˆst −
1
1 + ∆bΞb + ∆aΞa
(∆bΞbΞˆbt + ∆ΞaΞˆat) (63)∗
φˆct = Sˆ
c
t + Qˆst − Nˆ ct (64)∗
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Ωˆt = θc
(
1 +
µs
λc − µs
)
νˆt+1 + θc
λcµs
(λc − µs)2
µˆst+1 (65)∗
Nˆ ct = θc [R + φ
c(Rs −R)(1 + ∆bΞb + ∆aΞa)]
(
ˆN ct−1 − xˆnt
)
= + θc [1− φc(1 + ∆bΞb + ∆aΞa)]RRˆt−1
= + θcφ
c(Rs −R)(∆bΞbΞˆbt−1 + ∆aΞaΞˆat−1)
= + θc [φ
c(Rs −R)(1 + ∆bΞb + ∆aΞa)]
[
ˆφct−1 +
Rs
Rs −RRˆst − ψˆt−1
]
= + ωc/N
c
[
Sc(Qˆst + Sˆ
c
t−1) +B
c(Qˆbt + Bˆ
c
t−1) + A
c(Qˆat + Aˆ
c
t−1)
]
(66)∗
Rˆbt =
Qb
rb +Qb
Qˆbt − Qˆbt−1 (67)∗
Rˆat =
Qa
ra +Qa
Qˆat − Qˆat−1 (68)∗
∆ˆbt = ηbBˆ
g
t − ηsbSˆgt (69)∗
∆ˆat = ηaAˆ
g
t − ηsaSˆgt (70)∗
Wholesale banks.
µˆwt = %ˆt+1 − %ˆt +
θw(1− φw)νw − 1 + θw
µw
RaRˆat+1 +
1− θw + θwφwµw
µw
RsRˆst+1
= + θw [(Rs −Ra)φw +Ra]
(
ˆµwt+1 +
ˆφwt+1 − φˆwt
)
(71)∗
νˆwt = %ˆt+1 − %ˆt +
[1− θw + θwνw(1− φw)]
νw
RaRˆat+1
= + θwφ
wRsRˆst+1 + θw [(Rs −Ra)φw +Ra] ˆνwt+1 (72)∗
φˆwt = Qˆst + Sˆ
w
t − Nˆwt (73)∗
φˆwt = νˆ
w
t −
µw
λw − µw µˆ
w
t (74)∗
Nˆwt = θw[(Rs −Ra)φw +Ra] ˆNwt−1 + θwRsRˆst + θw(1− φw)RaRˆat−1
= + θw(Rs −Ra)φw ˆφwt−1 + ωw
Sw
Nw
(Qˆst + ˆSwt−1) (75)
∗
NwNˆwt = S
w(Qˆst + Sˆwt )− Aw(Qˆat + Aˆwt ) (76)∗
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Central Bank.
Rˆt + pˆit+1 = ρR(Rˆt−1 + pˆit) + (1− ρR)κpipˆit + xˆrt (77)∗
Sˆgt = −Ψpispˆit + xˆst (78)∗
Bˆgt = −Ψpibpˆit + xˆbt (79)∗
Aˆgt = −Ψpiapˆit + xˆat (80)∗
Market clearing and policy.
Y Yˆt = CCˆt + IIˆt +GGˆt + τKψˆt (81)∗
KKˆt = S
cSˆct t + S
hSˆht + S
wSˆwt + Sˆ
g
t (82)∗
0 = BcBˆct +B
hBˆht + Bˆ
g
t (83)∗
Aˆwt = Aˆ
c
t + Aˆ
g
t (84)∗
Shocks.
xˆjt = ρjxˆjt−1 + σjε
j
t , ∀j =
{
d, l, p, i, n, r, g, s, b, a
}
(85)∗
Additional variables.
B̂St =
(
Sˆgt + Bˆ
g
t + Aˆ
g
t
)
/(4 · Y ) (86)∗
Rˆnt = Rˆt + pˆit+1 (87)∗
pˆrst = Rˆst+1 − Rˆt (88)∗
pˆrbt = Rˆbt+1 − Rˆt (89)∗
pˆrat = Rˆat+1 − Rˆt (90)∗
Ŝavt =
[
R ·D · (Rˆt + Dˆt) +Rb ·Bh · (Rˆbt + Bˆht)
]
/(Sav ·Rh)
Wˆt = (1− β)xˆdt + 1W
[
(1− h)−σC1−σ(Cˆt − hCˆt−1)− χL1+ϕLˆt
]
+ βWˆt+1 (91)∗
DDˆt = S
c(Sˆct + Qˆst) +B
c(Bˆct + Qˆbt) + A
c(Aˆct + Qˆat)−N cNˆ ct (92)∗
wˆt = Pˆpt + Yˆt − Lˆt
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D.1 Steady states
I x the steady states ofRs−R,Rb−R,Ra−R, Ξb, Ξa, φc, φw, (Kh/K), (Bh/B),
and L. The parameters K , ∆b, ∆a, ωc, ωw, λc, λw, Kh, Bh, and χ are calibrated to
comply with the chosen values.
Moreover, I choose a zero (net) ination steady state, so pi = 1.
Set χ to get L: from (42), (40), (45)
χ = λw
Lϕ
= [(1−h)C]
−σ(1−α)PpY/L
Lϕ
= p−1
p
[(1−h)(Y−δK−G)]−σ(1−α)Y
L1+ϕ
Set ωc to get Rs −R
Set ∆b to get Rb −R: ∆b = Rb −R/Rs −R
Set ∆a to get Ra −R: ∆a = Ra −R/Rs −R
Set λc to get φc: λc = µs + νφc(1+∆bΞb+∆aΞa)
Set B to get Ξb: Ξb = (1−Bh/B)B[1−Sh/K−(1−Sh/K)/( 1−1/φwΞa +1)]K
, from (61), (83) and (82)
Set ωw to get φw: ωw = (1− θw [(Rs −Ra)φw +Ra]) /φw (75) and (73)
Ξa: (1− θw [(Rs −Ra)φw +Ra]) /φw, from (75) and (73)
Set λw to get φw: λw = µw + νw/φw, from (74)
D = 1, from (A.disp)
Qs = 1, from (49)
Qb = 1, from (67)
Qa = 1, from (68)
Pp = (p − 1)/p, from (FOC-P)
R = 1/β, from (41)
Rs – targeted (set K accordingly)
Rb – targeted (calibrate ∆b accordingly)
Ra – targeted (calibrate ∆a accordingly)
Rh – targeted (calibrate s accordingly)
L – targeted (calibrate χ accordingly)
φc – targeted (calibrate λc accordingly)
φw – targeted (calibrate ωw accordingly)
Ξb – targeted (calibrate ωc accordingly)
Ξa – targeted (calibrate λw accordingly)
Bh = Bh/B ·B – targeted (calibrate αs accordingly)
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K = (αPp/[Rs − 1 + δ])1/(1−α) L, from (47) and (45)
B = ΞbK
[
1− Sh/K −
(
1− Sh/K
)
/
(
1−1/φw
Ξa
+ 1
)]
/(1 − Bh/B), from
(61), Bh/B, (82), Sh/K , (76), (73), (62)
Sc = (K − Sh)/[1 + Ξa/(1− 1/φw)], from (82), Kh/K , (76), (73), (62)
Bc = B −Bh, from (83)
Y = KαL(1−α), from (45)
Yp = Y , from (50)
I = δK , from (48)
C = Y − I −G, from (81)
% = (1− βh)[(1− h)C]−σ, from (40)
rpk = αPpY/K , from (46)
F = PpY
1−βγ , from (51)
H = Y
1−βγ , from (52)
Ω = 1−θc
1−θc−θcβ(Rk−R)(1+∆bΞb+∆aΞa)φc , from (65)
µs = βΩ(Rs −R), from (57)
µb = βΩ(Rb −R), from (58)
µa = βΩ(Ra −R), from (59)
ν = Ω, from (60)
λc = µs +
ν
φc(1+∆bΞb+∆aΞa)
, from (64)
N c = Sc/φc, from (63)
µw =
β(1−θw)(Rs−Ra)
1−βθw[(Rs−Ra)φw+Ra] , from (71)
νw =
β(1−θw)Ra
1−βθw[(Rs−Ra)φw+Ra] , from (72)
λw = µw + νw/φw, from (74)
Ac = ΞaS
c, from (62)
Aw = Ac, from (84)
Sw = K −Kh −Kc, from (82)
Nw = Sw − Aw, from (76)
ωw =
1−θw[(Rs−Ra)φw+Ra]
φw
, from (75) and (73)
ωc =
N(1−θc[R+φc(Rs−R)(1+∆bΞb+∆aΞa)])
K+B+Ac
, from (66)
D = Sc +Bc + Ac −N c, from (92)
κs =
[
1 + (R/Rb)
−sBh/D
]−1, from (43)
s is obtained from (44)
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Additional variables.
prs = Rs/R
prb = Rb/R
pra = Ra/R
W =
[
[(1−h)C]1−σ
1−σ − χL
1+ϕ
1+ϕ
]
/(1− β)
D.2 Data used for calibration
All values are calibrated using samples from 2009m1(q1) to 2015m12(q4).
Steady-state leverage of commercial banks. The value of φc is set to the (Tot-
Loans)/TotCap, where
• TotLoans: BSI.M.U2.N.U.A20.A.1.U2.2000.Z01.E = “Loans vis-a-vis euro area
non-MFI reported by MFI in the euro area (stock)”
• TotCap: BSI.M.U2.N.A.L60.X.1.Z5.0000.Z01.E = “Capital and reserves, reported
by MFI excluding ESCB (stock)”
Steady-state share of bonds held by households. I deneBh/B as 1−Bc/B,
where the latter is the 2009-2015 average of the annual series
• GFS.A.N.I8.W2.S13.S122.C.L.LE.GD.T._Z.XDC_R_B1GQ._T.F.V.N._T = “Gov-
ernment debt held by other monetary nancial institutions (as % of GDP)”
By this I subsume all other holders of government debt (foreign agents, house-
holds, non-deposit issuing nancial sector, central bank) into Bh.
Government spending over GDP. G/Y is set as the average of nominal gov-
ernment consumption, GCR×GCD, over nominal GDP, YER×YED, from the area-
wide model database (see Fagan, Henry, and Mestre, 2001).
Loan and bond spread. To calibrate the spread of both loan rate and govern-
ment yields to deposit rate, I use the 2009-15 average of the series Remps , R
emp
b and
Remp (1.03541; 1.02833; 1.01295), which are taken from, respectively,
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• MIR.M.U2.B.A2A.F.R.0.2240.EUR.N = “Credit and other institutions (MFI ex-
cept MMFs and central banks) reporting sector - Rate on loans other than re-
volving loans and overdrafts, convenience and extended credit card debt, Up to
1 year initial rate xation, Up to and including EUR 1 million amount”
• FM.M.U2.EUR.4F.BB.U2_10Y.YLD = “Euro area 10-year Government Bench-
mark bond yield - Yield”
• MIR.M.U2.B.L23.D.R.A.2250.EUR.N = “Credit and other institutions (MFI ex-
cept MMFs and central banks) reporting sector - Rate on deposits redeemable
at notice (up to 3 months period of notice)”
The spreads are then obtained as (Rj −R) = (Rempj −Remp)/4 for j = {b, s}, and
∆b = (Rb −R)/(Rs −R).
Bonds and nancial assets relative to loans. To calibrate the steady state
shares Ξb and Ξa, I use the 2009-2016 average of the following series as stand-ins
for QstSct , QbtBct and QatAct , respectively:
• BSI.M.U2.N.A.A20.A.1.U2.2240.EUR.E = “Euro area (changing composition),
Outstanding amounts at the end of the period (stocks), MFIs excluding ESCB
reporting sector - Loans, Total maturity, Euro - Euro area (changing compo-
sition) counterpart, Non-Financial corporations (S.11) sector, denominated in
Euro, data Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted”
• BSI.M.U2.N.A.A30.A.1.U2.2100.Z01.E = “Euro area (changing composition),
Outstanding amounts at the end of the period (stocks), MFIs excluding ESCB
reporting sector - Debt securities held, Total maturity, All currencies combined
- Euro area (changing composition) counterpart, General Government sector,
denominated in Euro, data Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted”
• BSI.M.U2.N.A.A30.A.1.U2.1000.EUR.E = “Euro area (changing composition),
Outstanding amounts at the end of the period (stocks), MFIs excluding ESCB
reporting sector - Debt securities held, Total maturity, Euro - Euro area (chang-
ing composition) counterpart, Monetary nancial institutions (MFIs) sector, de-
nominated in Euro, data Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted”
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Household holdings of deposits and government bonds. The data are only
used for comparison, the value of κs is implied by steady state relationships.
• QSA.A.N.I8.W0.S1M.S1.N.A.F.F2._Z._Z.XDC_R_POP._T.S.V.CY._T = “Currency
and deposits of households, per capita. Euro area 19 (xed composition), report-
ing institutional sector Households and non prot institutions serving house-
holds (NPISH)”
• QSA.A.N.I8.W0.S1M.S1.N.A.F.F6._Z._Z.XDC_R_POP._T.S.V.CY._T = “Insurance,
pension and standardized guarantee schemes of households, per capita. Euro
area 19 (xed composition), reporting institutional sector Households and non
prot institutions serving households (NPISH)”
D.3 Other results
D.3.1 Replication of GK13 results
With my model, I am able to replicate very closely the dynamics after an unex-
pected shock to loan and bond purchases as described in Gertler and Karadi (2013,
"GK13"). Figure 46 shows the responses to several economic variables after un-
expected purchases of government bonds, along with a commitment to keep the
zero-lower bound binding for another four periods. To introduce the ZLB, I replace
equation (77) by
Rtpit+1 = zt · 0 + (1− zt) · (Rt−1pit)ρR
[
Rpi ·
(pit
pi
)κpi
(Pp/Ppt)
κy
]1−ρR
xrt
log(zt) = log(zt−1) + εst − εst−4 + εbt − εbt−4 + εat − εat−4,
or, log-linearised,
Rˆt + pˆit+1 = (1− zˆt)
[
ρz(Rˆt−1 + pˆit) + (1− ρz)
(
κpipˆit − κyPˆpt + xˆrt
)]
zˆt = zˆt−1 + εst − εst−4 + εbt − εbt−4 + εat − εat−4.
So a shock to asset purchases will also trigger zero movement in the policy rate
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for four periods (quarters). The calibration follows GK13 and takes one period to
be a quarter, so the ZLB is in eect for one year. The result shows that shutting
o the nancial assets and changing calibration, my model dynamics are in eect
very comparable to GK13.
Figure 46: Comparison to IRFs from Gertler and Karadi (2013)
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Notes: Impulse responses to unexpected purchases of bonds (εbt ) in Gertler and Karadi
(2013, "GK13") and my model. Both depict deterministic simulations with a zero-lower
bound for 4 periods after the unexpected purchases. Calibration follows GK13. Their model
is reproduced using a slightly adjusted version from the Macroeconomic Model Data Base,
see Wieland, Cwik, Müller, Schmidt, and Wolters (2012) – I mainly undo the changes from
the MMDB to the original code.
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D.3.2 More results from sensitivity analysis
Another parameter for which I have no good empirical measure is the aggregate
steady-state leverage ratio in the wholesale banking sector, φw. However, as Figure
47 shows, the dynamics and quantitative results are not very sensitive to changes
in that parameter: For a variation between 75 and 125% of the baseline value of
10, the eect on output will be changed by less than 10 basis points up or down,
or be within a [87.5%, 112.5%] interval. Still, the expansionary eect of the loan
purchases does not turn negative within the 40-periods horizon considered here
for the case of a low leverage of 7.5 (implying stronger nancial-accelerator eects
through the bank-lending channel), while it will undershoot for all larger values
of steady-state leverage φw.
Figure 47: Sensitivity analysis: variation of φw
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Note: Impulse responses to an AR(1) loan-purchase shock xst with persistence 0.9755.
Similarly, I have checked that variation of the following parameters has no
strong impact on model dynamics: variation of of the survival rate of wholesale
banker, θw, between 0.5 and 0.95 (Figure 48), of the interest-rate spread Rs − R
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between 0.004 and 0.007 (Figure 49), of the steady-state commercial-bank holdings
of government bonds and nancial assets over loans, Ξb and Ξa, between 0.25 and
0.5 (not shown). The results do not seem to be very sensitive to changes in these
parameters, even though these are substantial and cover the range of values that
the parameter could realistically take.
Figure 48: Sensitivity analysis: variation of θw
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Note: Impulse responses to an AR(1) loan-purchase shock xst with persistence 0.9755.
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Figure 49: Sensitivity analysis: variation of Rs −R
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Note: Impulse responses to an AR(1) loan-purchase shock xst with persistence 0.9755.
D.4 ESCB asset purchasing programmes
This subsection presents a short overview of the ESCB’s APPs.
All asset purchases are conditional on the ination outlook (analogous to con-
ventional monetary policy conduct), however, ECB has announced targets of their
overall size. While no concrete breakdown of the announced €60bn of monthly
purchases was given, ECB has communicated that the purchases of the second
round of purchases started in January 22, 2015 (“Extended APP”) will be struc-
tured similarly to the ones in the rst round, i.e. with a stronger weight on public
sector debt than nancial assets. Direct intermediation by buying corporate sector
debt (CSPP) was only introduced in June 2016. Figure 50 gives an overview of the
size of APPs since the start of the programme.
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Figure 50: APPs on the ESCB balance sheet
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Source: ECB’s Statistical Data Warehouse. See Appendix D.4 for details on the ESCB
APPs.
Round 1 (2009 to 2011)
Covered Bond Purchase Programmes (1 and 2). From 2009-10, ESCB bought
€60bn worth of covered bonds over one year. From 2011-12, ESCB announced pur-
chases of up to €40bn worth of covered bonds in the second CBPP (around €16bn
were bought). Covered bonds are very safe, as they have preferential rights in case
issuer becomes insolvent. Stated goal: to bring ination closer to 2%.
SecuritiesMarkets Programme. From May 2010 to September 2012, ESCB un-
dertook interventions in the public and private debt securities markets "to ensure
depth and liquidity in those markets" (€210bn).
Round 2: Extended APP (2014 to today)
Common denomination for CBPP3, ABSPP and PSPP. Initiated to “to address the
risks of a too prolonged period of low ination” (see ECB homepage). Purchases of
€80 billion (from March 2015 to March 2016: €60bn). Intended initially to be carried
out until the end of March 2017, extended until end of December 2017.
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Covered Bond Purchase Programme 3. Since October 20, 2014 (announced
September 4), there is a third programme, scheduled for two years.
Asset-Backed Securities Purchase Programme. Since November 21, 2014,
ESCB buys asset-backed securities on primary and secondary markets.
Public Sector Purchase Programme. Announced on January 22, 2015, and
started in March 9, 2015, ESCB buys €60bn worth of bonds issued by EA central
governments, agencies and European institutions, at residual maturities of two to
30 years.
Corporate Sector Purchase Programme. Since June 8, 2016, ESCB buys high-
quality bonds of European corporate rms.
[Outright Monetary Transactions]
Announced, never triggered. The potential purchases of securities related to ECB
President Draghi’s "whatever it takes" speech (September 2012). Any government
bonds of countries in European Financial Stability Facility/European Stability Mech-
anism (EFSF/ESM) programme are eligible, no limits have been specied.
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